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ABSTRACT 
 
  
 Catholic health care faces a difficult challenge in today’s secular society.  
Because they are directed by the teachings of the Catholic Church, certain services, 
such as abortion, sterilization and contraception, cannot be provided at Catholic health 
care facilities.  This limitation on services has placed Catholic health care providers at 
odds with many in the communities which they serve.  This conflict was exacerbated 
in the 1990s during the active period of mergers and acquisitions which left some 
communities with only one hospital, which was now Catholic.  These moral conflicts 
often seem intractable. 
 This dissertation examines the nature of moral conflict and how these conflicts 
might be resolved.  Many times when moral conflicts seem intractable we are pressed 
to compromise.  But in countenancing moral compromise there is usually concern over 
the loss of integrity.  After examining the nature and importance of integrity to the 
resolution of intractable moral conflict (and when moral compromise might be 
countenanced), the conflicts over reproductive services at Catholic hospitals are 
addressed.  In many of these conflicts moral compromise is found to not preserve 
integrity and so we are left to examine how Catholic moral theology addresses these 
conflicts.   
 Finally, the teachings of the Catholic Church on contraception, sterilization 
and abortion are explored and applied to some ‘tough’ cases present at Catholic 
hospitals.  Despite what is often understood about Catholic teaching in these areas, I 
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show that Catholic moral teaching provides the tools to deal with these conflicts and, 
in some cases, can manage ‘compromise.’ 
 vi
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1.  THE SCENE IN 21ST CENTURY CATHOLIC HEALTH CARE 
 
 Life at the beginning of the twenty-first century is anything but uncomplicated. 
We find ourselves craving simplicity while simultaneously living lives made more and 
more complex by advances in technology and science as well as social changes –
ironically, the advances are all intended to make life simpler.  In part due to the 
complexities of modern life, we also live in a time of inevitable moral conflict.  Our 
heterogeneous society has plural and conflicting values.  How are we to manage the 
inevitable conflicts?  At one time it might have been hoped that a moral theory, 
unified and universal – the ‘Holy Grail’ at the end of what Richard Rorty calls the 
‘Platonic Quest’ – could take the day.  But despite 2500 years of this quest, the unified 
and universal moral theory eludes us.  Other approaches to conflict resolution include 
force, persuasion, rational argumentation, emotional appeals, bargaining and 
compromises.  In bargaining and compromises, the implication is that we will have to 
give a little, but we will also get a little in return or in exchange.  In these cases, we 
find many conflicts are reducible to exchangeable interests.
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 But there are some compromises that do not, or perhaps should not, admit to 
exchangeable interests.  These are conflicts that have at their base of disagreement 
deeply held and long-standing beliefs, principles and commitments, that is to say, 
moral values.  When discussing these types of interests, we usually reject compromise 
because we see it as a form of betrayal – betrayal of both ourselves and our causes, 
and that somehow, by betraying ourselves in that way we show a lack of integrity.  
This loss of integrity manifests itself as an apparent unwillingness to stand behind our 
principles, beliefs and commitments when it involves great difficulty for ourselves. 
 What of conflicts that go beyond two individuals?  What about conflicts that 
involve two or more groups of individuals, corporations, or causes?  When assessing 
these conflicts and their proposed resolutions, we must closely examine the arguments 
in support of each position, as well as the overall integrity of these positions.  Next, 
one might discuss how groups go about acting with integrity with regard to these 
beliefs.  At some point in these seemingly intractable conflicts, perhaps compromises 
will be suggested.  As many initially rebuff these suggestions, the next step might be 
to determine if there are some compromises that are morally permissible and which 
preserve integrity. 
 This dissertation will examine the nature of intractable moral conflicts and the 
moral compromises to which they might direct us.  Because compromise is often 
rejected in favor of preserving one’s integrity, the notion of integrity must be 
investigated.  This will help us determine what moral space exists in which we might 
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enter moral compromises which preserve integrity.  This investigation will be 
illuminated by an in-depth discussion of reproductive issues that involve Catholic 
health care providers and the Ethical and Religious Directives for Catholic Health 
Care Services1 under which all Catholic health care providers must operate.  In 
mergers and acquisitions where the facility maintains or takes on the Catholic identity, 
the Directives are in effect, and as a result, certain reproductive services are no longer 
offered.  This is especially problematic in areas where the Catholic facility is the sole 
provider in the area.  The following vignette will give us a taste of the types of 
conflicts that result from the mergers and acquisitions involving Catholic health care 
facilities. 
 
I. CLAIRE’S CASE 
 Claire lives in a rural town in Florida.  The only hospital in her community is a 
facility that has recently merged with a Catholic hospital system to gain market share 
and secure the benefits of larger purchasing power.  The facility now operates under 
the Catholic Church’s Directives for health care, a change not known to Claire.  Claire 
is 22 weeks pregnant and her blood pressure is dangerously high.  She has been on bed 
rest for six weeks with no reduction in her blood pressure.  Claire’s life is at risk if she 
chooses to continue the pregnancy because a stroke is a real possibility.  She has the 
                                                 
1 United States Conference of Catholic Bishops, Ethical and Religious Directives for Catholic 
Health Care Services, Fourth Edition (Washington, D.C.: United States Conference of 
Catholic Bishops, Inc, 2001).  Hereafter abbreviated as Directives or ERDs. 
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option of prematurely delivering by C-section or having an abortion.  To complicate 
matters the results of her alpha fetal protein (AFP) test indicated a greater than normal 
risk of a fetus with Downs Syndrome.  Her options are limited at her hospital because 
abortion is proscribed by the Catholic Directives.  Furthermore, Claire does not wish 
to deliver the baby at this point in her pregnancy.  Chances for the baby’s survival are 
virtually nonexistent and Claire does not believe that she can handle the stress of 
giving birth only to watch her baby die.  Claire is left with the only option of traveling 
eighty miles by ambulance to the nearest facility that will perform an abortion.  Or is 
she?  As we shall see, due to common misperceptions of the Directives, this case 
might turn out differently than expected. 
 
II. WHAT’S BEHIND CLAIRE’S CASE 
 That Catholic healthcare organizations and providers are directed by the 
Ethical and Religious Directives for Catholic Health Care Services “to remain faithful 
to their mission of healing carried out in the name of Christ and to offer healthcare to 
the community at large as a means of providing for the common good of the 
community”2 is certainly at odds in many ways with both the ‘business’ of health care 
and our pluralistic society at the beginning of the twenty-first century.  Unlike the 
cloistered religious who have a calling to serve the larger community by withdrawing 
from it and leading a life of prayer, Roman Catholics hold that all others must be in 
                                                 
2 Jean de Blois and Kevin O’Rourke, “Healthcare and Social Responsibility,” Health Progress 
May (1995):1. 
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the world to serve Christ.  Christians are instructed, “You must be in the world but not 
of the world.”  While this tension is not new, the commodification of health care since 
the latter half of the twentieth century is new, and Catholic health care institutions find 
themselves struggling to stay financially viable in a radically changing economic 
environment.  A common practice among both public and religiously affiliated 
hospitals in the 1960s and 1970s was what was called ‘cost shifting.’  This is a means 
whereby the costs paid by private pay patients subsidize the care that is provided to 
indigents, for whose treatment little or no reimbursement will be collected.  But in the 
1980s, the face of health care changed with the growth of managed health care plans.  
Now the Catholic hospitals’ problems were twofold: they had to organize to become 
players in the managed care networks being developed, and they had to find means of 
funding indigent care because cost shifting was no longer possible with the reduced 
reimbursement from managed care.  This situation has become dire for many Catholic 
hospitals, and the choices are all less than ideal.  Some hospitals are left to decide to 
either sell-out to for-profit corporations or close their doors for good – in the words of 
the former president of the National Daughters of Charity System, Sister Irene Kraus, 
“no margin, no mission.”3 
 Two ways in particular that Catholic health care facilities have remained viable 
are through mergers with other not-for-profit hospitals and mergers with or 
acquisitions by for-profit corporations.  Neither of these two options is without serious 
                                                 
3 Gloria Shur Bilchik.  “When The Saints Go Marching Out: Is American Health Care Losing 
Its Religion?” Hospitals & Health Network vol. 72, no. 10:36. 
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problems.  Should these mergers or acquisitions result in the hospital relinquishing its 
Catholic affiliation, then from the point of view of the Church the mission is lost; 
should that very hospital retain its Catholic-sounding name but not maintain its 
Catholic affiliation, then the possibility exists for misunderstandings, confusions, and 
even scandal from the point of view of the community.  In cases where the institution 
retains its Catholic affiliation – its identity – the merged or acquired facilities are 
contractually bound to comply with the Ethical and Religious Directives for Catholic 
Health Care Services, a document of seventy-two directives authored by the National 
Conference of Catholic Bishops (NCCB) and most recently revised in 2001. 
 In cases where the Catholic identity is retained, other conflicts with regard to 
the mission of Catholic health care as well as adverse effects on the community arise, 
two of which are paramount to the subject of this work: first, the disparate underlying 
philosophies of for-profit health care and Catholic health care and second, the drastic 
curtailment of reproductive services offered to the community.  The adverse effects 
can range from a reduction of indigent care to situations like Claire’s.  In Claire’s 
case, some might be inclined to say that this is just an unfortunate situation for Claire 
and not the stuff of deep moral conflicts.  But whether one considers health care to be 
a market commodity or a social good greatly affects how patients are treated and what 
services are provided them.  Exacerbating this problem is the fact that the largest not-
for-profit provider in this country is religiously affiliated (Catholic) and places 
restrictions on services which it finds morally objectionable.  
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III. FOR-PROFIT OR NOT-FOR-PROFIT?  
 To further grasp the first of these two conflicts, consider one of the normative 
principles that guide the Directives: 
...the biblical mandate to care for the poor requires us to express this in 
concrete action at all levels of Catholic health care.  This mandate 
prompts us to work to ensure that our country’s health care delivery 
system provides adequate health care for the poor.  In Catholic 
institutions, particular attention should be given to the health care 
needs of the poor, the uninsured and the underinsured.4 
 
This principle seems contrary to the goals of a for-profit corporation, which by design 
must ultimately and primarily be accountable to its shareholders.  But those within 
Catholic health care who support such acquisitions contend that care for the indigent 
has remained at or above pre-acquisition rates, and further, that care in general has not 
been adversely affected.  Most importantly, they say, by financially stabilizing the 
facility as well as agreeing to abide by the Ethical and Religious Directives, the for-
profit corporation has enabled the Catholic health care providers to fulfill their 
mission.  Others within the Catholic community believe that the disparate guiding 
philosophies of the mission of Catholic Health Care Providers, placing the patient first 
and for-profit corporations, placing profits first, are not so neatly reconciled despite 
the fact that, thus far, these disparate philosophies have not proven, in practice, to be 
irreconcilable.  John Kavanaugh, S.J., reports on the changing milieu at a faith-based, 
not-for-profit hospital, “which seems forced by the logic of capitalist competition to 
                                                 
4  Ethical and Religious Directives for Catholic Health Care Services, Fourth Edition, Part 
One. 
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act more and more like a for-profit organization.”5  Many of these hospitals are forced 
to cut any unprofitable services that affect their competitive edge; often pastoral care 
is that unprofitable service.  At one hospital, the pastoral care department reports that 
they no longer: 
• have 24-hour priest backup for sacraments, 
• see same-day surgery patients before surgery, 
• provide regular coverage to the emergency room, 
• provide regular coverage to psychiatric patients, 
• do routine follow-up visits to inpatients, 
• make pre-op visits to cardiac patients, 
• provide regular coverage to maternity patients, 
• have chaplains distributing Communion to inpatients, 
• make the Eucharist available on Saturdays, 
• celebrate 6:30 a.m. Mass during the week, and 
• provide regular coverage to families awaiting serious cardiac procedures.6  
 
 The issue of whether Catholic Hospitals can fulfill their mission when 
purchased by a for-profit corporation can be framed as part of the larger question of 
whether health care should be treated as another marketplace product.  Positions on 
this differ both within the Catholic Church and in the non-sectarian domain.  Jean de 
Blois, the director of missions and senior associate for ethics at the Catholic Hospital 
Association, makes the stronger claim that health care is a basic human right like 
education or food.  She says all three are “basic and universal human needs that must 
be met to some degree if persons are to have reasonably satisfying and fulfilling
                                                 
5 John Kavanaugh, “Capitalism’s Cost to Care; Decline of Chaplaincy at Privatized Catholic 
Hospitals,” America vol. 178, no. 8 (1998):37. 
6 Ibid., 37.  This is only a portion of the complete list. 
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 lives.”7  The lack of vision in seeing these similarities perpetuates the myth that 
health care is just another commodity on the market.  As such, this maintains the 
connection between health care and affluence and perpetuates the plight of the poor 
and under-served.  De Blois says that we should not treat health care as a commodity 
but rather accept it as a social good. 
 Additionally, when speaking of health care within the context of Catholic 
Health Care Services, de Blois claims that rather than a job, business or profession, 
Catholic Health Care is a ministry.  “Ministry is a response in faith to the call to be, as 
Jesus was, a presence of radical healing in the world on behalf of the reign of God.”8  
She sees Catholic health care as situated within the broader American health care 
system and within society as a strong and influential presence that offers services that 
reflect and promote values of the Catholic tradition while addressing social, political 
and other forces that undermine the health and well-being of all persons.  De Blois’ 
statement about ministry seems quite foreign when juxtaposing it to the notion of 
profession.  After all, even if health care were provided in a socialized system, many 
of the caregivers would be considered professionals.  What differentiates a ministry 
from a job, business or profession is how it is situated in one’s life.  In ministry, one 
no longer lives for self but for God; this is manifested by service to others.  So one 
may still make a livelihood from one’s ministry but it is how this livelihood is situated  
                                                 
7 Jean de Blois, “Can For-Profit Hospitals be Catholic?” Panel Discussion, National Catholic 
Reporter vol. 34, no. 6 (December 5, 1997):20. 
8 Ibid., 20. 
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within one’s life that is important.  With this understanding, ministry would preclude 
injustice.   
 Others within the Catholic Health Care System see the concerns about health 
care as a commodity and the view of Catholic healthcare as a ministry as real and 
important; however, those already situated in systems that face dire decisions take a 
more sober view of the situation.  James Clifton, the director of pastoral care at St. 
Joseph Hospital in Omaha, Nebraska, tells of their experiences.  Founded in 1870 by 
the Sisters of Mercy, St. Joseph Mercy Hospital served the poor and trained health 
care providers in the Catholic tradition.  In 1977, they built a new hospital and clinic, 
placing it near Omaha’s central city.  By that time most other hospitals had moved to 
the suburbs or had closed their doors.  This left St. Joseph providing more care to the 
under-served while carrying massive debt for the new buildings.  By the early 1980s, 
they were left with the decision to either stop providing care to the indigent or to close 
their doors.  They were approached by American Medical International, one of the 
companies that would later become Tenet Corporation.  Thirteen years after their 
acquisition by the for-profit Tenet, St. Joseph boasts the following: 
• The hospital has maintained or increased its support for training students in 
medicine, pharmacy, nursing and allied health professions, 
• Residency programs have held steady or grown, 
• They have maintained the highest ratio of chaplains-to-patients of any hospital 
in the region, 
• They have never experienced a conflict with AMI or Tenet related to hospital’s 
adherence to Catholic teaching, 
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• They have maintained and actually increased commitment to indigent 
care...consistently providing more than half of the area’s indigent care...9 
 
 Another problem often cited in this discussion is the question of the real 
distinction between for-profit hospitals and not-for-profit hospitals.  In both the 
market and profitability determine what services will be offered.  If not-for-profit 
hospitals make their decisions solely in that manner, then they can not claim to have a 
corner on the market of caring for the poor and defending the sacredness of human 
life.  Catholic health care cannot merely claim that not-for-profit status resolves the 
problems inherent in for-profit hospitals.  However, the proposition that a Catholic 
hospital, being true to the values of serving the poor and protecting the sacredness of 
human life, can be operated by a for-profit company, which by definition can embrace 
these values only as market decisions and not as first principles, seems dubious.  
 At this point several questions arise.  Is there a way to reconcile these disparate 
philosophies?  Can Catholic health care facilities maintain their integrity and values 
under the rapidly changing circumstances of our economy and society?  Unless radical 
changes take place, Catholic health care must accept that health care has been 
commodified in this society and work within that system.  As alluded to earlier, some 
have blamed the necessity of working within that system as the motivation for the 
“merger-mania” we saw peak at the end of the 1990s.  Others might maintain that at 
least the market system fosters excellence in the field and drives out the mediocre.    
                                                 
9 James Clifton, “Can For-Profit Hospitals be Catholic?” Panel Discussion, National Catholic 
Reporter vol. 34, no. 6 (December 5, 1997):20. 
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IV. REPRODUCTIVE SERVICES 
 The second major conflict resulting from Catholic hospital mergers occurs in 
cases where the merged facility becomes the sole provider in a given area.  If the 
facility remains identified as a Catholic health care facility, then it must abide by the 
Ethical and Religious Directives which significantly curtail the reproductive services 
that can be provided.  The Ethical and Religious Directives proscribe the following 
range of reproductive services, listed in what might be considered by many, including 
many Catholics, the least to the most morally troubling: the distribution of emergency 
contraception in cases of rape, all artificial forms of birth control, sterilizations, many 
fertility procedures, and abortion.  By virtue of the hospital’s mission, these services 
to which the members have a legal right are now excluded.  Moreover, in some cases, 
forgoing any one of these services may have serious health consequences.  In effect, 
people in the community are now forced to travel out of their area to procure these 
services.  One might ask if this is merely a matter of inconvenience or if it makes 
members of a given community virtually unable to obtain these services.  In some 
cases, for those without means of transportation or the ability to pay someone to 
transport them, this is more than just an inconvenience.  Some might be inclined to say 
that Claire is just in an unfortunate situation, that this is merely a case of hard luck.  
Others might claim that this is a conspiracy masterminded by the hierarchy of the 
Catholic Church to systematically reduce women’s access to reproductive services.  
More moderate voices might say that there is a basic issue of justice: why should a 
woman be deprived of a legally secured right by virtue of where she lives, or more 
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pointedly, because of the economics behind the hospitals in her region?  Other 
moderate voices might claim that this is an issue of religious freedom, the freedom to 
follow one’s conscience, and the freedom from providing a service one finds morally 
objectionable.   
 While many see this as an inter-communal conflict between the Catholic and 
non-Catholic communities, the intra-communal conflict within the Catholic Church on 
these issues should not be overlooked.  Some questions in this regard may be beyond 
the scope of this work; however, their existence may shed light on how the inter-
communal conflicts might be resolved by moral compromise. 10 
     A. Intra-communal Conflicts within the Catholic Church 
   The Catholic Church’s teaching on sexual morality is not obscure.  “It can be 
summarized concisely and clearly.  Human sexual acts have two intrinsic and natural 
ends or purposes: the procreation and education of children, and the union in love of  
                                                 
10  It is not to be implied that the proscription of services of the Ethical and Religious 
Directives is limited to reproductive services but may affect whether the hospital can comply 
with certain advance directives as well.  Traditionally, where the position of the Catholic 
Church has differed most radically from the secular community is on beginning-of-life and 
end-of-life issues.  Certainly in places where physician-assisted suicide is permissible, this 
would be proscribed by the ERD.  In the future, this might be the more telling problem.  
Stanley Hauerwas says, “Maybe in the future we will be able to tell Christians by the fact that 
they don’t kill their babies or their old” (personal conversation).  Physician-assisted suicide 
would be an option for twice the number of people, and the fact that those accounting for this 
increase are male might bring the issue to the fore earlier and with greater force than women’s 
access to reproductive services. 
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Partners.”11  However, many sources emphasize the former, often to the detriment of 
the latter.   A popular undergraduate textbook in applied ethics stresses,  
“That the Roman Catholic Church believes that the natural purpose of 
sex is reproduction is well known.  Equally well known is one 
consequence that the church draws from that belief – that artificial 
means of birth control are immoral.  Less well know are other, related, 
beliefs that are also directly related to sexual morality... – the ability to 
engage in fully human love...fully human love does not stop at 
romantic love; it naturally evolves into parental love.”12 
 
The Catholic Church’s position on sexual morality and associated issues has remained 
historically constant13 and is philosophically grounded in natural law.  This moral 
basis for decisions on reproductive issues is then employed to address new medical 
ethical issues that result from advances in medical technology.  This is not to imply 
that all members of the Church wholeheartedly embrace these teachings.  In June 
1964, Pope Paul VI formed a commission to study questions in dispute about marriage 
and birth control.  The Pope was ostensibly looking for certainty in this teaching and 
used this justification in October 1966 for the continued work of the commission.  
This period of apparent indecision led many to conclude that there was doubt 
regarding traditional church teaching.  But striking down a traditional Church  
                                                 
11 Lisa Sowle Cahill, “Catholic Sexual Teaching: Context, Function, and Authority,” in 
Vatican Authority and American Catholic Dissent, The Curran Case and its Consequences, 
ed. William W. May (New York: Crossroads Publishing, 1987). 187.  Some might question 
the suggested limitation on parents’ responsibility to children; however, at this point the 
inclusion of ‘education’ in this statement shows the abiding responsibility of human sexual 
acts. 
12 Jeffrey Olen and Vincent Barry, Applying Ethics; a Text with Readings, Sixth Edition 
(Belmont, CA: Wadsworth Publishing Company, 1999):76. 
13 Allowing that there has been considerable debate on the teachings of Thomas Aquinas 
regarding ‘quickening’ and the ‘ensoulment of the fetus’ and the implications of this on the 
Church’s prohibition of abortion. 
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teaching based on natural law is no small matter.  Despite the commission’s majority 
opinion that did not uphold the traditional norms forbidding the use of birth control 
(within sacramental marriages), Pope Paul VI in the encyclical Humanae Vitae (1968) 
overrode the majority and proscribed the use of artificial birth control.14  This 
encyclical prompted a statement from a group of theologians, whose numbers grew to 
over 600, “recognizing that in theory and in practice Roman Catholics could dissent 
from the specific conclusion of the encyclical condemning artificial contraception.”15  
This was one of the signals of the American Catholic Church’s growing dissent with 
the Roman Catholic Church.   This also accompanied changes in approaches to moral 
theology that resulted in a pluralism of Catholic moral theology.  What stands out 
most starkly is that, by and large, Catholics disregard the official church teaching on 
artificial birth control.16 
 There are numerous published reports as well as personal accounts from both 
those who practice health care in Catholic facilities, and ‘practicing’ Catholics in 
secular institutions whose practice standards do not coincide with the Directives.  One 
woman, a devout Catholic and nurse practitioner specializing in women’s health, is 
employed at a community health department.  There her responsibilities include 
family planning as well as care for obstetrical patients.  As part of her family planning 
                                                 
14 Richard A. McCormick, Notes on Moral Theology 1965 through 1980 (Washington, D.C.: 
University Press of America, Inc., 1981):210-13. 
15 Charles E. Curran, Transition and Tradition in Moral Theology (Notre Dame, IN: Notre 
Dame Press, 1979):v. 
16 Benedict M. Ashley, OP and Kevin D. O’Rourke, OP.  Health Care Ethics: A Theological 
Analysis, Fourth Edition (Washington, D.C.: Georgetown University Press, 1997):285. 
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duties, she prescribes and dispenses artificial birth control to her patients.  She 
believes she is living her faith by helping to prevent the greater evil of abortion. 
 Another Catholic, a physician who specializes in infertility and practices in a 
secular institution, explains that, while he performs in vitro fertilization (a procedure 
proscribed by the Directives), he will only fertilize the number of eggs that will be 
implanted during one procedure and he will not freeze any fertilized eggs for later use. 
He hastens to add that he informs his patients of these self-imposed practice 
limitations and explains he is compelled to do this as a sign of his respect for the 
sacredness of human life.  But some might question whether he has fully taken into 
moral consideration the additional cycles of ovulatory stimulants and retrievals that 
this woman and her partner may have to go through if there is no pregnancy resulting 
from this round of in vitro attempts.   
 Other published accounts in publications as diverse as Playboy and the 
Canadian, Chatelaine (a sort-of Canadian version of our Better Homes and Garden 
magazine), discuss loopholes as well as clandestine disregard for the Directives.  
Playboy reports that a rape victim taken to a Catholic facility in rural California is 
neither counseled about, nor given, emergency contraception in the ER.  “She got the 
pills in the parking lot, in a paper bag, in the dark – standard operating procedures so 
long as the bishop doesn’t find out.”17   
 In Canada, a physician with privileges at both the Catholic and secular 
                                                 
17 Stephen Rae, “Thy Will Be Done: Hospital Mergers Leave No Choice,” Playboy, vol. 45, 
no. 4 (April 1998):50. 
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hospitals in his town decides to perform an abortion on a woman who is eight weeks 
pregnant at ‘Saint X’ because to get her on the waiting list at ‘Crosstown General’ 
might delay the procedure long enough that it would require an operating room 
surgical abortion.  Having once been reprimanded by hospital officials, this physician 
says that the threat of losing hospital privileges pales in comparison to the death 
threats he has received.  He says he is motivated by memories of botched abortions 
prior to their legalization in Canada in 1969.18 
 This last example of intra-communal conflict within the church will show a 
group that provides a natural transition to the inter-communal conflict.  Catholics for a 
Free Choice (CFFC) is an independent not-for-profit advocacy group that supports the 
availability of reproductive services in Catholic hospitals.  A major emphasis of their 
advocacy is for lower income women who, as a group, are the most seriously affected 
when the Catholic facility is the sole provider in an area.  Frances Kissling, the 
group’s president, states, “In general, lower income women... are the ones who use 
hospitals as their primary source of healthcare.  Therefore, anything that happens in 
hospitals to limit services is going to disproportionately affect poor people.”19   
 What can we make of these different health care practitioners and practices?  
Should a Catholic have the same responsibilities whether working in a Catholic or a 
secular institution?  The nurse practitioner and fertility specialist might be commended 
                                                 
18 Ivor Shapiro, “Doctor of Choice; Abortion and Delivery of Babies,” Chatelaine vol. 71, no. 
9 (1988):38. 
19 Jennifer Baumgardner.  “Immaculate Contraception: Programs Not Offered at Clinics 
Funded by Catholic Hospitals,” The Nation vol.268, no. 3:11. 
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if, while working in secular institutions, they have maintained integrity by following 
their faith the best they can under the circumstances.  But what if the nurse 
practitioner was the nurse in charge of the ER and was the one to deliver the 
emergency contraception in the parking lot?  What light is shed on this problem if all 
of the above described situations are carried out by devout Catholics trying to find the 
best way to live out their faith?  While the Magisterium of the Catholic Church speaks 
with a loud, and mostly unified voice, the same cannot be said of the members of the 
‘mystical body of Christ.’  What implications does this have for the church and its 
Ethical and Religious Directives?   
 There must be a way for people to resolve their conflicting values – from the 
Catholic health care professionals working within the Catholic health care system to 
the patients who must receive medical services from a Catholic hospital and who may 
or may not be aware of the Directives.  In our vignette, we might suppose that Claire 
is Catholic.  She is then in need of a way to consider her personal situation and resolve 
this conflict vis a vis the Church’s position in a way that she can live with the 
decision. As we will see in Chapter Five, an early induction of delivery would be 
permitted in Claire’s case according to the Directives, although this is not always 
understood by all Catholics and unfortunately might not be interpreted in this way in 
all dioceses.   If not available to her, she must secure access to the procedures she 
needs.  A similar need is present in the health care professionals who are Catholic but 
working in secular institutions.  They must have a way to resolve the dissonance 
between their faith, what the Church teaches, and the way they conduct their practices. 
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 This study in moral conflict, integrity and the possibility of integrity-preserving moral 
compromise will provide a framework for situations such as these. 
     B. Inter-communal Conflicts: Catholic and Non-Catholic 
 The inter-communal conflicts are many and varied.  The most immediately 
visible are limitations on reproductive services, which affect disproportionately poor 
women, who have fewer choices when it comes to health care in general.  It might be 
helpful at this point to delineate the different conflicts occurring on different levels.  
The immediate, and perhaps most personal, is the curtailment of reproductive services 
felt most acutely in areas where the Catholic facility is the sole provider and the 
person seeking services does not share the same values as the Catholic Church.  The 
next level is on the societal level as regards legal and constitutional rights, and finally, 
more broadly, the question of what rights and obligations one who provides a shared 
good has to the community.   
 One of the charges leveled by CFFC’s Kissling is that often mergers take place 
in areas without a Catholic majority, so there is foreknowledge that this community 
may not share the values of the Catholic Church.  In some cases, the unavailability of 
procedures may force women to undergo additional procedures that may be more than 
just an inconvenience but which may place her at a greater potential for harm.  These 
cases include when the mother’s life is in danger and on a lesser scale when a tubal 
ligation is most safely performed immediately after a C-section.   
 Some advocacy groups have framed this conflict in terms of legal and 
constitutional rights.  The National Women’s Law Center in Washington has 
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published a guide to assist communities in which mergers are threatened.  The guide 
advises the use of antitrust laws to fight mergers they believe will threaten services.  
They advocate the involvement of the Federal Trade Commission and the Justice 
Department.  Susan Berke Fogel, the legal director of the California Women’s Law 
Center, claims that the tactics of Catholic health care is “stealth elimination” of 
reproductive services.20  She is particularly incensed at the Catholic Church’s claim to 
be exempt from antidiscrimination law because its hospitals are non-profits rather than 
businesses.  Referring to a recent California Supreme Court case regarding 
compliance with fair employment laws in which the court ruled in favor of a Catholic 
hospital, Berke Fogel says, “Look, I don’t argue with the importance of allowing 
hospitals to be non-profits so that the communities will reap the benefits rather than 
shareholders, but that shouldn’t be license to discriminate, either in the types of 
services they provide or in hiring based on race or gender.”21  Statements made in 
response to charges of a conspiracy to eradicate services to which the church is 
morally opposed from Catholic health care administrators are incomplete in their 
argumentation.22  Sister Diana Bader, senior vice president for mission at Denver’s 
Catholic Health Initiatives, says, “If the desired partner were actually being coerced 
                                                 
20 Jennifer Baumgardner, 11.  
21 Ibid., 11. 
22 While the issue of a whether the Church’s actions constitute a conspiracy will not be 
resolved in this work, the discussion is included to show the lengths to which each side will go 
to paint their opponent.   
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into this relationship, you might have an argument.”23  The Rev. Michael Place, 
president of the Catholic Health Association, says facilities agree to sacrifice 
reproductive services because the proposed arrangement with the Catholic facility 
offers the best hope for financial health.  He says, “They’re making value judgments 
about what’s in the best interest.”24  And this is where the market pressures need to be 
acknowledged and the health care system must share culpability.  As Jennifer 
Baumgardner reports in The Nation, when referring to the secular hospital acquiescing 
to the Catholic Ethical and Religious Directives in financing arrangements, “Bring up 
women’s rights, and many defenders of the hospitals in question respond with a blank 
stare.  It isn’t about sexism, they say, it’s about cost.  Reproductive care is just too 
expensive.”25  It is difficult to separate how the market influences are distinguished 
from the religious influences as they are inextricably bound. 
 This leads us to the issue of shared goods in the community – another of Susan 
Berke Fogel’s criticisms is that Catholic facilities receive much of their funding from 
Medicaid and Medicare.  “The reality is that they are accumulating a huge amount of 
money that is exempt from taxation: we, the taxpayers are subsidizing their expansion. 
 Their revenues are not required to go back into health care but can go into religious 
                                                 
23 Deanna Bellandi, “What Hospitals Won’t Do for a Merger: Deals Involving Catholic 
Facilities Often Mean a Loss of Reproductive Services,” Modern Healthcare (September 28, 
1998):28. 
24 Ibid, 28. 
25 Jennifer Baumgardner, 12. 
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 institutions.  The public is simply not benefiting from these transactions.”26  These 
charges might easily be deflected by considering the amount of expenditures on 
indigent care; it seems like merely a matter of bookkeeping to show that the Church is 
not profiting from Medicare and Medicaid dollars.  But it does raise the question of 
federal funding to a facility that does not provide a full range of services, especially 
when that facility is the only provider in the area.   
 
V. MORAL COMPROMISE 
 What we have seen thus far are multi-layered and interlocking conflicts.  In 
situations of conflict several options can be pursued.  In the most extreme case, the 
stronger forces its position on the weaker without regard for the weaker side’s wishes. 
 This can be labeled the ‘might makes right’ approach.  Another way conflict is 
approached is through exchangeable interests.  Suppose my house is in the way of 
your proposed strip mall.  There might be an amount of money that I will accept in 
exchange for my house and land.  But, for some, that example might be an intractable 
moral conflict; a committed environmentalist might never sell his family’s homestead 
and especially not for another strip mall.  But in the end, most things, particularly 
material things, have exchangeable interest.  In other conflicts, one might try to 
reason, cajole or persuade to win the other to her side.  And sometimes this works – 
reason, humor and persuasion can be very effective.  However, some conflicts admit 
of no exchangeable interest, and sometimes all the reason, humor, persuasion and 
                                                 
26 Jennifer Baumgardner, 12. 
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threats will not prompt the other to capitulate.  These are often conflicts over deeply 
held and long-standing beliefs, principles or commitments.  I will claim that some of 
the conflicts resulting from the Catholic hospital mergers and acquisitions reach this 
level.  How do we address these seemingly intractable moral conflicts?  Is 
compromise a morally licit endeavor at this juncture? 
 Compromise is rarely considered or acted on as the first course of action.  
There are some cases of simple horse-trading and bargaining that might be considered 
advantageous, but compromise can be a treacherous landscape when it involves 
important interests or deeply held and long-standing beliefs, principles and 
commitments.  Compromise can be viewed as prudence or betrayal.   
 In a prudential compromise, an external condition or circumstance presses a 
choice that one would not have made otherwise; this is distinguished from a 
compromise that is self-serving or cowardly.  For example, I might forego playing on 
an injured foot in tonight’s game in order to protect my long-term interest of playing 
in the WNBA, or an army might give up a town in order to secure the bridge that will 
ultimately lead to the end of the conflict.  Often compromises in the market place or 
compromises in politics are prudential compromises.  As such, it is easier to trade on 
issues when we believe they are market or political issues, which are usually assumed 
to involve non-moral values.  It might be this tendency to see health care as just 
another cog in the market wheel that results in the problems we have seen in the 
Catholic hospital mergers and acquisitions.  If health care is a social good that should 
not be commodified, then issues in health care should be approached has having moral 
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components that render them less amenable to horse-trading, and compromise would 
be approached with caution.   
 To consider compromise as betrayal is to see it in its most pejorative sense.   In 
this sense, compromise can be a betrayal of oneself or one’s causes.  Why is this so 
problematic, after all, a compromise might bring about a better state of affairs than the 
one in which we currently find ourselves?  People who fail to live by their beliefs, 
principles or commitments are seen variously as moral chameleons, opportunists, 
hypocrites, weak-willed, self-deceived or gullible.  In short, many describe these kinds 
of people as those who lack integrity.  We must pursue why most people resist 
compromising and what it is about integrity that leads some to dogmatically cling to 
their beliefs, while opportunists, hypocrites and others are free of its influence.  Some 
philosophers have noted the identity-conferring nature of integrity.  There are basic 
questions as to what constitutes integrity and why it seems so important in our self-
concept as well as our views of others.  I will be developing an account of integrity in 
which its identity-conferring character includes our deeply held and long-standing 
beliefs, principles and commitments, as well as our world view and our way of life 
that makes compromise in this area seem initially repugnant to us.   
 If we fear a loss of integrity in a compromise, it is usually perceived as a loss 
of personal integrity.   But there is another sense in which we use the notion of 
integrity.  We can talk about the integrity of steel, the integrity of a bridge, the 
integrity of a cause.  In this sense, we get closer to the Latin root integere, which 
means whole, of a piece.  So not only must we get a sense of personal integrity, in 
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what it consists, and the moral importance of it, but we must also be able to apply this 
notion to beliefs, principles, commitments, causes and missions around which people 
can focus their lives.  A committed Nazi officer has focused his life around a pursuit 
that we find morally repulsive.  Can that man, in being true to his deeply held and 
long-standing beliefs, principles and commitments, be a man of integrity?  This is an 
important problem that must be addressed.  Another aspect of integrity to be addressed 
is whether the notion of personal integrity can be transposed to a corporate body, and 
if so, how this affects the justification of moral compromise?  
 In the conflicts illustrated in the Catholic hospital mergers, all sides believe 
they are morally justified in holding their position and all sides base their positions on 
deeply held and long-standing beliefs, principles and commitments.  To give an inch 
on any of these would seem to betray one’s cause.  Once the concept of integrity is 
better understood, we can judge the integrity of the position each side defends as well 
as the possible compromises that might result.  
 After exploring the nature and importance of integrity, we will look at how one 
acts with integrity when dealing with intractable moral conflict.  We will also consider 
when moral compromise can be countenanced in these cases. This work will explore 
the concept of and moral space for compromise both within communities and in the 
broader context.  This analysis is not solely, or even primarily, a study of the moral 
methodology of the Catholic Magisterium, but of what other methodologies might 
bring to the conflict as well.  I will offer a way of understanding conflicts and integrity 
and the possibilities for compromise which is designed to be endorsable by all 
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reasonable parties to the conflicts.  
 To perform this task, the second chapter will start with a general introduction 
to the problems of compromise and then quickly delve into the notion of integrity, 
since the loss of integrity is what many fear most in compromise.  What exactly is 
integrity?  If it is to be considered a virtue, it certainly seems different than the first-
order virtues like courage, honesty and loyalty.  Are there criteria for integrity?  We 
might wonder whether it is a trait which we possess, or rather, a way of acting.  How 
do we translate or transfer the notion of the integrity of the individual to a corporate 
body, cause or mission?   
 Chapter Three will address how we can confront intractable moral conflict 
with integrity and when compromise is permissible.  Chapter Four will then address 
the conflicts surrounding the delivery of reproductive services at Catholic hospitals.  
Finally, Chapter Five will explore in-depth three major issues in reproductive health 
care and how they are actually handled in Catholic hospitals. 
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2.  THE NATURE AND IMPORTANCE OF INTEGRITY 
 
 
 Why is integrity important?  With regard to the moral realm, it seems to be a 
virtue that is highly valued.  It is something most of us strive for, jealously protect, 
reluctantly admit the loss of, and which can be rehabilitated by the way we handle the 
aftermath of moral wrongdoing, both our own and others.  It also plays an important part 
in our personal identity.   
 Concern for integrity seems to be one of the primary reasons we resist 
compromise in general.  The stakes only become higher when it comes to moral 
compromise.   Our refusal to compromise morally on matters of deeply held and long-
standing beliefs, commitments, and values seems rooted in efforts to keep ourselves 
intact, to refuse to betray our values, and thus to maintain our integrity.  In order to 
understand which moral compromises preserve integrity, I will propose that we look at 
integrity as a virtue that moderates, and at times, constrains our actions.  In this way, 
integrity can assist us in our approach to moral conflict, especially intractable moral 
conflict, which might lead to moral compromise.  Integrity can also assist us with self-
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evaluation.  In self-evaluation, I can both reflect on the way in which I conduct my affairs 
and the positions that I hold and ask myself, ‘Am I acting with integrity?’ and ‘Are the 
positions I hold positions of integrity?’  Before I can consider defending my integrity, I 
must ascertain that I have something to lose and something that is worth defending.  Part 
of this is allowing that I might be wrong. 
 In order to preserve integrity when compromising morally on matters of deeply 
held and long-standing beliefs, commitments, and values, it is important that those with 
whom I disagree hold positions that meet the demands of integrity.  This is not to say that 
sometimes we aren’t compelled to compromise on moral values with people who do not 
have integrity.  A paradigmatic case of this type is the German woman who must choose 
between either sleeping with the SS Officer or seeing her family taken to the 
concentration camps where their deaths seem inevitable.  She can reason morally that 
protecting the lives of the innocent is of greater value than protecting her own virtue by 
refusing to cooperate with evil, but I do not think that we can say here that her integrity is 
preserved, regardless of which choice she makes (either of which may be morally 
justifiable).  In either choice she makes she becomes disintegrated, either internally or 
externally.  So the distinction can be made between moral compromises that are morally 
licit and those morally licit moral compromises that preserve integrity.  This distinction 
has far-reaching implications.  One of the implications has to do with the identity-
conferring role that integrity plays with the individual or organization.   
 We will begin with a discussion of integrity as a virtue.  Once it is situated 
historically within moral theory, the discussion will expand to the contemporary 
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philosophical milieu.  Two of the chief concerns found in the literature include whether 
integrity has content or is merely a formal concept and the related problem of the role it 
plays in personal identity.   
 The distinction between content and form allows for very different conceptions of 
integrity.  Those who see integrity as a formal concept tend to relegate it to a minor role 
in the moral life; whereas, those who see integrity as having content assign it a more 
prominent role in the moral life.  I will argue that integrity has content, but moreover, 
content of a specific sort.  The content I will propose for integrity will be handled through 
an investigation of commitments and the significance of the inter-relationship of integrity, 
commitments and personal identity.  This discussion will include an argument for content 
that is morally defensible as well as suggesting certain other elements or conditions that 
are necessary for integrity.   
 Next we will address other factors that underlie the importance of integrity.  Some 
philosophers have claimed that integrity derives its importance from its identity-
conferring nature.1  This view is often allied with the formal view of integrity; put simply, 
the individual merely forms her own beliefs (or determines her own commitments) and 
then lives up to them.  The formal view of integrity limits the moral acceptability of 
compromising because to do so in the moral arena would be akin to giving up one’s very 
self.  In much of the literature this position is shown to contradict, or at the very least, be 
in tension with the integrity as content view.  I will argue that a position that emphasizes 
                                                          
1 The main proponent of this position is Bernard Williams in “Integrity,” Utilitarianism: For and 
Against (New York: Cambridge, 1973). 
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the importance of the identity-conferring nature of integrity need not be allied with the 
formal view; rather, the identity-conferring nature of integrity is compatible with content-
full view.  There are two realities that create problems for the identity-conferring content-
full view of integrity that must be accounted for: 1) people do not remain fixed and static 
throughout their lifetimes, and 2) the moral life consists of a wide range of morally 
justifiable and morally reasonable positions that are in conflict with each other.  The first 
points out that if we are to advocate the identity-conferring nature of integrity, then we 
will have to also account for individuals changing and growing throughout their lives.  
The second problem releases the supporter of the content view from having to defend 
moral absolutism.  In a pluralistic world of competing and conflicting values it would be 
unreasonable to think that there would not be values in conflict.   
 Historically there is a paucity of philosophical literature on the subject of 
integrity.  It is perhaps due to the resurgence of virtue theory that the majority of what is 
written on integrity is to be found in the past thirty years.  This literature shows that a 
precise definition of integrity is elusive.  Most will claim that, as a moral notion, integrity 
is closer to a virtue than to a principle or a rule.2  Others claim that the best way to  
                                                          
2 Daniel Putnam, “Integrity and Moral Development,” The Journal of Value Inquiry 30: 237-246 
(June 1996) and Mark Halfon, Integrity: A Philosophical Inquiry.  Philadelphia: Temple 
University Press, 1989. 
  31
illuminate the concept of integrity is in relief and start their discussions by saying what 
integrity isn’t, or rather, what type of person lacks integrity.3  Others attempt to elucidate 
the basic question of whether integrity is a set of virtues, sometimes viewed as adherence 
to a socially accepted code, or whether it is a special application of virtues, sometimes 
described as adherence to standards the individual has come to accept.  And further, 
regardless of whether we conceive it to be a socially accepted code or the individual’s 
code, some address the question of whether there are criteria to be met.4  These issues 
must be addressed for the individual before we can talk about institutional integrity, 
which will encompass integrity of groups, causes or missions.  Perhaps most important of 
all will be the identity-conferring aspect of integrity and how this is fixed.  Finally, some 
identify integrity with morality itself, but this certainly seems to overplay its importance.   
 The literature contains at least three competing views of integrity: the integrated-
self picture, the identity picture, and the clean-hands picture.5  At present there is no 
philosophical consensus on the concept of integrity despite the common themes that 
emerge.  The understanding of integrity proposed in this work is supported in general in 
the literature; additionally, the proposed understanding of integrity gives us an  
                                                          
3 Gabriele Taylor, “Integrity” Aristotle Society 55:143-59 and Martin Benjamin, Splitting the 
Difference: Compromise and Integrity in Ethics and Politics (Lawrence, KS: University of Kansas 
Press, 1990) and Jeffrey Blustein, Care and Commitment. New York: Oxford University Press, 
1991. 
4 Mark Halfon, as well as, Stephen Carter in his Integrity (New York: Harper Collins Publisher, 
1996). 
5 Cheshire Calhoun, “Standing for Something,” The Journal of Philosophy XCII, 5 (May 
1995):235-61.  
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explanation of why we resist moral compromise, but it can also lay the groundwork for 
compromises that at the same time preserve integrity.  That process will be discussed in 
Chapter Three on resolving moral conflict with integrity.   
 The ubiquity of ascriptions of integrity helps illustrate its complexity and varied 
usage.  Its uses range from the description of a sound structure to the moral soundness of 
a person to a marketing tool for sports teams.  In all uses, and perhaps most markedly in 
its advertising usage, it conjures up images of uprightness, soundness (both moral and 
physical), stability, steadfastness, dependability and wholeness.  Among its synonyms in 
Roget’s Thesaurus are: truthfulness, rightfulness, morals, virtue, whole, completeness, 
oneness.6   However, these do not quite cover the myriad of uses, nor do they explain the 
importance of integrity to our lives.  In this chapter, I will argue for a notion of integrity 
that: 1) has content which must be morally reasonable, 2) places its importance in its 
identity-conferring nature through the commitments that an individual chooses, which 
also accounts for identity over time allowing for growth and development; and 3) the 
elements of integrity will include deeply held, long-standing beliefs, commitments and 
values, and these must be publicly stated, and one must be willing to stand for these in the 
face of adversity.  By way of illustration, this chapter will also include a preliminary 
discussion of how this notion of integrity can be applied to the problems resulting from 
the Catholic hospitals’ mergers and acquisitions. 
 
                                                          
6 Bartlett’s Roget’s Thesaurus (Boston: Little, Brown & Company, 1996), s.v. “integrity.” 
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I.   INTEGRITY AS A VIRTUE 
 This section serves to situate integrity historically and within moral theory.  Once 
it is thus situated, the information gleaned may inform the other aspects of 
conceptualizing integrity.  Philosophers disagree about integrity’s status as a virtue.  
Among moral notions its classification is clearly closer to a virtue than a rule or a 
principle, but just what kind of virtue it might be is contested.  Perhaps the disagreement 
over whether it functions as a formal concept or has content is at the base of the doubts 
about what kind of virtue it is.  In his article “Integrity and Moral Development,” Daniel 
Putnam claims that “integrity ranks near the top of any list of virtues”7  while at the same 
time Mark Halfon, who dedicates an entire book to a philosophical inquiry into integrity, 
comments on the relative dearth of literature on integrity and surmises that philosophers 
have relegated its status to a minor virtue.8  Regardless of which impression one favors, 
they both share the belief that integrity is a virtue.  Gabriele Taylor observes that integrity 
is different from other first-order virtues such as honesty, fidelity, or loyalty.9  In fact, 
several of these first-order virtues are often used in attempts to define the concept of 
integrity.  As such, some philosophers are prone to describe it as a second-order virtue. 
 Is there something about the classical understanding of the nature of a virtue that 
gives us helpful information?  Aristotle defines the virtue of man as a state of character 
which makes man good and which makes him do his own work well.  This state of  
                                                          
7 Daniel Putnam, 237. 
8 Mark Halfon, 6. 
9 Gabriele Taylor, 152. 
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character is concerned with choice, the mean between the vices of excess and deficit.  
This state of character is developed through habit.  But Aristotle says that, although none 
of the virtues arises in us by nature, we are adapted by nature to receive them and we are 
made perfect by habit.10  In his revival of virtue ethics, Alasdair MacIntyre describes a 
virtue as a learned human quality necessary to attain any goods internal to a practice.11  
These descriptions of virtue conceive integrity as a formal concept.  But those analyses 
run head-on into the question of whether a Nazi can have integrity.  This underscores the 
need for a better sense of whether integrity is formal concept or has content.  Gabriele 
Taylor describes this distinction as a special application of the virtues (formal) or a 
selection of the virtues (content).   
 Taylor suggests that the first indication of integrity’s difference from other virtues 
is that the ascription of integrity cannot be expressed in adjectival form.  She says, “Those 
who have generosity are generous, those who have courage are brave, but what are those 
who possess integrity?  On my account the gap would appropriately be filled by ‘is 
integrated’ or ‘is intact’, but in contrast to ‘he is brave’ etc. this would convey not specific 
information about the agent and would be of no practical use.”12   ‘Integrated’ and ‘intact’ 
give us no specific information on that person.  Taylor uses this example to justify her 
position that no particular behavior is necessarily linked with ascriptions of integrity.  
Further, if integrity is a virtue at all, then it is a secondary virtue that seems to involve 
                                                          
10 Aristotle, Nichomachean Ethics. 
11 Alasdair MacIntyre, After Virtue: A Study in Moral Theory (Notre Dame, IN: University of 
Notre Dame Press, 1981). 
12 Taylor, 151. 
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possessing a set of other virtues.  So we cannot get at integrity directly, and she suggests, 
“We think of it as a virtue perhaps because we assume that being virtuous is a 
consequence of possessing integrity.”13   
 While Taylor’s assessment may be prima facie plausible and Lynn McFall agrees 
that integrity is a higher-order virtue, McFall comes to a different preliminary conclusion 
than Taylor.  That integrity is a higher-order virtue presupposes some lower-order moral 
commitments, and moral integrity in turn adds moral requirements to personal integrity.  
Her intention here is to clarify that they are not just any moral commitments, “So it is 
more plausible to say that moral integrity adds a moral requirement to personal integrity: 
one must adhere to some set of recognizable moral principles or commitments.  This rules 
out a singular commitment to art, as well as to personal pleasure, approval and profit.”14  
McFall’s position on integrity will eventually take us to the point where she denies the 
distinction between personal and social morality. 
  There is consensus in the literature that, as a moral notion, integrity most 
resembles a virtue.  As a virtue we can situate it within moral theory.  Here we have the 
first hint of integrity as an ideal to which one aspires, and we have an introduction of the 
problem of whether integrity is a formal notion or has content.  Aside from the 
form/content issue, one of the important implications of integrity being classified as a 
virtue is the association with depth of character.  This underscores the importance of 
consistency as well as the importance of integrity to our identity.  Sections II and III will 
                                                          
13 Taylor, 151-2. 
14 McFall, 14-15. 
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discuss whether integrity involves some set of morally correct (or less strongly stated, 
morally reasonable) beliefs, or whether it is a matter of being true to oneself.  
 
II. INTEGRITY: FORM OR CONTENT? 
 Honesty, sincerity, and loyalty are often considered to be elements of integrity.  
But are these hard and fast?  Perhaps these are prima facie elements, but we can consider 
cases where our common sense tells us that acting with integrity would require us to lie.  
Consider the following scenarios: 
A: The Nazi SS Officer is loudly rapping at your door.  He asks you whether 
there are any Jews at your residence.  You know that if you tell the truth, 
the family you are hiding in your attic will be taken to their certain deaths. 
  
 
B: Later that same day, after a difficult day’s work, the Nazi SS Officer is at 
home with his wife and two children.  By all appearances he is a faithful 
and devoted husband and father.  He reads stories to his children which 
inculcate the value of love for the motherland.  He is firmly committed to 
the ideals of the Third Reich and is willing to die for these beliefs.   
 
These two scenarios help illustrate the problems with the content notion of integrity (or 
adherence to a socially/morally accepted code of conduct, a set of virtues) and the formal 
notion of integrity (or adherence to one’s own moral code, a special application of 
virtues).  There also seems to be a further distinction to be made; if integrity has content, 
then is the content exceptionless?  If we take the formal view, it seems that, from a moral 
perspective, both Scenario A: lying to protect the innocent thereby putting oneself in 
harm’s way, and Scenario B: being a committed Nazi who has internalized these beliefs 
and is willing to act on them at risk to oneself are compatible with integrity.  If we take 
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the content exceptionless view, where prohibitions of lying and racism comprise part of 
the contents, then neither you nor the Nazi are acting with integrity.  However, if we 
allow for principled exceptions on the content-full view, then our moral perceptions seem 
to allow for an exception to honesty in scenario A because the principle to protect the 
lives of the innocent is a countervailing weight; whereas, genocide and racism, as part of 
nationalism, would not trump the principle of not killing the innocent.  So integrity 
conceived as both a formal notion and a content-exceptionless notion lead us to 
conclusions that are counter-intuitive and which render the concept ineffective for the 
evaluation of moral acts.  We must work toward the justification of integrity that 
overcomes these counter-intuitive results. 
 Gabriele Taylor characterizes this classic problem of integrity as whether it is a 
select set of virtues or rather a special application of virtues.15  Virtues such as honesty, 
uprightness, loyalty, promise-keeping, and playing by the rules are usually mentioned 
when discussing integrity.  As such, integrity can be described as adherence to a socially 
accepted code.  Another way of looking at it, however, is to describe integrity as not 
necessarily being true to an accepted code, but rather to be true to the standards that the 
individual has come to accept.  This would include loyalty to, or being honest about, 
one’s own principles.   
 But Halfon and Putnam both find a problem with the traditional discussion of 
integrity.  In the sense that integrity is seen as a formal notion, an absence of context 
                                                          
15 Taylor, 143. 
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allows for devotion to our own principles regardless of what those principles might be.16 
If, as I am suggesting, integrity will be a guide for the moral licitness of compromise, 
integrity must have teeth.  And short of requiring complete honesty at the expense of 
innocent lives, there must be some content.  
 Integrity as a formal notion (or a special application of the virtues) allows 
integrity to be ascribed to individuals who might have commitments to evil.  As such, the 
only way this will inform the process of moral compromise is possibly to impede it or 
render it morally impermissible.  Viewing integrity as having content, on the other hand, 
leaves it open to charges of inflexibility, not being representative of the real world and 
having the ability to lead to fanaticism.  However, there is a conception of integrity that 
calls for some constraints on the content, is compatible with moral compromise, and does 
not entail moral absolutism.  It is this third conception that will be defended in the 
following section and which will be supported by Christopher Gowan’s moral remainder 
thesis that will be discussed in Chapter Three.   
 
III. ‘MORALLY CORRECT’ OR ‘TRUE TO SELF?’ 
 Heretofore I have maintained that a conception of integrity with constraints on its 
content will perform an important role in decisions of moral compromise.  This section 
will address the nature of this content through a discussion of commitments.  The 
principal way of showing that one has integrity is through faithfulness to the 
commitments one has made.  So, at the very least, we might say that one must have 
                                                          
16 Halfon, 5 and Putnam, 238-9. 
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commitments to earn an ascription of integrity.17  And our most important commitments 
are the ones that we believe help define who we are.  So there is an interdependent 
relationship among integrity, commitments, and personal identity.  The importance of the 
relationship to personal identity will be addressed in the next section.  One way to frame 
the problem of this section is determining whether integrity is: a) consistently doing the 
morally correct thing, generally understood as the content view, b) consistently acting 
according to one’s own beliefs, commitments and principles, understood as the formal 
view, or c) the position I will defend – consistently doing the morally defensible thing 
that one has internalized. 
 One might say that if I am arguing for integrity to have content and the content is 
important, then why not just say that integrity is consistently performing morally correct 
acts?  The problems with that position are twofold.  First, it assumes that we can 
determine what is morally correct, leading to a position of moral absolutism; and 
secondly, this account fails to appreciate the richness of integrity as a virtue which 
accounts for the requirements of consistency and depth of character.  Mark Halfon begins 
his philosophical inquiry into integrity by asking a similar question about the relationship 
between integrity and morally right actions.  He proposes that if integrity is a  
                                                          
17 Mark Halfon defends this position against the criticisms that a) there seem to be persons who 
have moral integrity but who have not made an explicit commitment and b) there are persons who 
seem to lack integrity for the very reason that they have made no commitment.  He defends 
against the first by drawing a distinction between explicit and implicit commitments.  An example 
of the latter occurs when one does not make an explicit pledge to a person but has pledged to act 
in accordance with a general principle.  As far as amoralists avoiding potential loss of integrity, 
Halfon says that in some difficult cases silence is complicity and can signal the loss of integrity.   
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matter of consistent performances of morally right acts, then normative ethics should 
focus on the standards for determining the difference between right and wrong acts.  If 
that is the case, then there would be no special need to investigate the concept of integrity, 
and he surmises that this may be why integrity has not been addressed more directly by 
philosophers in the past.  But Halfon proceeds to argue that this is wrong and that he 
wants to distinguish between conditions that must obtain for persons of moral integrity 
but not for persons who simply act consistently on principle, whether the principle is from 
an accepted canon or one’s own.  What gives integrity standing over “conformity to 
principles” is the element that ascriptions of integrity usually include “a willingness to 
maintain one’s commitments under adverse conditions.”18   
 The role of commitments is essential to the notion of integrity and it is here that 
Halfon introduces the nature of commitments.  He argues that persons of integrity must 
be committed to some action, goal, ideal or principle.  These commitments may be either 
explicit or implicit, but to be relevant to ascriptions of integrity they must be serious 
rather than frivolous.  To exemplify the latter, he talks of the difference between fasting in 
protest of human rights violations and fasting to break the Guinness World Record.  
Having commitments is not enough; one must also be committed to them, have the 
intention and wherewithal to carry them out, and as stated above, be willing to carry them 
out in the face of adversity.  Lynn McFall and Gabriele Taylor also agree that one must 
have something to lose, namely commitments, to have integrity. As McFall says, “To sell 
one’s soul one must have something to sell.”  We must be committed to something; a 
                                                          
18 Halfon, 4-5. 
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commitment to spinelessness, according to McFall, does not vitiate spinelessness.19  For 
purposes of this discussion, I will use commitments to stand for ‘beliefs, principles and 
commitments’ that will figure prominently in the discussion of moral compromise.   
 It is virtually impossible to be equally committed to each of our commitments so 
there must be some way to rank their importance.  The process of discerning defeasible 
from indefeasible might be the first step in an ordinal ranking of commitments.  McFall 
considers indefeasible commitments to be identity-conferring commitments.  Along these 
lines, she claims that some commitments must be unconditional because they are 
conditions of continuing as ourselves.  Halfon proposes that the way to discern 
indefeasible commitments is to ask which commitments are bound up in our sense of self-
respect.   
 Additionally our commitments can conflict with each other, and when they do, 
there must be a way to a) reconcile these commitments in a way that they are able to 
coexist within an integrated person, i.e. they must be consistent and coherent; and b) after 
meeting the requirements of (a), we must also be able to decide which commitment 
outranks the other.  Two questions follow from this discussion that will be addressed in 
Chapter Three.  First, should moral theory function as a guide to action such that when 
deciding between two acts there is not sense of regret or remorse for the action that 
remains undone?  Sometimes regardless of our good reasons for choosing A, it might be 
morally appropriate for us to have regret over our inability to also perform B at the same 
time.  Secondly, one might be able to simplify one’s life in such a way that one’s 
                                                          
19 Lynn McFall, 5-9. 
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commitments do not conflict.  However, we then have an analogous situation to the 
person who is so single-focused so as to be a fanatic.  One who oversimplifies is as 
morally culpable as the fanatic.   
 We have said that, at the very least, the contents of integrity include 
commitments.  But what, if any, constraints are there on beliefs, principles or values to 
which we are committed?  Our choices for the content of commitments parallel those for 
integrity: 1) they must be morally correct, 2) they must be morally defensible, or 3) they 
are morally indifferent.  We can see that this spectrum mirrors the moral absolutism and 
moral relativism debate.  Contents which are morally indifferent are incompatible with 
the picture I have drawn thus far, and morally correct contents fail to account for the 
pluralistic world with competing and conflicting values in which we live. 
 Perhaps the most recalcitrant problem in the integrity literature involves the 
content of integrity.  Most philosophers who write about integrity want to include some 
sort of constraints on the commitments a person of integrity can have.  Some even refer to 
what I will call ‘The Nazi Problem’ when addressing this issue.  As alluded to in an 
earlier section, there is something counter-intuitive to the ascription of integrity to a Nazi, 
one who is committed to a morally reprehensible goal.20  Some, such as Taylor, admit 
outright that their analysis may not rule out such people: 
  
                                                          
20 NB: for the purposes of this discussion my use of integrity should read as ‘moral integrity.’ 
Personal integrity might more closely resemble the formal notion of integrity. The Nazi, with 
consistent and coherent commitments which he pursues in the face of adversity would qualify as 
having personal integrity, whereas we would not want to ascribe ‘moral integrity’ to him.   
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I have not ruled out the possibility that all the conditions I have given may 
be fulfilled by someone who ruthlessly and without regard for the well-
being of others pursues his own aim, even if in doing so he behaves in 
ways we regard as morally wrong.  Not every immoral action need be a 
sign of the agent’s corruption.  I am inclined to think, however, that the 
ruthless egoist will not in fact possess integrity.  ‘Being truly committed to 
a project’ has no doubt more implications than I have been able to draw 
out.21 
 
Others claim that they want to “justify the claim that the content of certain principles or 
commitments disqualifies their adherents as candidates for integrity”22 or even less 
strongly stated, “A balance ... should be struck that allows for latitude in the choice of 
moral commitments but does not sanction an obviously intolerable moral position.”23  
However, of these two, McFall, in the end, only justifies that moral integrity allows for a 
partialist ethic and so is a challenge to both personal and social ethics which are impartial. 
 This does not come close to disqualifying the Nazi from the ascription of integrity.  
Likewise, when pushed on the subject (in a much later chapter), Halfon admits that there 
are certain Nazis, the young naive Nazi and the mature sophisticated Nazi, who might 
meet his conditions for integrity.24   
 Putnam and Blustein are the only ones who claim that they have eluded The Nazi 
Problem.  Putnam utilizes the work on moral development by Carol Gilligan and 
concludes that, on Gilligan’s ‘Balance of Virtue’ level, integrity, at the highest level of  
                                                          
21 Taylor, 158. 
22 McFall, 14. 
23 Halfon, 32. 
24 Halfon, 134-6. 
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moral development, will exclude the Nazi.  The Nazi fails at this level because he lacks 
any of the virtue of empathy.   
 Halfon comes to a similar position on this point.  Rather than claiming that the 
commitments of persons of integrity are either a) any action, ideal or principle or b) 
‘right’ actions, ‘desirable’ ideals or ‘just principles,’ he plumbs the middle ground and 
strikes a balance that allows for latitude in the choice of moral commitments while at the 
same time not sanctioning any obviously intolerable moral position.  He defends this with 
the use of the commitments themselves.  If the nature of commitments are, as he claims, a 
pledge to pursue some objective in the form of a promise, oath, vow or declaration and 
that at a minimum one intends to fulfill this promise and use what resources they have 
available to reach that end, then the commitments themselves pose restrictions on the 
behavior of persons of integrity.  For example, for intellectual integrity, one must be 
committed to seeking the truth, and all relevant and available evidence must be 
acknowledged and examined.  This implies that one must believe that one’s commitments 
are true, or less strongly stated, that there is a commitment or intention to discover the 
truth. 
 Gabriele Taylor settles on a notion of integrity that rejects both that integrity is a 
select set of moral virtues or that it is a special application of these virtues.  Her choice is 
the idea of the person who keeps her inmost self intact, whose life is ‘of a piece’ and 
whose self is whole and integrated.  Taylor’s first condition for the possession of integrity 
is that one must be rational in a number of related ways such that she will not ignore 
relevant evidence, her behavior is consistent, and she will not act on insufficient reasons.  
  45
The second condition is that the person who keeps her self intact will be under due 
influence of her past.  This must, however, allow for a person to change and develop over 
time. 
 An evaluation of one’s commitments is important to the concept of integrity.  But 
there might also be a process by which one examines not only one’s commitments but 
one’s actions as well.  In his book, Integrity, Stephen Carter claims that there are three 
steps that take one towards integrity: 1) discerning what is right from wrong, 2) acting on 
what one has discerned, even at one’s own cost, and 3) saying openly that one is acting on 
one’s understanding of right and wrong.25  There is a clear indication that if not a notion 
of moral correctness, then at least there is an element of moral justification, in Carter’s 
criteria for integrity.  Carter places a great deal of importance on the act of discerning.  
Moral correctness is discerning right from wrong rather than just following our own 
beliefs, which can be evil.  He claims that we have a general duty to do the right rather 
than the wrong.  This rests on the assumption that some beliefs and some acts are morally 
better than others, but more importantly that it is possible to tell which are which.  The 
methods for achieving this are through reflection, conscience, and received social 
knowledge.  However, without some higher-order principle to follow, the Nazi might 
claim to have gone through this process and passed the test. 
 I will maintain that constraints on commitments can take several forms: a)  
                                                          
25 Stephen Carter, 10-12. 
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constraints on the individual’s deliberation, constraints on the person’s behavior, and 
constraints on the commitments themselves. 
Constraints on the individual’s deliberation: 
 1.  Willingness to investigate the truth of one’s beliefs. 
 2.  Willingness to consider all relevant evidence. 
 3.  Willingness to take one’s past into consideration. 
 4.  Logical consistency. 
Constraints on the individual’s behavior: 
1.   The intention and wherewithal to follow through on commitments even in the 
face of adversity. 
2.  Free of hypocrisy, weak-will, shallow sincerity, self-deception or wantonness. 
Constraints on acts or commitments themselves: 
1.  At a minimum, acts must pass the ‘respect for the dignity of the person’ 
principle. 
 
It might be argued that this list will not preclude the Nazi from an ascription of integrity.  
The sincere Nazi might argue that the Jew does not meet the requirements of personhood. 
This, it seems, flies in the face of the constraint on deliberation of being willing to 
consider all the relevant evidence. 
 At this point some comment on process should be included.  The ‘process’ to 
which I refer can be considered judgment or moral reasoning.  Inherent in this are the 
notions of discernment, reflections, conscience, and considerations of social codes.   
 
IV. INTEGRITY AS IDENTITY-CONFERRING  
 In her discussion of commitments, Lynn McFall says that some need to be 
unconditional because the commitments themselves are conditions of our continuing as 
ourselves.  She distinguishes defeasible commitments from identity-conferring 
commitments; the latter she takes to reflect what to the individual are the most important 
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and determine to a large extent our moral identities.  She says that the willingness to die 
for these is the clearest proof we have of these types of commitments.  She continues this 
theme with regard to the alleged separation of personal and social morality.  McFall 
concludes that, without integrity and the identity-conferring commitments it assumes, 
there would nothing to fear the loss of because there would be nothing to lose.  Margaret 
Walker also emphasizes the role that commitments have in giving our lives meaning.  
Proceeding along these lines, I want to show that not only are our indefeasible 
commitments identity-conferring, but that this also supports the role that integrity plays in 
our personal identity.  
 Many start their discussion of integrity by giving examples of what it is not or 
examples of people who show a marked absence of it.26   In each case, there is a 
disordered relationship among the individual’s commitments, his or her self-perception 
and his or her motivations.  Gabriele Taylor takes as the very base of integrity that a 
person must have commitments and be true to them.  She then discusses the hypocrite, the 
shallowly sincere, the weak-willed and the self-deceiver.  The hypocrite only pretends to 
others that he is so committed.  In some sense he is able to maintain internal integrity (he 
knows that he is not really so committed) but lacks external integrity.  The shallowly 
sincere are prompted by impulse and momentary enthusiasm.  It is not that this person is 
insincere, but there is a total lack of self-knowledge.  The weak-willed has  
                                                          
26 Gabriele Taylor, “Integrity” and Martin Benjamin, Splitting the Difference: Compromise 
and Integrity in Ethics and Politics (Lawrence, KS: University of Kansas Press, 1990) and 
Jeffrey Blustein, Care and Commitment (New York: Oxford University Press, 1991). 
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commitments but is unable to be true to them.  Unlike the shallowly sincere, he is aware 
of this failing.  Martin Benjamin adds here that the weak-willed may have a coherent set 
of principles but lacks the courage of his convictions.  The self-deceiver is, Taylor claims, 
the most important and fundamental case of the lack of integrity.  Benjamin seems to 
concur on this point.  In his description of the self-deceiver, Benjamin claims that she has 
to convince herself of an idealized self-conception.  This drive is motivated by a desire to 
preserve integrity.  However, it preserves only the internal appearance of integrity at the 
expense if a great deal of psychic energy.   
 In addition to those listed by Taylor, Benjamin includes the moral chameleon, the 
opportunist and those subject to coercion.  The moral chameleon is anxious to 
accommodate others and is indisposed to moral controversy and disagreement.  Left long 
enough, the moral chameleon is apt to betray herself as well as others.  The opportunist 
has fluid values and principles, similar to the moral chameleon.  The salient difference is 
that where the moral chameleon uses this fluidity to get along, the opportunist uses it to 
get ahead.   Those subjected to coercion can lack integrity in different ways.  They might 
display external integrity while disintegrating internally.  Benjamin illustrates this with 
the example of the battered wife who stays with her husband.  The example earlier in this 
chapter seems pertinent here. Certainly if the woman submits to the SS officer, she does 
so under coercion.  Aristotle addresses cases like this and says that although these types 
of acts are done under compulsion, which he says normally renders them involuntary, 
they more resemble voluntary acts because “the movement of the limbs instrumental to 
the action originates in the agent himself, and when this is so it is in a man’s own power 
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to act or not to act.”27 
 Benjamin concludes from this excursion into those who lack integrity that 
integrity is an integrated triad: 1) coherent and stable values and principles, 2) verbal 
behavior expressing these values and principles, and 3) conduct which embodies these 
values and principles.  These criteria allow for an internal and external integrity.28 
 Mark Halfon proposes that persons of integrity are: committed to some action 
goal, ideal or principle; are willing to persevere in the face of adversity; and maintain a 
consistent commitment to do what’s best.29 
 Margaret Urban Walker begins her chapter on “Picking up Pieces: Lives, Stories 
and Integrity” by asking the question, does a well-ordered life necessarily involve the 
right kinds of content?  She considers the two options of a principled consistency or an 
unconditional commitment to morally important matters.  She expands on this by 
discussing three types of narratives that are central to living responsibly a life of one’s 
own.  One of the three is the narrative of moral identity, in which we have a “persistent 
history of valuation that can be seen in a good deal of what a person cares for, responds to 
and takes care of.”30   Most of us set priorities among values, develop highly selective 
responses, and pay acute attention to particular kinds of things as well as people.  None  
                                                          
27 Aristotle, Nichomachean Ethics, Book III. 
28 Benjamin, 51. 
29 Halfon, 13-37.  
30 Margaret Urban Walker.  “Picking Up Pieces: Lives, Stories and Integrity” in Moral 
Understandings: Feminist Study in Ethics (New York: Routledge, 1998):112. 
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of these license avoidable cruelty, destructiveness or indecency to anyone.  But these 
selections reflect and refine a moral identity.  With regard to integrity, Walker favors a 
view of moral responsibility over coherence or continuity.  What we are accountable for 
we must be willing to repair and restore dependability when the structure we have built 
teeters or fails.  We must be reliably responsible in matters of our own and others’ good 
and keep clear and vibrant shared understanding of them.  Narratives are connected to 
integrity in that we can have multiple stories with identity; sometimes we must become 
differently reliable.  This can also be a way to honor commitments or act credibly when 
the situation has been affected by someone else’s bad behavior.  For Walker, integrity 
does not have to be a whole life referent; it can be more or less local. 
 One of the pictures of integrity that Cheshire Calhoun describes is the identity 
picture of integrity.  This view, she claims, equates the condition under which we can go 
on as the same self as equivalent to the conditions for integrity.  But action on deep 
impulses that define psychological sense of self may have little integrity.  
 
V.  FROM PERSONAL INTEGRITY TO ORGANIZATIONAL INTEGRITY 
 This section will demonstrate how the requirements for personal integrity can be 
extrapolated to organizational integrity, and thus show us a working model for evaluating 
the individual’s as well as an organization’s integrity.  Although there is little or no 
philosophical literature that directly addresses this issue, there are connections that can be 
made through moral theory literature, business ethics literature as well as organizational 
literature.  In this section I will maintain that, as a virtue, integrity has a decidedly social 
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aspect.  Most basically this is displayed in the way one maintains one’s commitments.  
Furthermore, in the same way that commitments are identity-conferring to the individual, 
so do they help establish the true identity of the organization.  The need to eliminate 
internal and external conflicts is also a key connection to be made in this discussion.  
Additionally, virtue theory will provide a vehicle to bridge the individual and the 
organization.  Finally, a brief discussion of organizational behavior will illustrate why 
integrity becomes a more unwieldy concept at the organizational level.  Because of the 
variables at the organizational level, we might have grounds to slightly weaken the 
demands of integrity that have been posited at the individual level. 
 Some philosophers distinguish among the different types of integrity: moral 
integrity, personal integrity, and social integrity, for example.31  But it should be clear 
from our earlier discussion that if there is, in fact, a difference between personal and 
social integrity, then our understanding of commitments provides the bridge between the 
two.  Cheshire Calhoun concludes her discussion of integrity pointing out that the three 
received views of integrity – the integrated self picture, the identity picture, the clean-
hands picture – are ultimately inadequate because: 1) they both reduce integrity to 
conditions of unified agency, to conditions for continuing the same self, and to conditions 
for having a reason to refuse cooperating with some evils; and 2) they proceed on the 
assumption that integrity is a personal virtue and this assumption wrongly limits  
                                                          
31 Blustein and Halfon are two of these. 
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what can be said about both the nature and value of integrity.  She differentiates personal 
virtues from social virtues.  An example of the former is temperance, which is to have 
proper relation to oneself, in this case to one’s desires; an example of the latter is civility 
which consists in having proper relations to others.  Some virtues, such as self-respect, 
can be both personal and social.  Calhoun claims that it is necessary for integrity to have 
the social, as well as the personal, in order to explain the importance of ‘standing for 
something;’ and that, to say it is only personal does not make the other person central to 
the defense.  Lynn McFall ultimately comes to a similar posture as Calhoun, but argues 
rather that there is no difference between personal and social integrity.  
 Commitments by their nature are a form of activity; activity that to some extent is 
social.  Commitments, when upheld even at risk of harm or cost to oneself, are often the 
public manifestations that account for ascriptions of integrity.  Even the most personal of 
our commitments, when upheld, are manifested in a public way.  An example of this is 
the recovering alcoholic.  Her continuing sobriety is a public manifestation of her 
commitment to address her alcoholism which can be an extremely personal commitment.  
 Another way that commitments can bridge the gap between personal and social 
comes from Bernard Williams with regard to our ground projects that give our lives 
meaning.  “One can be committed to such things as a person, a cause, an institution, a 
career, one’s own genius, or the pursuit of danger.”32 
                                                          
32 Bernard Williams, 112. 
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 As with individual integrity we took note of the relationship between principles 
and actions.  Does the individual live according to her principles, or is she a hypocrite?  
This same relationship applies to the organization: does it embrace principles that it lives 
by or is merely spin?  Is ‘image everything?’  If not, then these organizations are 
shallowly sincere in the worst sort of way.  Most advertisements cut right to the heart of 
the shallowly sincere.  
 There must be a balance between the external and the internal.  Earlier in this 
chapter, I used the example of the woman forced to sleep with the SS officer in order to 
save the life of her family.  Either choice might be morally justified, and with either 
choice she becomes disintegrated either internally or externally.  Ideally there should be 
balance between the internal and the external.  This is difficult at best with the individual; 
these difficulties increase exponentially within the organization which is made up of 
numerous individuals.  We might infer that this signals a greater need for integrity or at 
least deserves greater attention to integrity.  We might also argue that, because of the 
multi-valence within an organization, we might lessen the conditions for integrity.  
 Virtue theory provides another interesting bridge between the individual and the 
organization.  In his book on business ethics, David Stewart says: 
By making only a few alterations we can use the language of Aristotle to 
describe the goals and purposes of business.  What eudamonia is to the 
individual, profits are to the business organization.  Without profits, a 
business dies.  Without profits, a business cannot offer employment, make 
products, or pay investors a return on equity.  And just as individuals 
achieve happiness by seeking other goals, there is growing evidence that 
the business goal of profit can be best sought if a company first pursues 
such goals as enduring quality of its product, service to its customers, and 
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a commitment to ensuring a stable community and work force.33 
 
Another take on virtue theory might be that, if virtue theory emphasizes the development 
of the moral individual through a common cultural tradition that reinforces shared moral 
values, then we can see an analog in the contemporary corporate culture or organizational 
culture.  This culture has a strong influence on both the direction of the organization as 
well as the actions of those individuals within the organization.  As reported in O.C. 
Ferrell and John Fraedrich’s text on business ethics, research was conducted on two basic 
dimensions of an organization’s culture.  The two dimensions included were concern for 
people and concern for performance.  This study resulted in a classification of four 
cultures: apathetic, caring, exacting and integrative.  Not surprisingly, it was the 
integrative culture that combined both a high concern for people and a high concern for 
performance.34  Ferrell and Fraedrich also maintain that an organization’s culture can be a 
factor in ethical decision making.  It stands to reason that integrity is related to ethical 
decision making.   
 Throughout this work we will discuss the mission and values of Catholic health 
care: how those values are derived, how those values are expressed by the institution 
through its policies and procedures, how these values are inculcated in the co-workers, as  
                                                          
33 David Stewart, Business Ethics, (St. Louis: McGraw-Hill, 1996):50. 
34 O.C. Ferrell and John Fraedrich, Business Ethics: Ethical Decision Making and Cases (Boston: 
Houghton Mifflin Company, 1997):118 -20. 
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well as how conflicts are addressed when co-workers and patients do not share those 
values. 
 Now we will turn to the subject of moral conflict and how one might act with 
integrity when confronting moral conflict, especially intractable moral conflict, and 
when one might countenance moral compromise. 
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3.  ACTING WITH INTEGRITY IN MORAL CONFLICT 
  
 In the last chapter we discussed the importance of integrity to the moral life.  I 
argued for a notion of integrity characterized by its content and identity-conferring 
aspects.  One with integrity has a morally reasonable set of beliefs, commitments and 
projects that one has publicly stated and which one will defend even at risk to oneself.  
A person of integrity will deliberate in a reasonable way, consistent with logic, and 
with a willingness to consider the truth of her position as well as the truth of opposing 
positions.  A person of integrity also acts in a way that shows respect for persons, and 
at a minimum, the content of her position must meet the demands of respect for 
persons.  Our focus on integrity implies a reference to virtue theory.  Virtue theory is 
usually criticized as an incomplete moral theory in that it instructs us as to what kind 
of person we should be but does not necessarily tell us how to act.  I will argue that the 
notion of integrity I have described is morally important in that it benefits a pluralistic 
society, facilitates tolerance and guides us when confronting moral conflict, especially 
intractable moral conflict.  Much of the conflict we experience everyday is a result of 
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wildly varying worldviews.  Some societies are more conducive to peaceful 
coexistence of these worldviews.  I will also discuss the role that democratic societies 
serve in the tolerance of different positions, as well as in handling dissent of those who 
feel oppressed.   
 This chapter will address some of the concerns one faces when confronted with 
moral conflict that is intractable, and how integrity can guide us when countenancing 
compromise.  The following chapter will then address these moral conflicts as they 
often arise in the context of Catholic hospitals. 
 
I. MORAL CONFLICT 
 When we are engaged in moral conflict and seeking resolution, our integrity 
can be challenged.  These challenges can feel particularly acute when the moral 
conflict seems, after reasonable deliberation, to be intractable.  In some circumstances, 
we can get to the point of thinking that we must morally compromise, but this terrain 
is treacherous and we must take care in navigating it.  Integrity can assist us in this 
task. 
 In Chapter Two we discussed the constraints on deliberation of one who has 
integrity.  They are: 1) willingness to investigate the truth of one’s beliefs, 2) 
willingness to consider all relevant evidence, 3) willingness to take one’s past into 
consideration and 4) logical consistency.   In Chapter Two, these applied to the 
discussion of the commitments that one has, but they also hold true for the deliberation 
process when one is confronted with moral conflict.  That discussion also included 
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constraints on how an individual acts: 1) the intention and wherewithal to follow 
through on commitments even in the face of adversity and 2) free of hypocrisy, weak-
will, shallow sincerity, self-deception or wantonness.  Again, these can apply in the 
way we go about deliberating in moral conflict.  When we have acted according to 
these guidelines and can reach no agreement, we might be close to the claim of 
intractability.  There are also other aspects we should consider. 
 Initially the non-moral concerns should be separated from the moral concerns.  
Non-moral concerns are more likely to be fungible or have exchangeable interest, in 
which case compromise does not present the same danger to our moral lives.  Then of 
the moral concerns it should be determined that the conflict is not able to be resolved 
by a synthesis or middle-of-the-road position, which Martin Benjamin in his work, 
Splitting the Difference: Compromise and Integrity in Ethics and Politics, says is not a 
compromise in the strict sense.  Another aspect is that the conflict will be between 
parties in which a relationship must, or should for the best interests of all parties, be 
maintained.  One relationship of this sort, in a very broad sense, is the relationship 
between citizens in a democracy.  This could be considered a non-voluntary 
relationship; however, this does not vitiate the responsibilities of its citizens.  As 
Henry Richardson says in his article, “Democratic Deliberation about Final Ends,”1 all 
citizens have the claim to equal respect and concern.  These relationship-demands 
extend to voluntary relationships such as those between friends and spouses, as well as 
involuntary relationships: such as the teenager who might like to divorce his parents.  
                                                 
1 Henry Richardson, “Democratic Deliberation about Final Ends,” (Paper delivered at the 
meeting of American Philosophical Association (APA) Atlanta, GA 30 December 1996). 
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At the very basis of the requirements to maintain relationships is the treatment we owe 
to fellow rational beings worthy of respect.  Concomitant with the responsibility to 
respect persons is that the parties to the moral conflict operate in good faith.  They are 
both willing to act in response to the other party’s argument as well as consider the 
other party’s situation and need, but not to be unduly influenced by the latter.  In a 
response to Richardson, Betsy Postow says that continued deliberation can keep that 
possibility in check.2  Parties must be able to reflect on their own self-understanding – 
they must be able to question their motives and be willing to amend their position if 
their motivations are not morally reasonable. 
 
II. INTRACTABLE MORAL CONFLICT 
 When one is confronting intractable moral conflict, one can choose from at 
least four options: 1) to not act at all, 2) to stand firm and maintain one’s position, 3) 
to give in altogether, or 4) to engage in moral compromise.  The first option is a live 
option for only a limited amount of time, if it is an option at all.  The situation often 
degenerates to one where the refusal to make a decision, which is how this situation 
can be described, is itself a decision.  The second option of standing firm has its own 
repercussions.  Someone who stands her ground might be lauded as one who has 
maintained her integrity; however, she may be easily susceptible to the error of 
fanaticism.  This type of situation might lead to either a non-violent conscientious 
                                                 
2 Betsy Postow, “Response to Richardson’s ‘Democratic Deliberation about Final Ends’,” 
(Paper delivered at the meeting of American Philosophical Association (APA) Atlanta, GA 30 
December 1996). 
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objection or might provoke a violent response from others.  In the third option, one 
who gives in might be seen as lacking integrity and being weak-willed, or on closer 
examination, it might be shown that the individual capitulating has done so under the 
coercive nature or position of the other.  This problem of coercion due to a power 
differential will be addressed later in this chapter.  The fourth option of moral 
compromise will be the focus of the remainder of this chapter.  Figures 1 and 2 (on 
page 61) depict schematically the morally licit and morally illicit consents to 
compromise and refusals to compromise that will be discussed; e.g., the German 
woman who ‘consents to compromise’ by sleeping with the SS officer to save her 
family members’ lives, consents to a morally licit compromise; however, we allow 
that externally her integrity has not been preserved.  When the option of moral 
compromise is pursued it is usually because inaction is no longer an acceptable option.   
 
III. COMPROMISE 
 On first blush, the most palatable rationale for accepting moral compromise is 
that it is ‘best of the worst’ options or the ‘lesser of all the evils’ available to us.  
Additionally, moral compromise should only be pursued when the second option of 
standing firm and the third option of giving in do not allow us to maintain integrity.  
We are then left with considering the possibility of morally compromising while 
maintaining our integrity.  
 We all face decisions in which we feel pressured to compromise.  Often  
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Figure 1.  Consents to Compromise 
 
 
Figure 2.  Refusals to Compromise 
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 compromises challenge our most deeply held moral beliefs.  However, there are costs 
to resisting compromise.  Life can become more uncomfortable for ourselves or for 
those whom we love, and we can alienate ourselves and others.  But there are often 
greater costs to acceding to moral compromise, such as: loss of our reputation, the 
respect of our family and friends, self-respect and sometimes, worst of all, we lose part 
of ourselves – our identity.  In many ways these can be attacks on and do damage to 
our integrity.  Furthermore, the integrity of institutions that hold absolutist ideals or 
principles is at greater risk in the case of compromise.  How do institutions survive in 
this world and maintain their principles?  Even more difficult, how do they provide 
services necessary to all in the community, such as healthcare, and operate on 
principles that do not coincide with those of the culture? 
 Prior to discussing what prevents us from compromising, a brief review of the 
nature of compromise is in order.  In Splitting the Difference, Martin Benjamin begins 
by elucidating the varied meanings of compromise.  In what Benjamin calls the 
standard sense, compromise is both a process (a settlement of differences by mutual 
concessions) and an outcome (a resolution that is reached where the parties more or 
less ‘split the difference’).  Not all compromises in the standard sense will necessarily 
contain both elements.  If the conflicting parties to a compromise decide on an 
outcome that is superior to either party’s original position without either party 
relinquishing any ground, then Benjamin considers this a synthesis position and not 
strictly a compromise.  Strictly speaking, a compromise does not end the disagreement 
between the parties but rather ends up splitting the difference in some way.  He 
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includes two conditions for compromise in the standard sense: 1) the disagreement is 
over a more or less indivisible or non-shareable good and 2) the initial procedure is an 
agreement to abide by the outcome of a subsequent procedure that gives equal respect 
considered to the interest of all the contending parties.3   
 In addition to the standard sense, compromise can sometimes be seen as a kind 
of betrayal in some cases, as well as a form of prudence in other cases.  A prudential 
compromise is impelled by objective ends; it is neither cowardly nor self-serving.  For 
example, I might forego playing basketball in the NCAA finals when my broken ankle 
is not completely healed in order to prevent permanent disability which would 
preclude a career in the WNBA.  Benjamin also includes how acts of nature can force 
prudential compromise. We certainly would not say that the captain of a schooner 
betrayed his goals when turning back from a devastating storm. 
 When it is a betrayal, compromise does damage to our commitments to self, 
others, our projects, our community and perhaps most importantly, our sense of 
integrity.  This is the form of compromise that we resist in order to keep ourselves 
whole, thus maintaining our integrity.  Benjamin says, “It is this sense of 
compromise…that inclines us to regard compromise as morally questionable and to 
regard as exemplars those who have resisted various pressures or temptations to 
compromise.”4  Some of the exemplars he lists are Socrates, Gandhi and Martin 
Luther King, Jr.  Benjamin admits that the distinction between compromise in the 
standard sense and compromise as a betrayal suggests the distinction between non-
                                                 
3 Benjamin, 67.  
4 Benjamin, 8. 
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moral legitimate interests and conflicts of moral principles.  Therefore, it is necessary 
to consider the nature of the conflict.  Is the conflict over something that can be 
represented by exchangeable interest?  If so, a compromise need not be perceived as a 
betrayal and therefore integrity is not at stake.  However, moral principles do not 
easily convert to exchangeable interests, and so, in what Benjamin says is the first 
substantive question, one asks “Are there any circumstances in which parties to a 
conflict involving rationally irreconcilable ethical commitments may devise mutually 
satisfactory compromise without compromising (or betraying) themselves or others?”5  
Compromise as betrayal can also take the passive voice, where one is compromised or 
made vulnerable with limits placed on one’s future actions either through the actions 
of others, or by one’s own failings or indiscretions. 
     A. Why Do We Avoid Moral Compromise? 
 It has been mentioned throughout Chapter Two that one of the primary reasons 
we resist compromise is that we fear the loss of integrity.  However, there can be 
additional reasons for our reluctance to compromise.  I have divided these reasons into 
two categories: impediments to compromise and constraints against compromise.  If 
we could look at compromise in a non-pejorative sense, impediments are those 
obstacles that prevent us from reaching compromise, obstacles that we might wish to 
remove.  Constraints will be those things that are normally employed to rightly direct 
our actions but which may bind us too strongly in favor of one direction.  Either 
impediments or constraints, when taken to an extreme, become fanaticism. 
                                                 
5 Benjamin, 23. 
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 1.  Impediments 
 Impediments to reaching a reasoned compromise include those traits that seem 
to protect what is often the most fragile part of our human nature – the ego.  Pride, or 
more precisely, improper pride and hubris insulate us and our projects from the barbs 
of the world.  Moreover, they often protect us to the detriment of others and their 
worlds and their projects.  Hubris denotes a sense of pride that is scornful and 
overweening.  Others and their ideas do not and cannot meet our level and our ideas.  
Compromise is not countenanced because we consider that the other party can bring 
nothing to the table.  If our overly prideful selves acknowledge others’ projects, at 
best, they do not reach the standard of ours.  We see this, for example, in the 
researcher whose work could be augmented through collaboration with a colleague but 
who does not see the value in this because of an inflated sense of self. 
 Identifying pride and hubris in others is difficult to do in an objective way.  
Because they are attributes of the nature of a person, one can look to certain behaviors 
that indicate pride or hubris, but these are really attributes best revealed through self-
reflection.  Although humans are often good at self-deception and others may be good 
at seeing through each other, they are nonetheless in an epistemically privileged 
position to reason and reflect on their own motivations provided that they are diligent 
and rigorous in this self-reflection.  Many who lack integrity have certain character 
defects. Thus, in the case of Catholic hospitals as the sole provider for a given area 
and the community’s demand for increased reproductive services, it is difficult to 
objectively ascribe to the hospital motivations of improper pride or hubris.  The same 
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can be said of those forces working to make reproductive services available.  
Certainly, we often describe one side or the other as acting out of pride or hubris such 
as when the head of the Catholic Hospital Association, Rev. Michael Place, in an 
interview with “60 Minutes” talks as if there is nothing more to the issue than the fact 
that, “… Every hospital does not provide every service.  All women’s services are not 
provided...”6  A similar assessment is appropriate when pro-choice forces deny the 
humanity of a full-term fetus in the partial birth abortion debate.   
 2. Constraints 
 In addition to impediments, there are constraints which keep us from 
compromising.  Constraints function to direct our actions rightly; they provide our 
moral compass.   The primary constraint discussed so far has been integrity; however, 
constraints can also include first principles, individuals’ moral beliefs, projects and 
identity – what makes them who they are, without which they would cease to be who 
they are.  While it is best to heed constraints, if they are taken to an extreme, we can 
become uncompromising in the sense of a dogmatist, fanatic or ideologue.   When 
taken to an extreme, pride, hubris and power can lead to fanaticism.  In a cartoon by 
Chuck Jones, Wiley Coyote has once again been foiled in his attempts to catch the 
Road Runner and a series of road signs (which quote philosopher Georges Santayana) 
says, “A fanatic is someone who redoubles his effort when he has forgotten his aim.”  
This might be aptly illustrated by one who clings more tenaciously to certain beliefs 
                                                 
6 “60 Minutes” episode, fall season 2002.  And yet, since this broadcast, it has become clear 
how the media sound bytes have distorted, at the very least, the messages of the Catholic 
Health Association of the United States (CHAUSA). 
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the more a resolution to the moral conflict is required.  Mark Halfon groups fanatics 
along with dogmatists and ideologues as typically uncompromising (in the pejorative 
sense) while distinguishing them from those who are uncompromising in a non-
pejorative sense.7  Serious effort must be given to confronting the impediments of 
pride, hubris and power before moral compromise can be considered. 
 In the next chapter, we will deal with conflicts that arise in the context of 
Catholic health care.  At the heart of many of the reproductive issues lies the abortion 
debate.  The constraints for either side in this conflict seem clear.  The Catholic 
Hospitals must operate according to the principles as set forth in the Ethical and 
Religious Directives as promulgated by the National Conference of Catholic Bishops 
(NCCB).8  Catholic health care identifies itself in terms of a ministry, a mission to 
spread the Gospel and see the face of Christ in the poor and sick.  The integrity of their 
mission in terms of the sanctity of life at the beginning, middle, and end of life shows 
a consistency that is rarely seen in politicized debates, i.e., no political party has seen 
it expedient to endorse both a pro-life stance as regards abortion and euthanasia as 
well as an anti-death penalty stance.   
 Likewise, those in favor of reproductive liberties, although quite varied in 
ideologies, can base their arguments within consistent principled positions, be it a 
feminist or a libertarian stance.  Feminist arguments in favor of reproductive liberties, 
also many and varied, have as their base notions that historically (and still today), 
                                                 
7 Halfon, 63. 
8 Whose work is decided in conjunction with Catholic moral theologians as well as encyclicals 
and writings of the various popes.  The basis for the prohibition of abortion is found in Donum 
Vitae, and reiterated in Humanae Vitae and Evangelium Vitae. 
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women have not been treated as equals to men (some label this as oppression), that we 
should work to end this oppression, that one of the primary forms this oppression 
takes is to deny women the right to control their reproductive abilities, and therefore, 
women should have the right to reproductive choice.  Libertarians, while coming to a 
similar conclusion, frame the argument within the role of the state in individual’s 
lives.  Libertarians would maintain that, other than the minimal police state developed 
to protect citizens from threats to their individual liberties, there is no role for the 
government.  Therefore, woman’s right to decide what happens to her body should not 
be any concern of the state. 
 The message to be taken from this discussion is that we must work to remove 
impediments while at the same time giving proper attention to those principles, 
morals, and projects that form our identity and constitute integrity.   
     B. Why We Compromise 
 There are several reasons why we do compromise, and it is interesting how 
these different reasons map onto the different types of individuals, all of whom, 
according to Benjamin, lack integrity in varying degrees.  There are those who will do 
most anything to get along, and there are those who will do likewise to get ahead.  
Benjamin labels these types the moral chameleon and the opportunist.  The moral 
chameleon finds that she has been identified as someone protesting outside an abortion 
clinic.  Realizing that she is in a group of pro-choice advocates (and perhaps acting out 
of insecurity) she quickly, and before hearing any reasoned arguments from the group, 
admits that she was there, but contends that she was merely talking to the protestors to 
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come to a better understanding of their position.  While the opportunist, looking for 
maximum gain with minimal input, has no real position on whether abortion is moral 
or not, she sees that the group most able to help her in her graduate career is pro-
choice and so she adopts that position publicly.  Additionally, there is the hypocrite 
who will try to convince us that she maintains certain positions but does not really act 
on them, the weak-willed who has principles but not the fortitude to live up to them,9 
the self-deceivers who have convinced themselves that they are something they are 
not, as well as those who fall prey to coercion.  The hypocrite and the self-deceiver are 
sometimes hard to distinguish from each other.  Take the politician who runs his 
campaign on ‘family values’ and reproaches another politician for an extra-marital 
affair with a young intern and then is caught in the same entanglement himself.  
Further, he might try to convince himself and others that what transpired between him 
and his paramour did not constitute ‘sexual relations.’  And therefore of the hypocrite 
one must ask, does he really believe that he is acting according to his professed 
beliefs?  Perhaps his brand of ‘family values’ is constituted by continuing the marriage 
to his high school sweetheart, thus maintaining the family unit, but acting 
independently otherwise.  The moral chameleon, the opportunist, and the hypocrite, in 
some sense, all act out of a sense of expedience.  
 Those who compromise due to coercion present a different scenario than the 
aforementioned.  We might allow that those subject to coercion are not necessarily 
                                                 
9 The weak-willed is certainly compatible with the moral chameleon; however, the moral 
chameleon is less likely to have a coherent set of values because she is forever 
accommodating others to avoid conflict.  The weak-willed may have a coherent set of beliefs 
but lack the courage to carry them out. 
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responsible for their actions in the same way the others are.  In particular, the 
hierarchical nature of the power structure might lead to the weaker party being coerced 
into a compromise; this would encompass compromises pursued out of financial 
necessity.  For example, the sales manager instructs the new sales representative to 
release misleading information to their clients.  If her prospects for another job were 
better, she would stand up to the manger and refuse; however, as the sole provider for 
her family and somewhat unemployable, she acquiesces and distributes the 
information.  One of the problems in determining the extent of culpability is 
determining why one has changed positions.  Politically, Southern Democrats prior to 
the 1990s were often pro-life candidates, in particular when the office that they sought 
was on the local or state level.  However, when pursuing a national position, they 
switched to a pro-choice position.10  Was this switch a moral compromise, a result of 
further consideration of reasoned arguments, a result of the political hierarchy of 
power on a national level, a matter of expedience, or some combination?  
     C. Why We Should Compromise    
 Next we turn to reasons why we should compromise.  One of the strongest and 
prevailing justifications that we can give for compromising is that we live in a 
pluralistic world.  Pluralism says that ultimate values and first principles may differ 
according to one’s worldview, culture, or religious beliefs.  The acknowledgment that 
people of goodwill hold different worldviews, different religious beliefs and have 
different ways of life, thereby coming to different conclusions in moral deliberation, 
                                                 
10 The three most visible of these ‘southern Democrats’ are Rev. Jesse Jackson, Al Gore and 
Bill Clinton.  
  71
provides the grounds for a moral compromise.  Pluralism coupled with the inevitable 
moral conflicts that will ensue provides additional incentive for moral compromise.  
 While the acceptance of pluralism provides the grounds, and perhaps incentive, 
for moral compromise, could monism provide a similar incentive?  Perhaps.  Moral 
monism claims “there is one ultimate moral value to which whatever apparent 
diversity of moral values there is may be reduced.”11  It is reasonable to think that 
monism would provide a conclusion to moral deliberation to which all could agree and 
which would leave no remainder.  However, Christopher Gowans claims that even in a 
monistic system there can be moral ‘remainders.’  He argues that there are cases where 
moral wrongdoing is inescapable, even in a monistic system.  While on the surface 
that might not seem to provide the same motivation for compromise as the 
acknowledgment of pluralism, this might be more compelling.  Compromising to 
acknowledge pluralism depends on my respect for your moral views, which may 
involve trying to preserve my own integrity.  This may speak to the phenomenological 
experience of moral distress that we feel over these moral remainders.  This, in turn, 
may influence our approach to the opposing party in an intractable moral conflict.   
 Other reasons that justify compromise include its intrinsic and instrumental 
values, its treatment of other parties in a conflict as rational beings worthy of respect, 
and the desire, or even obligation, to maintain a long-term relationship.  As discussed 
in chapter two, often long-term relationships can speak to our sense of identity in the 
same way that principles and projects do.  To adhere to a principle at the expense of a 
                                                 
11 Gowans, 145.  However, this also suggests room for different interpretations of the single 
principle or value. 
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relationship can lead to a loss of integrity in a similar way as betraying that principle.  
Additionally, conflicts may seem intractable, inexorable and the situation demands 
that action be taken.  These are all incentives to moral compromise.  At this point it 
might be helpful to see where pluralism is situated within what some see as the goals 
of moral philosophy. 
 1.  Moral Theory and Pluralism 
 The goal of Western philosophy has been described as a Platonic Quest 
seeking to transcend the contingent “in order to identify foundations of knowledge, 
reality and moral value that are independent of any particular social, cultural, 
historical or linguistic point of view.”12  Richard Rorty, an outspoken critic of the 
conception of philosophy as the ‘Platonic Quest’ describes it as 
…the search for a way in which one can avoid the need for 
conversation and deliberation and simply tick off the way things are.  
The idea is to acquire beliefs about interesting and important matters in 
a way as much like visual perception as possible – by confronting an 
object and responding to it as programmed.13 
 
Rorty opposes this view by stating that we are situated within traditions, language, 
history and culture, which can not help but shape our thinking and self-criticism.  As 
such, we are unable to compare ourselves to an absolute; we cannot transcend the 
contingent.  As part of the Platonic Quest of philosophy, the goal of moral theory has 
been to develop a “fully consistent, comprehensive set of values and principles that 
when embraced by all, would – at least in principle – eliminate rationally irresolvable 
                                                 
12 Benjamin, 77. 
13 Richard Rorty, “Pragmatism, Relativism, and Irrationalism,” in Consequences of 
Pragmatism (1980):164. 
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(or incommensurable) moral conflict.”  Benjamin goes on to say, “Discovery or 
development of the single true ethical theory that commends itself to all insofar as 
they are rational would enable us to resolve all disagreements without remainder.”14  
However, Benjamin allows that the abandonment of the Platonic Quest does not rule 
out the possibility of harmonizing moral values and principles.   
 Benjamin borrows a phrase from Stuart Hampshire, “the doctrine of moral 
harmony,” to describe the goal of some moral theorists to harmonize our ethical values 
and principles.  By viewing the successes wrought through the process of ethical 
inquiry, these moral theorists are hopeful that through further reflection and 
understanding, we will “devise a consistent and comprehensive theory that will be 
capable, at least in principle, of resolving all moral conflicts without remainder.”15  
Hampshire identifies Hume, Kant, the Utilitarians, the deontologists and the ideal 
social contract theorists with the doctrine of moral harmony.  Despite their differences 
they share a belief in agreement with Aristotle: 1) in stating or implying that moral 
judgments are ultimately to be justified in reference to some feature of human beings 
which is common throughout the species and 2) by implying or stating that a morally 
competent and clear-headed person has, in principle, the means to resolve all moral 
problems as they present themselves, and that he need not encounter irresoluble 
problems.16  Hampshire disagrees, saying that these two main candidates for this 
common feature among the species prove to always underdetermine a way of life and 
                                                 
14 Benjamin, 75. 
15 Benjamin, 82. 
16 Stuart Hampshire, Morality and Conflict (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 
1983):144.  
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underdetermine the moral prohibitions and injunctions that support a way of life.17  
Moral theory thus becomes too abstract and theoretical to be of practical use.  If we 
agree that the Platonic Quest for the one true moral theory to which all willingly 
subscribe has not yet succeeded in moral theory along with the impractical results of 
the search for the ‘doctrine of moral harmony,’ then we can accept pluralism.   
 What place does pluralism occupy in a democracy, and how do power and 
dissent affect moral conflict in a pluralistic society?  Part of the acceptance of 
pluralism is the tolerance of moral theories and moral principles that one does not 
endorse.  More broadly, one reason moral theories can conflict is because they are 
often rooted in different worldviews.  Benjamin defines a worldview as “…a complex, 
often unarticulated (and perhaps not fully able to be articulated) set of deeply held and 
highly cherished beliefs about the nature and organization of the universe and one’s 
place in it.”18  Additionally a way of life is often associated with a particular 
worldview.  Stuart Hampshire defines ways of life as,  
…coherent totalities of customs, attitudes, beliefs, institutions, which 
are interconnected and mutually dependent in patterns that are 
sometimes evident and sometimes subtle and concealed. …Alongside 
repeated patterns of behavior, a way of life includes admired ideal 
types of men and women, standards of taste, family relationships, styles 
of education and upbringing, religious practices and other dominant 
concerns.19 
 
So we see that pluralism encompasses not only a plurality of values and principles but 
also of worldviews and ways of life.  In the next section, this topic will be revisited to 
                                                 
17 One should remember that there will still be prohibitions in other realms such as law, 
manners and even professional standards.  
18 Benjamin, 88. 
19 Hampshire, 5-6. 
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connect the particular issues that arise in societies where pluralism is most likely to 
flourish. 
 
IV. DEMOCRACY – THE ENVIRONMENT MOST CONDUCIVE TO 
 PRESERVING INTEGRITY IN MORAL CONFLICT 
 
 For purposes of this work, it will be helpful to consider where a plurality of 
worldviews and ways of life can best flourish.  Democratic societies seem the best 
able to accommodate this plurality.  The United States of America might appear more 
‘plural’ than other democracies because, since its inception, it has been a melting pot 
of many races and cultures and was initially colonized by groups seeking freedom to 
practice their religion.  The point here is not to justify the concept of democracy but 
rather to situate moral conflict within this type of society with a plurality of 
worldviews and ways of life and show how moral compromise can be recommended 
in cases of moral conflict in policies affecting the public. Many conflicts and 
particularly moral conflicts are clashes that come from different religious, 
metaphysical or epistemological beliefs.  As for a conception of democracy, we can 
use Henry Richardson’s broadly accepted and minimally described notion of 
democracy as: 
a form of government in which the people rule (1) by means of 
elections in which each citizen gets one vote and (2) by the use of some 
form of majority rule in elections and legislatures.  These procedures, 
in turn, require a stably, and perhaps constitutionally implemented, rule 
of law.20 
 
                                                 
20 Richardson, 8. 
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     A. Democracy 
 In Stephen L. Carter’s work, The Dissent of the Governed; A Meditation on 
Law, Religion and Loyalty, he explores the problem of dissent, especially as it is 
manifested in a democracy.  While introducing his thesis he observes that throughout 
America’s history and past, “people who hold power, whatever their politics, will not 
listen to those who disagree with them unless they are forced to,”21  He also maintains 
that Americans tend to dislike dissent, most notably in causes we despise.  He talks 
particularly about the ways in which whoever happens to control the apparatus of the 
sovereign uses its authority to manipulate language and policy.  They also make 
dissenters seem un-American.  He gives several examples of this beginning with the 
Sedition Acts when the U.S. was in its infancy. In the first of his three lectures, Carter 
shows that what the founding fathers did in the writing of the Declaration of 
Independence was to present a justification for America’s act of disallegiance.  He 
quotes both the beginning and the end of the Declaration of Independence:  
We hold these truths to be self-evident, that all men are created equal, 
that they are endowed by their Creator with certain unalienable Rights, 
that among these are Life, Liberty and the pursuit of Happiness. – That 
to secure these rights, Governments are instituted among Men, deriving 
their just powers from the consent of the governed. 
 
And after they have enumerated their grievances, the Founding Fathers end with: 
In every stage of these Oppressions We have Petitioned for Redress in 
the most humble terms: Our repeated Petitions have been answered 
only by repeated injury.  A Prince, whose character is thus marked by 
every act which may define a Tyrant, is unfit to be the ruler of a free 
people.   
                                                 
21 Stephen L. Carter, The Dissent of the Governed: A Meditation on Law, Religion and Loyalty 
(Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1998):x.  
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Carter’s point here is that in reviewing the list of complaints, none of them has its 
roots in the lack of consent to the government apparatus, but rather he believes it is the 
repeated petitions for redress that have been met with injury that forms the basis and 
justification of their act of disallegiance.  So a sovereign’s practical (as opposed to 
theoretical) legitimacy may evaporate if the citizens’ repeated petitions for redress of 
oppression are only met with repeated injury.  Carter believes that we may be reaching 
that point in America, and he focuses in particular on the alienation felt by religious 
groups. 
     B. Tolerance of Communities 
 Carter discusses several sources for feelings of alienation among different 
groups in America: economic dislocation as the labor market changes, the flight from 
towns and the ensuing suburban consumerist complacency, the persistence of crime 
and poverty and social wars, which include issues like euthanasia, abortion, and gay 
rights.  Carter notes that many of these wars boil down to a battle of two very different 
ways of looking at the world: one the deeply secular committed to change and the 
other the deeply religious committed to tradition.  One source of alienation Carter 
emphasizes is what he calls ‘liberal constitutionalism,’ which he defines as “the effort 
to use the power of the federal government, and to interpret the Constitution, in a way 
that creates a single, nationwide community with shared values and shared, 
enforceable understandings of how local communities of all descriptions should be 
organized.”22  He claims the project of liberal constitutionalism is both anti-
                                                 
22 Carter (1998), 19. 
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democratic and anti-communitarian, and that it flies in the face of multiculturalism and 
diversity.  A particularly telling example, used by both Carter and Benjamin but to 
illustrate different aspects, and which Carter would says illustrates his point exactly, is 
the request of some Christian communities asking for prayer to be permitted in public 
schools.  Benjamin characterizes these Christians as feeling oppressed by secular 
humanists, a group which they consider tantamount to a religion.  Benjamin objects to 
the characterization of secular humanism as a religion as that does a disservice to the 
concept of religion; but what Benjamin does not acknowledge is that many Christian 
groups feel that much of the power in the U.S. seems to be in the hands of secular 
humanists. 
 A democracy must be able to protect communities.  Carter defines a 
community in terms of community of meaning rather than a geographical community.  
Such a community can be  
self-defining or self-constituted, not in the sense that its members 
constantly reinvent themselves – although indeed they might do so – 
but in the sense that the community, as it struggles against the world for 
meaning, is defining itself according to a set of understandings that 
might be radically different for those that motivate the larger society in 
which it is embedded.23   
 
These self-defined communities of meaning must be able to transmit their narrative.  
Carter cites several cases where the court’s ruling has served to eradicate the religious 
community.   
 Carter’s framework allows for a pluralistic system and welcomes dissent.  He 
virtually encourages the existence of separate communities, and he believes that these 
                                                 
23 Carter (1998), 27. 
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different communities should not be silenced in their dissent.  Everyone should have a 
voice, even if that voice is grounded in religious beliefs.  With regard to the civil 
rights movement, Carter says, 
 Certainly [Martin Luther] King and other religious leaders showed no 
reluctance to claim for their positions an ‘exclusive alignment with the 
Almighty.’  Nor is there any reason that they should have been 
reluctant, provided that they had come in a prayerful way to a sincere 
belief that they had discovered the will of God.24 
 
     C. Power and Dissent 
 Dissent is vital to a democracy; that is, citizens should be able, and even 
encouraged, to petition for redress of injuries.  However, it is difficult to get those who 
wield power to listen to the dissenters, much less act in their concerns.  Power of both 
the sovereign and the individual poses particular problems in moral conflict.  The 
effects of pride and hubris are compounded when we are in a position of power, 
formal or informal, over others.  Thomas Hobbes says, “The power of a man, to take it 
universally, is his present means to obtain some future apparent good, and is either 
original or instrumental” and says of its nature, “…power is, in this point, like to fame, 
increasing as it proceeds…”25  For Hobbes, the greatest of human powers culminates 
in the sovereign, which has the compounded powers of all men, united by consent, in 
one entity and that has use of all their powers.  A man’s value or worth is the extent of 
the value of his power, and this value is shown in the many ways man can be honored.  
Hobbes takes the original meaning of power, from the Latin verb, potere (to be able) 
                                                 
24 Stephen L. Carter, The Culture of Disbelief: How American Law and Politics Trivializes 
Religious Devotions (New York: Anchor Books, Doubleday, 1993):48-49. 
25 Thomas Hobbes, Leviathan, chap x. 
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and contextualizes it as an asset.  He then proceeds to list the various ways in which a 
man can be honored and thus increase in power.  It is easy to see how the pejorative 
sense of power can be found in Hobbes.  It does not matter to him how one obtains 
wealth, office or great actions, but rather that one has these things are all signs of 
power.  View the events of the twentieth century in light of Hobbes’ discussion of 
power and it is not difficult to see why much of contemporary discussion of power is 
in terms of its corrupting influences.  
 Hierarchical forms of power infuse every sphere of life; it is so insidious we 
are often unaware of the way it affects and sometimes oppresses us.  There have been 
various perspectives on power: feminist, liberationist, afro-centrists, but none of the 
resulting paradigms have been capable of overthrowing that of hierarchical power.  
Feminist literature is rich with critiques of power.  In general, feminist perspectives on 
power can be broadly divided into the domination theory and empowerment theory.  
Domination theory looks at power in terms of the ways in which men have power over 
women. It fights the conventional view that the hierarchy of power is based on natural 
and innate differences saying that it is the costs and benefits attached to these 
differences that is problematic.  Domination theory is based on the model of the 
master-slave relationship.  This conception of power is described as ‘power-over.’  
One of the primary objections to this theory of power is that in claiming that women 
are powerless, domination theorists deny themselves the theoretical resources for an 
adequate conception of women’s resistance to oppression. 
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 Empowerment theorists, on the other hand, focus on the power that women do 
have.  This is often discussed in terms of women’s abilities to care, nurture and 
mother.  Out of these experiences comes a concept of power that is transforming and 
empowers oneself and others.  This conception of power is described as ‘power-to.’  
One of the primary objections to this theory of power is that it glorifies practices, such 
as nurturing and mothering which, according to some feminists, have been instruments 
of oppression. 
 Amy Allen says that the problem with ascribing either of theories is that they 
are one-sided.  Domination theories neglect the power that women do have, and 
empowerment theories neglect the ways in which men dominate women.  She suggests 
that not only does the one-sidedness need to be addressed, but also the other forms of 
oppression, i.e., racial, class, as well as the complex and multifarious relationships that 
women have.  She wants an account of power that makes sense of male domination, 
feminine empowerment and feminist solidarity and coalition building.  To that end, 
she discusses three senses of power: ‘power-over,’ ‘power-to,’ and ‘power-with.’   
 Another way of looking at power is through the different societal sources of 
power: political, professional and institutional.  If, as will be discussed later, freedom 
from coercion is important for integrity preserving moral compromise, power 
differentials will need to be addressed.  While Benjamin does not discuss power, he 
does mention coercion, but only insofar as an example of one who lacks integrity.  He 
discusses the battered wife who stays with her husband for the sake of keeping the 
family together.  Benjamin calls her the ‘alienated victim of external coercion’ 
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observing that she maintains external integrity while lacking internal integrity.26  
Externally this woman presents an integrated view of her family and her life to others, 
but internally she hates her husband and continues to suppress her values and her 
desires to live a life free of his oppression.   
 Now there are several incentives that might prompt the party in power to 
compromise.  One might be the party’s sense of justice and fair play.  Also the party 
might be prompted to compromise because it serves the party’s short or long-term 
interests.  We find the former to be somewhat unlikely, and the latter to be obvious.  
As we will return to the issue of power later, let us at least acknowledge now that the 
party in power is less motivated to compromise than the party not in power. 
 The balance of power in the fight for women’s reproductive liberties has 
shifted over the years.27  How Catholic hospitals operate within a society where 
women have legal rights to reproductive freedom will be discussed in-depth in the 
next chapter.  This is mentioned to point out power differentials need to be 
acknowledged between the parties.  While parity need not be a requirement, the 
combination of treating others with respect, acting in good faith and with morally 
reasonable goals, the recognition of the power differential between the two parties 
should be enough to modify self-motivated activities. 
  At the risk of pursuing a method that was eschewed in the previous sections, 
we now turn to look at what integrity-preserving moral compromise might look like.  
                                                 
26 Benjamin, 50. 
27 For purposes of this discussion I will conflate ‘reproductive liberties’ with the accessibility 
of abortion. 
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However, at this point it is worthwhile to review what constitutes a compromise.  
Henry Richardson distinguishes between a compromise, a bare compromise and a 
principled compromise.  He defines a compromise as a change in one’s practical 
commitments that responds to the commitments of another person and is made partly 
in an effort to arrive at a fuller agreement with that person.  A bare compromise is a 
change in one’s support of policies or implementing means without a corresponding 
change in one’s ends.  By contrast, principled compromise is a change in one’s 
support of policies or implementing means that is accompanied and explained or 
supported by a change in one’s ends that itself counts as a compromise.  Meanwhile 
Martin Benjamin claims that a synthesis or middle-of-the-road position where both 
parties agree to a third position that combines the strongest features of the original two 
positions while avoiding their agreed upon drawback, is not, strictly speaking, a 
compromise.  In a compromise the third position splits the difference between the two 
original positions.  For Benjamin, a compromise never fully settles the matter; it does 
not end the disagreement.  Benjamin says that it makes the best of what both parties 
regard as a bad situation.  Benjamin also discussed the different sense of compromise: 
compromise as a process and compromise as an outcome.  As a process, compromise 
consists of the parties engaging in dialogue – give and take – and preparation to make 
concession for the sake of coming to terms.  Compromise as an outcome is the result 
of such a process that appears to split the difference.   
  So what counts as a successful compromise?  First, I think we must dismiss 
Richardson’s principled compromise in favor of Benjamin’s splitting the difference 
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definition or Postow’s bare-but-respectful compromise.  In one sense it is too much to 
expect that parties to a conflict will be able to agree on the ends.  As Postow says, this 
might necessitate a vision of the good which is less than ideal.  On the other hand, to 
reach agreement the ends might have to be so vague as to be ineffective.  Synthesis 
positions paint compromise too widely because by definition, all parties agree that the 
synthesis is preferable to either original position. 
 Compromise involves bargaining and negotiation, which even in non-moral 
conflicts has certain rules of fairness that are observed.  Bargaining and negotiations 
can be patterned on an adversarial paradigm that pits one party against the other in a 
zero-sum game, or it can be patterned on a cooperative paradigm in which the result 
can be a positive-sum game. 
  At the very least, integrity should be preserved – the integrity of each party to 
the conflict as well as the integrity of the relationship.  To that end, each party will 
have treated the other as a fellow human worthy of respect.  If one abides by these, it 
seems clear that agreement alone cannot justify successful compromise.  In an 
example adapted from D. Luban, Benjamin describes the case where two people, Rich 
and Poor, are given $1000 on the condition that they agree on its distribution.  Now 
Rich does not need the money so she proposes that she will take $900 and give Poor 
$100.  She says that is the only offer she will entertain.  Because Poor is desperately 
so, he grudgingly accepts.  Both Rich and Poor have reached agreement, but this is not 
a successful compromise in terms of preserving integrity.  One could argue that each is 
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not respecting the dignity of the other person; more pointedly, Rich does not need the 
money and so can be seen as acting out of avarice.   
 
 V. CONCLUSION 
 Because of the damage that moral compromise can do to the very core of who 
we are, it is important to approach it with care and attention.  When confronting moral 
conflict we must first separate the moral from non-moral concerns.  Then, if it is a 
moral conflict, we must thoroughly deliberate in good faith and with actions consonant 
with integrity.  If after careful deliberation we find the conflict to be intractable and 
we are in relationship that must be maintained, we may consider moral compromise.  
This chapter has carved out the moral space within which moral compromise can be 
considered.  In the next chapter we will see how this might apply to moral conflicts 
found within the context of Catholic health care.  
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4.  REPRODUCTIVE SERVICES IN CATHOLIC HOSPITALS  
 
 So far we have discussed the importance of integrity and the demands it places 
on us, especially when dealing with moral conflict.  When faced with intractable moral 
conflict, integrity can also guide us when considering moral compromise.  This 
chapter will consider the case of Catholic hospitals serving the needs of a society that 
is pluralistic.  We will begin by assessing the nature of the moral conflicts that result 
from the administration of health care according to the teachings of the Catholic 
Church and discuss whether they are intractable.  If some of these conflicts are 
intractable, we will discuss when and how Catholic hospitals might consider moral 
compromise.  If Catholic hospitals are still prohibited from moral compromise, we 
will then discuss the methodologies available within Catholic moral theology, 
comparing these to the process for handling moral compromise that was discussed in 
the last chapter.  Chapter Five will then examine in-depth three specific types of 
reproductive services that put Catholic hospitals at odds with many in the communities 
they serve and how these conflicts are handled.   
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 All Catholic healthcare facilities in the United States must operate under the 
Ethical and Religious Directives for Catholic Health Care Facilities1 as promulgated 
by the United States Conference of Catholic Bishops (USCCB).2  The two most recent 
updates of these Directives were in 1994 and 2001; the 2001 update was driven by 
some of the problems voiced over various concerns with Catholic hospital mergers 
and acquisitions.3  We will look at both this most recent edition as well as the prior 
edition to see if any of the issues we will cover are ameliorated with the advent of 
these new Directives. 
 An institution that operates according to a set of directives based on moral and 
religious beliefs seems to be at particular risk in a secular society.  On one hand, if the 
institution is perceived as compromising too much then it is in danger of losing its 
reputation, being seen as acting without integrity, or involving the Church in scandal; 
and on the other hand, by resisting the requests of some of the public it becomes the 
target of organized movements that might risk its overall mission.  This risk is 
increasing rapidly with various moves to limit ‘conscience clauses’ throughout the 
states, as well as other legislative actions.  How do institutions survive in this world 
and maintain their principles?  Even more difficult, how do they perform ‘public’  
                                                 
1 Hereafter abbreviated as ERDs or Directives. 
2 Formerly known as the National Conference of Catholic Bishops (NCCB); On July 1, 2003 
the NCCB and the United States Catholic Conference (USCC) were combined to form the 
USCCB. 
3 These Directives were not revisited at the June 2002 or 2003 meetings most likely due to the 
sex scandal in the Church the time.  That scandal will likely serve to place the Church under 
even greater scrutiny in its various ministries.  No doubt there will be repercussions to 
Catholic Health Care, and may they may now be experiencing some. 
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services such as health care and operate on principles that do not always coincide with 
those of the culture?  In the previous chapter, it was argued that a democracy is the 
society in which that scenario can most effectively be obtained.  And yet, some of the 
actions available to groups in a democracy might prove to be the downfall of Catholic 
health care.  What we hope to determine in this chapter are ways in which compromise 
might be countenanced by Catholic hospitals.  Absent the moral advisability to do that, 
we will consider what methods Catholic moral theology has to handle these conflicts. 
 
I. MORAL CONFLICT 
 The differences between the teachings that the Catholic hospital must follow 
and the values of a secular society can be broadly attributed to differences in world 
view.  From a Catholic perspective, life is seen as a gift from God, a gift that comes 
with certain obligations to maintain it and for which autonomy is limited: individuals 
are not the ultimate arbiters of their lives.  This can be generally compared to the 
(arguably) dominant paradigm of twenty-first century America with the individual as 
ultimate arbiter over his or her life, autonomy is generally valued above 
interdependence, and obligations to society come after obligations to self.  To fully 
examine the moral conflict arising from these different world views, we need to 
consider the histories of both the ongoing moral debate that has grown out of issues 
surrounding abortion, as well as the historical development of the modern hospital and 
especially the roles played by various groups of women religious.   
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     A. The Backdrop to Conflicts Regarding Reproductive Services 
 Many of the moral conflicts arising at Catholic Hospitals concern reproductive 
services, and have at their base, moral issues relating to the long and rancorous 
abortion debate.  That debate with its far-reaching implications presents many of the 
impediments to compromise in this case.4  So perhaps it is fitting to set this stage with 
a brief historical overview of the abortion debate to help understand the charged 
environment in which Catholic Hospitals now operate. 
 What is it, in particular, that makes the provision of reproductive services, or 
lack thereof, such a volatile issue?  On one side there is the belief that the ability to 
conceive is the co-creative process that humans share with God.  As such, it holds an 
almost sacred place in human life, and the range of morally permissible sexual acts is 
quite limited: usually placing the act of sexual intercourse within the bonds of a 
heterosexual marriage and limited use (or complete proscription) of artificial means of 
birth control, sterilization, and abortive remedies.   
 On the other hand, the biological fact that women have the unique ability to 
bear the burden of childbirth, as well as socially bearing the primary burden of child-
rearing, has been a persistent obstacle for women to earn equal rights and equal 
opportunities.  As such, the fight for women’s reproductive rights has been front and 
center in the women’s movement of the twentieth century and continues into the 
twenty-first.  In 1973, Roe v. Wade recognized the privacy issues inherent in a  
                                                 
4 The summer of 2001 illustrated how the abortion debate, and the polarized positions, has 
affected the political debate over stem cell research as well as cloning. 
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woman’s decision of whether to abort her developing fetus and was a milestone in this 
movement.  Now, over thirty years later, any moves to restrict this right to abort are 
met with vehement opposition.  This fight started out hostile and has, at many turns, 
been violent.  In the intervening years, the Supreme Court has reaffirmed Roe v. Wade.  
Roe v. Wade gave the woman what is tantamount to unrestricted choice in the first 
trimester of her pregnancy, in the second trimester the state ‘may’ regulate abortion 
procedures in ways that are related to maternal health, but in practice, abortion 
remains virtually unrestricted during the second trimester.  However, Roe v. Wade 
established that in the third trimester, after the 24th week of gestation when the fetus is 
viable, the state has a compelling interest in the viable fetus and so “…may, if it 
chooses, regulate, and even proscribe, abortion except where it is necessary, in 
appropriate medical judgment, for the preservation of the life or health of the 
mother.”5   The words “life or health of the mother” have led many on the ‘pro-life’ 
side to argue that the wide-ranging meanings of  ‘health’ have worked to render 
abortions virtually unrestricted, even in the third trimester. 
 To many, the right to choose to terminate a pregnancy has become part and 
parcel of the women’s movement.  Many claim that if a woman truly wants to be 
considered a feminist she must be pro-choice.  This position is politicized (many say it 
is merely a political issue) to the extent that the Democratic Party, as well as the 
National Organization of Women (NOW) have it as one of their party planks.  It was 
                                                 
5 Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 151-158 (1973). 
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often mentioned during the 2000 presidential race that the Republican Party should 
consider changing to a more pro-choice-friendly position to attract more women.  
 To further exacerbate the animosity between ‘pro-life’ forces and ‘pro-choice’6 
forces, the conservative position is usually identified with the religious right and 
attitudes that are considered regressive when it comes to women’s rights in general.  
Sue Sherwin lumps together conservatives and the Christian right, describing them as 
homophobic, misogynistic, and elitist.  She sees a relation between those beliefs and 
the fact that the system advocated by conservatives is especially harmful to poor 
women and children.  According to Sherwin, the conservatives are usually pushing not 
only a conservative social agenda, but also an elitist economic system.  In this way, 
advocates of women’s rights see poor women as bearing twice the burden.7     
 Primary to the most conservative positions regarding abortion, as well as 
possibly abortifacient methods of birth control, is the unwavering belief that after the 
‘moment’8 of conception, the genetically unique individual that is formed is worthy of 
respect and protection.  As the most vulnerable of all human life, it is worthy of the 
most protection.  While many see the developing fetus possessing a corresponding  
                                                 
6 Although there has been much written on the appropriate monikers for each of the sides in 
this battle, (i.e. some pro-lifers describe their opponents as ‘anti-life,’ likewise some pro-
choice advocates label their opponents ‘anti-choice,’ names that each side would respectively 
deny) I am using the conventional names which each side has adopted as their own descriptor.  
7 Sue Sherwin, No Longer Patient; Feminist Ethics and Health Care (Philadelphia: Temple 
University Press, 1992):113. 
8 Most holding a conservative position acknowledge that conception is a process and not an 
instant in time, however, they still maintain that there is a point prior to implantation that an 
individual, genetically distinct from either of its progenitors, comes into existence and which 
deserves protection.  
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developing moral status throughout gestation, one holding a conservative position 
might employ the argument from potential holding that even at its most minute 
existence, it contains all of the genetic substance that it needs to become an actualized 
human.  And because conception occurs prior to implantation, one holding this 
position is likewise opposed to any drug or procedure that prevents implantation as 
well as having limitations on how that embryo can be treated which will have 
implications for infertility treatments, use of stem cells and therapeutic cloning, to 
name a few. 
 In this charged environment, it is easy to see why decisions by institutions to 
provide or restrict reproductive services are so incendiary.  In many places where 
hospital mergers are being considered, these decisions have become front-page news 
for several weeks and months at a time.9  The explosive nature of the issues of 
women’s reproductive rights, including decisions regarding when life is worthy of 
defense and who gets the right to make that decision, lays the groundwork for some of 
the problems arising from Catholic hospitals’ acquisitions of and mergers with other 
hospitals as well as their general operations absent merger or acquisition activity.  
However, almost ten years after the flurry of merger and acquisition activity the 
environment has become hostile to Catholic health care in general.  In numerous state 
                                                 
9 Tom Flynn, “Can Secular Patients Survive Catholic Hospitals?” Free Inquiry vol. 21, iss. 1 
(Winter 2000):32.  The merger of Bayfront Medical Center in St. Petersburg, FL with seven 
other Tampa Bay hospitals to form BayCare Health System in 1997 had stories printed almost 
continuously from July 1997 through the following January.  The story became heightened 
when a lawsuit was filed to stop the merger and continued through 2001.  
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legislatures bills have been proposed to require all health care institutions to offer all 
reproductive services.  This will be discussed in more detail later in this chapter.  
     B. A Brief History of the Modern Hospital and the Roles of Women Religious 
 The Ursuline Sisters from France were the first group of Catholic women 
religious to arrive in the new world.  Shortly after 1727, they opened their hospital in 
New Orleans.  When Thomas Jefferson purchased Louisiana and the Western 
Territory from France in 1803, The Ursuline Sisters wanted reassurance that they 
would be welcome and independent in the United States.  According to Arthur Jones, 
Jefferson told the Ursulines their property was “sacred and 
inviolate” and that their institution would be “permitted to govern 
itself according to its own voluntary rules and without interference 
from the civil authority.”10 
 
 Jones notes the irony that what would be the first hospital established on the 
continental United States was the result of a merger.  Over the years the number of 
women religious who came to America grew.  In 1809, Elizabeth Ann Seton founded 
the Sisters of Charity, and shortly after her death, five Sisters of Charity managed and 
staffed the 50-bed Baltimore infirmary.  Many of the women religious coming to 
America were trained as educators; but they soon found that other social problems 
inhibited their ability to educate.  Overwhelming poverty, illness, homelessness and 
the number of orphans prompted them to build almshouses and orphanages.  They 
visited the sick in their homes but, given the number of homeless, they soon built 
                                                 
10 Arthur Jones, “Catholic Aim: Aid Poor, Survive,” National Catholic Register vol. 39, no. 31 
(6 June 2003). 
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modest infirmaries to care for the sick.  This was the beginning of the Catholic health 
system.   
 It was not until the 1960s with the advent of Medicare and Medicaid that what 
was considered a social service became a business.  Now hospitals that were once 
‘voluntary,’ and often provided services with no compensation were able to be 
profitable; Wall Street and the corporate world saw profits and the health care 
landscape was radically changed.   Employer-sponsored health care benefits and a lack 
of utilization review or even questioning of medical necessity fed into the profitability 
of health care.  However, costly advances in medical technology, an increased 
percentage of the Gross National Product (GNP) going to health care, the aging 
population, who was living longer and not always in better health, as well as the 
recession of the 1980s prompted new changes to the health care landscape.  Another 
trend during that time was the aging of many religious orders with fewer sisters to take 
their places.  These were the same orders which had established the hospital systems.  
It became clear to many of them that they had to consolidate for economies of scale.    
 During the 1980s, the Government lowered its Medicare and Medicaid 
reimbursements.  Additionally, ways to better utilize health care resources were 
explored: mechanisms such as utilization review committees and managed health care 
insurance plans became commonplace.  By the end of the decade, mergers and 
acquisitions among hospitals also became commonplace.  But the Catholic hospital 
systems were not merging only with their own kind, so to speak.  New challenges 
arose when Catholic hospitals merged with other-than-Catholic hospitals. 
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 The 1990s became the decade of a financial Darwinian struggle to eat or be 
eaten.  This was the time of the consolation and merging of several of the large 
Catholic hospital systems as well.  Ordinarily, these mergers and acquisitions would 
be newsworthy, but combine that with the fact that when mergers were between a 
Catholic facility and a non-Catholic facility, it became front page news.  Some groups 
already in existence, such as the ACLU, gave it close attention; other groups, such as 
Catholics for a Free Choice (CFFC) and MergerWatch, organized to deal with the 
‘threat’ of Catholic health care to reproductive rights.  Perhaps due to the work of 
these groups, there have been organized actions to both obstruct mergers in process as 
well as introduce legislation to mandate reproductive services by Catholic facilities 
and contraceptive coverage by all insurance plans.  The Catholic healthcare system has 
become one of the largest healthcare providers in the country, controlling 10 percent 
of the market.11  This has led some to level charges that this is a stealth attempt to 
eradicate women’s reproductive freedom.   
 Concurrent with the development of the modern Catholic hospital system was 
the growth of the field of bioethics.  The Catholic Church has a long history of taking 
positions on social issues; in the 1960s, when issues involving the clash between 
advancing medical technology and accepted notions of life and death emerged, 
Catholic moral theologians were some of the first ‘bioethicists’ writing and practicing 
in the nascent field.  For over forty years, the Catholic Church has spoken on virtually 
every issue regarding the ethical delivery of health care through writings by the Pope, 
                                                 
11 However, this percentage has remained constant for at least the past twenty years.   
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by the National Conference of Catholic Bishops (NCCB),12  and by individual 
Catholics, ordained and lay, writing within the field.  But the Church, through its vast 
healthcare system, is able to take a stand in a more direct way.  Its healthcare facilities 
can participate in the healing ministry of Jesus in the way the facilities are operated, 
by the services that are provided and the individuals who are served.  One way the 
ways the healing ministry of Jesus is lived is by following the Ethical and Religious 
Directives.  The Directives are developed in conjunction with Catholic moral 
theologians and promulgated by the USCCB.  They are based on Catholic moral 
theology (which has natural law theory as its philosophical base), scripture, and 
tradition.  The general argument in favor of life is often referred to as the ‘Seamless 
Garment’ argument.  This is a scriptural reference to Jesus’ seamless cloak, for which 
dice were thrown, rather than being torn into pieces because to tear a seamless 
garment would destroy its integrity.  From the beginning of life, conception, to the 
natural end of life, The Gospel of Life (Evangelium Vitae) gives a clear and consistent 
position on issues such as genetic screening, abortion, euthanasia and the death 
penalty.13   
 Specifically, in some of the services that are proscribed, the church’s position 
is surely counter-cultural.  As mentioned in Chapter One, if one were to discuss the 
increasing moral gravity of reproductive issues, with artificial means of birth control at 
one end and third trimester abortions on the other, we would see that, according to 
                                                 
12 Now known as the United States Conference of Catholic Bishops (USCCB). 
13 Pope John Paul II, The Gospel of Life (Evangelium Vitae) English translation by the Vatican 
(New York: Random House, 1995). 
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opinion polls, very few people have moral concerns with the former whereas the 
majority have concerns with the latter (albeit not when the life of the mother is at 
stake).14  Catholic healthcare facilities are proscribed from providing any of these 
services.  But the Catholic Church does not view this entire range of morally 
proscribed services as morally equivalent; moral distinctions can be made between the 
prevention of life and the taking of an existing life.   
By conceptualizing healthcare as a ministry, its practice becomes increasingly 
difficult in a secular society.  Because so much of American life has been defined in 
terms of rights – many of which run counter to basic Christian beliefs – Catholic 
healthcare increasingly comes under attack when it tries to operate within its 
Directives.   But it is just this principled approach which constitutes Catholic health 
care’s identity and ultimately the method by which it is able to provide health care 
with integrity.  These are essential components that cannot be lost to moral 
compromise.  
     C. Mergers and Acquisitions 
  1. ‘No Margin, No Mission’ 
 If the hospitals fail to become players in the market, which increasingly 
implies acquiring or merging with other facilities, the mission is at risk of being 
eliminated.  If Catholic healthcare facilities cease to exist, then a ministry vital to the 
                                                 
14 For example: LeMoyne College of Syracuse, NY and Zogby International of Utica, NY 
surveyed the beliefs of 1508 Roamn Catholics between October 25 and November 1, 2001 (as 
reported by Cathy Lynn Grossman in USA Today) with similar findings. 
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Church is lost; that ministry being a way to directly exemplify the teachings of Christ 
in caring for the sick, elderly and poor. 
 One might argue that to truly fulfill the mission of Christ, the healthcare 
facilities should not be reliant on the market economy.  One might even say that 
Catholic health care has compromised and has been compromised by being players in 
what is arguably an unjust system of health care delivery.  However, it should be noted 
that the Catholic health care system started as a voluntary system, and it has only been 
in the past four decades where health care has become more like a commodity; the 
injustice of the system has developed gradually over that time.  There is also evidence 
that the Catholic Health Association has consistently advocated on behalf of health 
care reform with an eye toward the poorest and most vulnerable.   
 If, as now is the case, the hospitals are players in the market they are forced to 
act that way.  One of the casualties of this situation directly involves which services 
are offered.  To be a market player means that one must be competitive.  To be 
competitive a facility may find itself offering only those services which are profitable 
– or in some cases –  they may find themselves offering services that operate at a loss 
for various reasons, but often because they are necessary to stay in the market.  
However, Michael Place, STD president of the Catholic Hospital Association states: 
On average, Catholic Hospitals offer a larger array of clinical 
services than facilities offered by for-profit corporations or by 
other not-for-profit sponsors.  Examples include neonatal intensive 
care units for preterm and other infants, trauma units, obstetric 
care, hospice and other end-of-life services, and HIV/AIDS 
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services.  While these services are important to most communities, 
frequently they do not pay for themselves.15 
 
So where these decisions might be governed by the bottom line, Catholic hospitals 
have shown that in several areas they let mission influence their ‘business’ decisions.
 2. Sole Provider Status and Groups Working to Oppose 
 When it became known that the availability of many reproductive services was 
the primary casualty of the mergers of Catholic and non-Catholic hospitals, groups 
such as Catholics for a Free Choice (CFFC) and MergerWatch were formed to fight 
such mergers and acquisitions.  The main charge leveled against the Catholic facilities 
was that they were steadfastly gaining market share through acquisitions and mergers, 
sometimes becoming the ‘only game in town,’ and then restricting reproductive 
services, often in communities not predominantly Catholic.  This is seen as tantamount 
to forcing the Catholic Church’s moral beliefs on the members of the community.  The 
increased attention to mergers and acquisitions involving Catholic hospitals only 
served to bring these issues to the fore in the popular media.16  This has these facilities 
the target of much criticism, including:  
• the poor are usually most affected by the unavailability of services, 
• emergency contraception is not given to rape victims, (or when it is, it is given 
covertly in the parking lot),17 and 
                                                 
15 Father Michael Place, “Conscience Clauses and Catholic Health Care,” Origins vol. 33, no. 
14 (September 11, 2003):225-229. 
16 In fact, it was a discussion with a professor and a piece on National Public Radio regarding 
the limitation of reproductive services by a hospital which was a sole provider in a community 
that piqued my interest in this topic in the mid 1990s. 
17 It became clear during research for this work that this claim, effective at rousing 
indignation, was actually very misleading.  This issue will be discussed more fully at the end 
of this chapter.   
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• not providing certain reproductive services when the Catholic facility is the 
only provider in the region. 
 
The ‘fact’ about the increased number of areas where mergers left a Catholic facility 
as the sole provider received a great deal of attention at the time.  However, varying 
presentations of the statistics give very different pictures.  Catholics for a Free Choice 
(CFFC) state in their publication When Catholic and Non-Catholic Hospitals Merge: 
Reproductive Health Compromised: 
In 1994, CFFC identified 46 Catholic sole provider hospitals dispersed 
across 17 states.  The number has now shot up to 76 Catholic sole 
provider hospitals, spread across 26 states.  Some of these hospitals 
serve counties (most of them rural) where Catholics make up less than 
1 percent of the population.  These Catholic hospitals are essentially 
rewarded, through higher rates of Medicare reimbursement, while they 
deny reproductive health care to an entire county.18 
 
However, this is not the case.  First, the Health Care Financing Administration 
(HCFA) does not consider ‘sole provider hospital’ in a county as designation for 
special reimbursement.  HCFA does reimburse providers who meet the criterion for 
“sole community hospital” status which is based primarily on travel distance to 
another like hospital.  And so, for example, in 1997 of the 1600 hospitals which were 
the only hospital in their county: 
• 50 percent were within 17 miles or less from their nearest hospital neighbor, 
• 75 percent were within 22 miles or less from their nearest hospital neighbor, 
• 90 percent were within 31 miles or less from their nearest hospital neighbor. 
 
Additionally, if you look at the actual figures of those Catholic hospitals who met the  
                                                 
18 Liz Bucar for Catholics For a Free Choice, When Catholic and Non-Catholic Hospitals 
Merge: Reproductive Health Compromised (Catholics For a Free Choice, 1998) emphasis 
mine.   
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criteria of sole provider status according to HCFA, you see that the number of  
Catholic sole providers in a community “shot up” from 81 in 1994 to 84 by 1999.19 
 3. Compromises 
As discussed in Chapter Three there are forces at work that often impel us to 
compromise at the cost of our integrity, or other identity-conferring values.  To do so 
might be the expedient course of action, but rarely does that sustain for the long term.   
In some cases, Catholic hospitals in certain dioceses were able to get around 
the proscription of surgical sterilizations by claiming that they were under duress, a 
condition which then permits immediate material cooperation.  The Fourth Edition of 
the Directives were amended in 2001 to address just this type of issue; those hospital 
systems now find themselves trying to get the water back over the damn (this topic 
will be covered in-depth later in this chapter).  Exceptions claimed under duress could 
also be categorized as prudent, but that ground is questionable, especially when 
integrity is at stake.   
Some creative solutions to the challenges of mergers between Catholic and 
non-Catholic in the early 1990s included:  
• the Catholic partner forgoes its share of net income derived from reproductive 
health services,  
• the partners lease space in one hospital to a separate corporate entity that 
provides reproductive health services with no participation from the Catholic 
partner,  
• the hospitals designate on-site physician offices as private practices and invoke 
doctor-patient confidentiality to cover family planning and sterilization,  
                                                 
19 Lewin Group analysis of Medicare PPS Impact File for 1997, December 1998 and March 
1999. 
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• the merger agreement exempts personnel of the formerly Catholic facility from 
providing reproductive health services,  
• the non-Catholic partner creates an endowment, prior to the merger, to fund 
abortion-related services through the local Planned Parenthood, and  
• two hospitals enter a “virtual merger,” collaborating closely without merging 
assets, and therefore neither applying the Directives  to the non-Catholic 
partner nor associating the Catholic facility with services provided at the non-
Catholic facility.20 
 
One such compromise took place in Austin, Texas in the mid-1990s.  There the public 
hospital, Brackenridge, was facing a crushing $38 million debt, primarily due to the 20 
percent of the population without insurance.  The proposed solution called for the city 
to lease Brackenridge and the adjoining Children’s Hospital to the Seton Healthcare 
Network.  To address the proscription of sterilization and contraceptive services, “the 
initial solution…in 1995 was a ‘wall of separation’ – meaning that Seton Staff didn’t 
provide proscribed services, city staff did.”21  However, after several of these creative 
compromises were in place, bishops in some dioceses received complaints by 
individuals in those communities.  This topic was taken up prior to the June 2001 
meeting of the USCCB, where the Directives were amended to close the loophole of 
‘duress.’  This drew additional attention to other compromises that didn’t seem to 
meet the requirements of material cooperation.  So the administrators of Seton Health 
Care and Austin city officials went back to the negotiating table where they devised 
the idea of a ‘condominium hospital,’ a sort of hospital-within-a-hospital.  At 
                                                 
20 Catholics for a Free Choice, When Catholic and Non-Catholic Hospitals Merge.  These 
‘compromises’ may preserve integrity; however, how these arrangements are presented to the 
public and its coworkers is key to whether they maintain integrity.  . 
21 Suzanne Batchelor, “Clash and Compromise: Ethics at Issue when Public Hospital is Put 
into Catholic Hands,” National Catholic Register vol. 39, no. 33 (4 July 2003). 
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 Brackenridge, the fifth floor was leased back to the city and all the reproductive 
services proscribed by the Directives were performed there.  This agreement met with 
the approval of the bishop, however, when the Vatican reviewed it they found it 
‘minimally acceptable’ and others were told not to use it as a model. 
     D.   Organized Opposition to Catholic Health Care – Two Main Directions 
 The sequelae of the mergers and acquisitions have become dire for the 
Catholic health care system.  The strategies of those who oppose the limitation of 
reproductive services will be discussed in this section.  The organized opposition has 
two main thrusts to their activities: the first encompasses attempts to impede and 
ultimately prevent mergers from occurring; the second includes activities to facilitate 
the development of mandates that certain reproductive services be provided by all 
hospitals as well as mandates of contraceptive benefits with all health care insurance.  
We will explore each of these categories in turn.  I hope to show that one sort of 
activity is more conducive to ‘compromise’ than the other. 
 The coordinated activities of the ACLU and other groups22 have made both 
compromising and standing firm virtual losing propositions for Catholic health care.  
To compromise would bring the wrath of avid pro-life groups upon the hospitals as 
well as local bishops; to stand firm provokes the wrath and added legislative activity 
                                                 
22 The list of groups actively working in this area include: The Alan Guttmacher Institute, 
American Public Health Association, CARAL Pro-choice Educations Fund, Catholics for a 
Free Choice, Center for Reproductive Law and Policy, Feminist Majority Foundation, 
MergerWatch, NARAL Pro-Choice Resource Center, Inc., National Health Law Program, 
National Women’s Law Center, Planned Parenthood Federation of America, The ProChoice 
Resource Center, Inc. and Religious Coalition for Reproductive Choice.  
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of the groups who oppose.  These areas of activity include: regulation, legislation, 
adjudication and public relations.  Each of these will be discussed with examples in 
the following sections. 
 1.  Work to Hamper Mergers 
 a. If Carried Out with Integrity, This is Democracy in Action 
 One of the ways the groups opposed to the limitations of Catholic health care 
have approached the problem is through information sharing.  The attempts to educate 
the public to the subtleties (and not-so-subtle aspects) of prospective mergers in their 
areas to enable democratic deliberation, their actions are admirable.  This type of 
education can empower an often alienated public.  And if the public forms a grass-
roots campaign to resist the merger in their area or to hold the government officials (if 
a publicly owned facility is on the block) or the corporate executives to accountability, 
this is democracy in action.  In this case then, a group often without power, becomes 
empowered and expresses their dissent from what might appear to be a fait accompli; 
this is an act to be treasured in a pluralistic democracy.  Some of the news reports of 
the BayCare Health System merger resemble this.  A coalition of community activists 
was able to motivate city officials to file suit in federal court to have the municipal 
hospital, Bayfront, released from its contract.  One of their points of contention 
involved misleading information regarding the Directives.  There were eight hospitals 
in the merger, and according to news reports, they were told explicitly that the 
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Directives would not apply to BayFront Medical Center.23  It is imperative that these 
actions be carried out with integrity, and this sort of process lives up to those demands.  
This process also has to its credit that it allows for dissent, works through the system 
and is conducive to maintaining communities.   
b. Circumstances Are Such that Catholic Hospitals Should Cooperate and    
Even ‘Compromise’    
 
In the above case, one can legitimately question why the Catholic network 
must insist that all eight of the facilities in the Tampa Bay area be designated as 
Catholic facilities, especially when the questioning is prompted by the citizens of that 
community.   
In each diocese the bishop is the ultimate arbiter of the how the Directives are 
applied in his diocese.  This can lead to variations in practice; what is a legitimate 
interpretation of the Directives in one diocese is not applicable in another.  One might 
argue that this allows for variations in customs and traditions specific to certain 
populations or distinct geographic areas.  Perhaps a more convincing argument is that 
this allows for the pastoral capability of the bishop.  However, either justification 
leaves Catholic health care open to criticism, and the onus is on them (all of the 
players: bishops and Catholic hospitals administrators) to justify why ‘an exception’ or 
‘compromise’ was valid in one situation and not in another.  In Chapter One we talked 
about Claire who went to the hospital in her community, which unbeknownst to her, 
had been merged with the Catholic hospital and was now practicing under the 
                                                 
23 However, a companion suit was filed by the ACLU and other groups that may fall into the 
other category of actions; that case will be discussed later. 
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Directives.  Perhaps what is most frustrating (to all involved) is that, according most 
individuals involved in these decisions at Catholic hospitals, in this case an early 
induction of delivery would be acceptable according to Directive 47: 
Operations, treatments, and medications that have as their direct 
purpose the cure of a proportionately serious pathological condition of 
a pregnant woman are permitted when they cannot be safely postponed 
until the unborn child is viable, even if they will result in the death of 
the unborn child. 
 
 To justify compromise, each side should have a position that at the very least 
meets the demand for respect for the dignity of the human person.  As well, each side 
should approach the other with this respect.   
 c. Other Options   
The Catholic Health Association (CHA) has been a vocal advocate for all 
facets of Catholic Health Care, from defending the conscience clause to lobbying for 
reform of the health care system.   
As a ministry, Catholic healthcare might return to an eleemosynary system, 
subsidized only through charitable contributions.  Those able to pay through insurance 
or other means would be required to pay; those unable to pay would be served.  The 
Church would then be able to stand by its beliefs and clearly make these Directives 
known (as sometimes is NOT the case presently) and provide only those services that 
abide by the Directives.  In this way, the message is clearly stated, the facility stands 
up for their mission, and they are only at risk of criticism from those who disagree 
with their mission, rather than criticisms regarding justice issues. As the system stands 
now, this is not feasible.   
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Some Catholic health systems have had to face dire situations and reassess 
their ability to continue to fund hospitals continually operating at a loss.  One such 
move was the Sisters of Mercy Hospital in Laredo, Texas.  The hospital could not 
continue to operate at a deficit, nor could the other hospitals in the system continue to 
keep it afloat.  After much thought and involvement from the various stakeholders, the 
decision was made to sell the hospital to a for-profit corporation.  The Sisters of 
Mercy were then able to take the proceeds from the sale to set up a fund to minister to 
the health care and social service needs of a largely immigrant community.  A similar 
situation had occurred for the in the Mercy System a few years prior to this in New 
Orleans, Louisiana.  This chapter ends with what may be a prophetic statement by a 
Catholic theologian regarding the Church’s continued ability to participate in this 
country’s health care system. 
 2.  Work to Mandate Services and Coverage 
 As mentioned earlier, the actions of groups opposed to the limitation of 
Catholic health care services includes the areas of regulation, legislation, adjudication, 
and public relations.  The scope of the changes pursued extend to mandating that 
certain reproductive services be provided at hospitals as well as mandating health 
insurance coverage by those employers who provide health care insurance.  Examples 
of these will follow in this section. 
 What this area of opposition points to is the larger issue of the role of religion 
in the public square – which is certainly beyond the scope of this work – but which is 
clearly important.  How do we reconcile public policy when it concerns moral and 
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religious beliefs without getting to the point of acceding to the project of ‘liberal 
constitutionalism’ as defined by Stephen Carter: 
…the effort to use the power of the federal government, and to interpret 
the Constitution, in a way that creates a single, nationwide community 
with shared values and shared, enforceable understandings of how local 
communities of all descriptions should be organized.24 
 
 a. Examples of the Project of Liberal Constitutionalism 
 To use the language of Stephen Carter, we should explore the coordinated 
actions against Catholic health services to determine if these are instances of attempts 
for redress of injury.  In cases where mergers are clearly leaving members of a 
community with services they use, the citizens of the community object, and the 
organized activists offer to assist the citizens in their ‘petitions for redress of injuries’  
it does not meet the level of completing the liberal constitutionalist project.  However, 
to have clearly stated goals of activities that will lead to, and in some cases intend, the 
eradication of Catholic health care services appear to go beyond the redress of injury.   
 The concerted moves strive for uniformity across all communities; this not 
only destroys communities of meaning, it does damage to diversity as well.  One 
might legitimately question why it is important for these communities of meaning to 
survive, especially one that is said to oppress women.  What seems unreasonable in 
these cases is that all of Catholic health care services are reduced to the terms of what 
they do not provide, rather than considering it in entirety: its history, tradition, and 
continued service to the poor and vulnerable.  What does it mean to have a community 
                                                 
24 Carter, Dissent of the Governed, 19. 
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of meaning?  Health care is a ministry of the Catholic Church, but why must it be 
maintained in its current form?  Some would say it need not.  But first consider the 
study by the Georgetown University Institute for Health Care Research and Policy that 
concluded that Catholic hospitals form a safety-net to the American health care 
system.  This study pointed out the amount of charity care provided by Catholic health 
care provider and what a vital role they play as a safety-net to the 44 million uninsured 
or low-income Americans.25  Catholic institutions are not only ways to carry out the 
Church’s mission to  
teach the young, care for the sick, and serve the poor…They are good 
for society at large…[and which] argues for voluntary societies 
mediating between government and the individual person…[making] it 
possible for the characteristic Catholic values of the dignity of the 
individual, the importance of the common good, and special concern 
for the poor to become more present in our institutional structure and 
contemporary ethos.26 
 
What does not seem to be considered by those in the organized opposition is, what 
will be lost if Catholic hospitals must choose between honoring their faith and 
continuing to operate hospitals?  
 b. Demanding an Overreaching of the Courts 
 As stated, the organized activities involve the areas of regulation, legislation, 
adjudication, and public relations.  It should be noted that some of these conflicts 
make their way into professional society statements and activities; three in particular 
                                                 
25 Georgetown University Institute for Health Care Research and Policy, A Commitment To 
Caring: The Role of Catholic Hospitals in the Health Care Safety Net (November 2002). 
26 Charles Curran, “The Catholic Identity of Catholic Institutions,” Theological Studies vol. 
58, no.1 (March 1997) 90-109. 
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at the American Medical Association (AMA), the American College of Obstetrics and 
Gynecology (ACOG) and the American Bar Association (ABA).   
 At the June 2000 meeting of the AMA, Resolution 218 was presented that 
would have made hospitals offer a full complement of reproductive services if they 
offered any perinatal services.27  After testimony from a Catholic Cardinal opposing 
the resolution, it was passed in an amended form allowing for exceptions based on 
reasons of conscience.  If the AMA had been able to push this through the federal 
legislative branch then the sanction for not abiding by this would be the loss of 
Medicare and Medicaid funding.  This would, in effect, force the closing of sectarian 
hospitals or force them to provide services against their stated beliefs.  Might this be a 
good case for compromise – and what compromise might preserve integrity?  But first 
we should ask, what was the real intent of Resolution 218?  It might have been 
designed to prompt a negotiation on these issues, to perhaps further a compromise.  
This is possibly a good impetus to compromise, to push someone to the edge.  This 
resembles the ‘horsetrading’ paradigm where I demand more than I know my 
opposition will give me, but we ‘settle’ on an amount that I was aiming for.  However, 
this is not conducive to an integrity-preserving moral compromise because, as we 
discussed in earlier chapters, matters of moral concern should not be bartered like 
exchangeable interests.   
                                                 
27 This resolution was proposed by a physician from California in direct response to the 
problems resulting from mergers and acquisitions in his state. 
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 During the ‘partial birth abortion’ debate, ACOG issued a statement.  While 
defending physicians’ rights to make these difficult decisions with their patients and 
without government involvement, they at the same time include: 
The policy statement notes that although a select panel convened by 
ACOG could identify no circumstances under which intact D&X would 
be the only option to protect the life or health of a woman, intact D&X 
“may be the best or most appropriate procedure in a particular 
circumstance to save the life or preserve the health of a woman, and 
only the doctor, in consultation with the patient, based upon the 
woman’s particular circumstances, can make this decision.”28 
 
 In the area of regulation activities, the opposing groups use spheres of 
influence to get government officials involved.  For example, these groups have 
involved state attorneys general to have an ultimate say as to whether a merger should 
be finalized.  Most recently, a news report from Massachusetts indicated that the 
Massachusetts attorney general was recommending that he have a say as to which 
Catholic seminarians should be ordained priests.29  This latest move is clearly an 
indication of the lack of leadership from church officials during the sex scandal, but 
the involvement of a state attorney general is a big step to take in the realm of church-
state relations. 
 In the legislative area, there are moves to link Medicare certification with the 
provisions of “full services,” which means a provision of all reproductive services 
similar to the AMA’s resolution 218.  There have also been legislative moves to  
                                                 
28 ACOG News Release, “Statement on So-Called ‘Partial Birth Abortion’ Law” (October 3, 
2003). 
29 Zenit News Agency, “Cardinal George Warns of Trend in Church-State Ties” (November 
13, 2003). 
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mandate the provision of emergency contraception by all hospitals, in some cases by 
any woman requesting it, and not limited to women who have been sexually assaulted.  
This latter case will be covered in detail in Chapter Five. 
 In the adjudication arena, there are moves to influence rulings on mergers 
through challenges of charitable asset laws.  In effect, to derail a sale or merger of a 
secular not-for-profit to a Catholic not-for-profit they claim that a change of the 
secular hospital to follow the Catholic Directives is a legally impermissible change of 
the mission of the secular not-for-profit. 
 The public relations area possibly has the most opposition activity on any 
given day.  The ongoing attacks on Catholic health care in the public forum are most 
effective on websites and in the popular media.  There are numerous examples: 
• A study published which claims that victims of sexual attacks were denied care 
at Catholic hospitals, 
• Language changes: shifting ‘conscience clause’ to ‘refusal clause’ gives these 
laws a starkly different connotation; attempting to change to definition of 
‘religious’ for religious exemptions, whereby the other institutions that meet 
that standard are those that employ primarily members of that faith and 
minister primarily to members of that faith.  Catholic hospitals, nor Catholic 
Schools nor Catholic social service agencies would meet that requirement.  
Nor would the work of Mother Theresa, i.e., her work would not be covered 
under a ‘religious’ exemption because she did not serve primarily Catholic 
persons with AIDS! 
• Groups arguing that because Catholic hospitals do not provide abortions or 
sterilizations, patients do not receive accepted medical “standards of care” and 
then are, by implication, receiving substandard care.   
 
 c. Misuse of Power 
Moral compromise when battled in the public arena leaves little room for 
integrity.  Perhaps the residual effects of the antagonistic nature of the abortion debate 
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make it virtually impossible to meet some of the conditions for compromise which 
were set forth in Chapter Three.  When misinformation and spin are the currency, 
there is not much room for democratic deliberations.  It is difficult to deny the 
acrimony present in many of the media presentations.  It was earlier stated that, in 
democratic deliberations, a willingness to act in response to another’s argument, to 
show respect for fellow rational beings, to lessen strife, and to promote good will were 
all necessary conditions for any moral compromise with the chance to preserve 
integrity.  Instead of moral deliberation where fine distinctions are made, in today’s 
public discussion, spin is the currency, and swaying public opinion is the goal.  This 
does not get us to the better epistemic credentials of which Postow speaks.30 
 Each side has mobilized its members and it is hard to hear through the chatter.  
Lest it appear that the left is taking undue criticism here, similar points can be made 
with the case of Terri Schiavo, the 39-year-old woman who has been in a confirmed 
Persistent Vegetative State for the past thirteen years.  
 d. No Obligation to Compromise, Call to Get Out the ‘Rest of the Story’ 
 However, the most questionable justification for compromise comes when one 
compromises while being coerced.  Many would claim that these groups have attacked 
the wrong target.  In many cases, the Catholic hospitals are really stuck in the middle 
between the avid pro-life groups and ACLU and other strong opposition groups.   
 What is the cost of this activity? Not only will important social services be 
threatened, there are costs to reason.  Their attacks have served to privilege the part 
                                                 
30 See Chapter Three and Postow’s notion of bare-but-respectful compromise. 
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(reproductive rights) over the whole (health care system) which might possibly lead to 
the death of the whole.   
Other less than honorable reasons that might constrain us from compromising 
include the shifting of power.  The one in power may be unwilling to level the playing 
field; from the position of power there is little incentive to compromise.  And even if 
the Catholic hospitals, which hold the power in this situation, were inclined to level 
the playing field, to want these services to be provided elsewhere may constitute 
cooperation, which will be discussed later in the chapter. 
As will be discussed in the next chapter, Catholic moral theology and the 
Directives never require the health care provider to abandon the patient.  One of the 
most common misconceptions is that Catholic hospitals are required to privilege fetal 
life over the life of the mother.   
 The preceding discussion shows some of the problems with navigating moral 
conflict by considering compromise and the attendant challenges it makes to integrity, 
both institutional and individual.  There are various factors at work that indicate moral 
compromise may not be especially advisable for Catholic hospitals.  Now let us turn to 
Catholic moral theology to determine if there are some moral tools with which to deal 
with this morass. 
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II. PROCESS OF COMPROMISING: HOW DOES CATHOLIC MORAL 
 THEOLOGY HANDLE THIS? 
 
 The Principle of Cooperation might be viewed as the tool for moral 
compromise in Catholic Moral Theology.  Originally designed as a pastoral tool to 
guide individuals on how closely they could participate in the evil actions of others, 
the principle of cooperation has been expanded to include how Catholic institutions 
can operate in a pluralistic society and maintain the integrity of their mission.  
Whether applied to individual or institution, it helps negotiate ways to be in the world 
but not of the world.  In June 2001, this tool of compromise was significantly dulled 
by the actions of the USCCB with the newly revised ERDs.  In this revision of the 
ERDs, surgical sterilization, heretofore the most morally perplexing case of material 
cooperation in the hospital mergers and acquisitions, has been moved to the category 
of “should not be considered for potential cooperation regardless of duress.”  This 
places it in the same category as abortion and euthanasia, which has led some to 
question whether the bishops are now equating the moral evil of these actions.  But to 
bring us to the present use of this principle it is important to explore its original 
intended application, its development to the present and the problems it has 
encountered along the way. 
     A. A Brief Overview of the Principle of Cooperation 
 The principle of cooperation differentiates the action of the potential 
cooperator from the action of the wrongdoer through two major distinctions: the first 
concerns the intentions of the cooperator, and the second concerns the object of the 
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action.  To determine to what extent I may cooperate in another’s wrongdoing, the 
first question I must ask is, ‘do I intend the object of the wrongdoer’s activity?’  If the 
answer to this question is in the affirmative, then my cooperation is considered formal 
and therefore morally impermissible.  However, intention is not just an explicit act of 
the will.  I may say that I do not intend the object of the wrongdoer’s activity, but in 
the absence of another explanation that will distinguish my object from the 
wrongdoer’s object I am said to be in implicit formal cooperation with the wrongdoer, 
which is morally impermissible, e.g. the judge who believes divorce to be immoral 
and yet who adjudicates only divorce cases.  If I do not intend the object of the 
wrongdoer’s activity, then my cooperation is material, and it may be morally 
permissible. 
 To determine if material cooperation is morally permissible, a further 
distinction must be made regarding the object of the action in question.  If the object 
of the cooperator is the same as the object of the wrongdoer, this is considered 
immediate material cooperation and is morally impermissible except in some cases of 
duress.  “The matter of duress distinguishes immediate material cooperation from 
implicit formal cooperation.”31  However, without the intervening conditions of 
duress, immediate material cooperation is equivalent to implicit formal cooperation, 
and both are morally impermissible.  The nurse who works for an abortion clinic and 
who assists in abortion procedures without any countervailing pressures is an example 
of this.  If the object of the cooperator’s action is distinguishable from the object of the 
                                                 
31 ERDs, in Appendix “The Principles Governing Cooperation,” 1994. 
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wrongdoer’s action, then this is considered mediate material cooperation and may be 
morally permissible.  “Mediate material cooperation can be justified if there is a 
significant reason to engage in the proposed course of action and if scandal can be 
avoided.”32  Under mediated material cooperation we are to be as remote and the least 
proximate as possible from the act of wrongdoing; and the reason for cooperation must 
be serious.  Later we will see that it is at this juncture that determining “serious” in 
itself is problematic.   
     B. Origins and Intended Usage 
Once confined to a single lecture in fundamental moral theology for use in 
private counseling, the principle of cooperation is now a staple in the Catholic 
bioethicist’s analysis kit.  In the past it focused on single all-too-human agents to 
advise private persons about involvement in cooperative enterprises with others whose 
intentions harbored ethical impropriety.   The principles of cooperation are tricky and 
inevitably involve dispute and disagreement.  Moral theologians since the eighteenth 
century have agreed that they are the most difficult of all principles to apply because 
they concern the borderline between the realm of prudential decision and the realm of 
violation of principle.  A theologian quoted by Richard McCormick in this Notes on 
Theology describes this area whose “demarcation [is] infinitesimally narrow, but 
always infinitely deep.”  Other noted theologians have said about the principle of 
cooperation that “there is no more difficult question than this in the whole range of 
                                                 
32 Russell E. Smith, “Ethical Quandary: Forming Hospital Partnerships,” Linacre Quarterly 
(May 1996):89. 
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Moral Theology,” and regarding the disagreement among theologians, “this 
disagreement happens among the most competent moral theologians.”33 
 James Keenan allows that until recent years the principle was used to help 
individuals; however, he maintains that in today’s reconfiguring of healthcare it is 
acceptable and advisable to apply in analogous and legitimate ways.  Keenan discusses 
three categories of individuals with whom one might need to employ the principle: 
superiors, partners and clients.  Classic examples he cites for each include: the servant 
transporting letters to a woman with whom his master was having an affair, the spouse 
who practices birth control against the will of the partner, and the nurse who assists 
the physician in an illicit operation.  In a later article, Keenan included two other 
classes of cooperation cases.  The first of these two concerns is when someone has the 
right to perform a particular act, but others who perform the same act have wrong 
intentions.  The other class of case includes those who cooperate in order to diminish 
the physically evil effects of another’s morally wrong actions.  The classic example he 
supplies is the belt-offering wife of the husband intent on beating his children with a 
baseball bat.   
Similar instances of material cooperation for the sake of diminishing 
the physical effects of moral evil are found in the cases of priests giving 
communion to unworthy recipients, judges presiding over divorce 
cases, doctors working in clinics that provide birth control instruction, 
nurses assisting in illicit operation, etc.  Effectively, in each case the 
agent asks at some point in her deliberations whether more harm than 
good could occur by her failure to cooperate materially.34 
 
                                                 
33 James Keenan, “Institutional Cooperation and the Ethical and Religious Directives,” 
Linacre Quarterly (August 1997):54-61. 
34 Keenan, 1997, 60-61. 
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These examples illustrate that the principle evolved in its application in context-
specific cases.  But this last class of cases differs considerably from the classes of 
cases with subordinates.  Keenan gives us four foundational insights for approaching 
the principle.  First it is a guiding principle rather than a permitting principle.  Second, 
we should avoid situations that employ this principle as much as possible.  Third, one 
of the basic reasons for the use of the principle is to contain evil, and fourth, the 
principle cannot be applied mechanistically.35 
     C. Problems with the Application of the Principle of Cooperation 
 All commentators on the principle of cooperation seem to agree on the fine 
distinctions it must make, its complexity and its easily misunderstood nature that can 
lead to scandal.  Accusations of ‘wink, wink, nudge, nudge-ing,’ rationalizations and 
even ‘phariseeism’ are made by many, and Russell Smith acknowledges, “The careful 
distinctions that have certain clarity on the blackboard of the theology department lose 
their focus in the minds of practical Anglo-Saxons.”36  It is notable that the 1994 
revision of the ERDs contains an explanation of the principle of cooperation in the 
appendix whereas it has been removed in the 2001 edition.  A brief history of the 
process by which the appendix was added in 1994, as well as why it was removed in 
2001, are good indications of the complexity and problematic nature of the principle. 
 James Keenan reports that it took six years and eleven drafts of the ERDs 
before the NCCB Committee on Doctrine was ready to offer it to the full assembly of 
                                                 
35 Keenan, 1997, 56-57. 
36 Smith, 1996, 92. 
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bishops.  The explanation of the principle of cooperation went from a “modest 
description of each of the principle’s conditions” to a “virtual skeletal outline” which 
was deemed not user-friendly, to including several cases, both personal and 
institutional, but “when faced with these cases the bishops fell into disagreement with 
one another.”37  They eventually removed the cases, returned to the original version 
and labored over the wording of the text.  Finally, it was presented to the NCCB 
assembly.  Keenan summarizes the process,  
But, consensus was eventually achieved in an atmosphere of mutual 
trust and respect.  That atmosphere must be promoted today among 
negotiating boards, ethicists and chanceries, if Catholic health care is to 
survive into the next century, for the principle of cooperation is a major 
guide in the present negotiations of joint ventures, mergers and 
partnerships.38 
 
     D. Individual Versus Institutional 
 
It is often questioned whether a principle intended to guide individual actions 
can legitimately be applied to the actions of an institution.  James Keenan brings 
together two notions: that the principle has historically allowed for individuals of 
conscience within institutions the ability to prevent further morally wrong behavior 
with the idea that today the principle of cooperation allows institutions “to maintain 
their distinctive moral contribution to a pluralistic society that increasingly permits 
and promotes morally unacceptable practice.”39  Keenan also says this notion is 
exemplified by the Vatican’s negotiation of concordances and treaties with foreign 
powers.  This was also exemplified in the NCCB’s support of the Hyde Amendment of 
                                                 
37 Keenan, 1997, 55. 
38 Keenan, 1997, 55-56. 
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recent years, where the action was not to end abortion but to limit it.  By its 
hierarchical nature, the Roman Catholic Church it would seem would be particularly 
comfortable with applying this principle at the institutional level.   
Another Catholic moral theologian, Germain Grisez, claims that the 
application of the principle of cooperation to institutions makes the likelihood and 
seriousness of possible scandal all the worse.  A Catholic institution claims to be 
different from other institutions by virtue of its Catholic mission, “whatever it does is 
taken by many non-Catholics and even less sophisticated Catholics to be the Church’s 
own act; and its acts are presumed to be fully deliberate and free, not the product of 
ignorance or weakness.”40  This in turn will also mitigate the institution’s capacity to 
provide credible witness.      
     E. Material Cooperation 
 Germain Grisez seems most concerned that what many determine to be 
material cooperation is actually formal cooperation.  He does not limit the cooperation 
to the delivery of services after the arrangements are made, but also to making the 
arrangement: 
The arrangement seemingly will establish a neat division of 
responsibility, isolating the Catholic hospital from immoral activities.  
In agreeing on this way of providing the full range of services, 
however, the Catholic negotiators will have intended that the excluded 
services be supplied by others under the conditions agreed upon, and 
that intention will constitute formal cooperation.  Moreover, it will be 
embodied in the arrangement established; in virtue of it, the Catholic 
                                                                                                                                            
39 James Keenan, “The Principle of Cooperation,” Health Progress (April 1995). 
40 Germain Grisez, “Difficult Moral Questions: How Far May Catholic Hospitals Cooperate 
with Non-Catholic Providers?”  Linacre Quarterly vol. 62, no 4:67-72. 
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hospital, simply by keeping its commitment to the arrangements and 
continuing in it, will formally cooperate in providing those services.41 
 
Russell Smith takes exception to this point, saying that any agreement negotiations are 
prompted by the desire of the Catholic hospital to provide health care and “that 
deliberation about prohibited services is aimed precisely at removing the Catholic 
partner from involvement with prohibited services.”42  Grisez then continues to list the 
possible evils that can obtain in material cooperation, which include: it may occasion 
formal cooperation, it may lead to scandal, it may impair ability to give credible 
witness, and it can lead to injustice.  Grisez includes three aspects of health care that 
make it easy to move from material to formal cooperation.  These include: the fact that 
health care providers often share the intentions of those they serve, particular services 
that are prohibited are integrated into a comprehensive health plan, and in prohibited 
services often a bad means is chosen for an appropriate end.  He uses the example of a 
woman who must limit reproduction for her physical health, but who refuses morally 
acceptable means.  The Catholic physician, even if not the one to prescribe the 
unacceptable means, must still encourage and try to ensure that the woman uses her 
chosen means regularly and effectively. 
     F. Immediate Material Cooperation and Duress 
 The 1994 ERDs state, “Immediate material cooperation is morally 
impermissible except in cases of duress.”  It has become apparent that this exception 
has created the majority of the problems in the mergers and acquisitions.  Just what 
                                                 
41 Grisez, 67-72. 
42 Smith, 1996, 90 (emphasis mine). 
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constitutes duress and the frequency with which it is encountered are the enduring 
questions here.  In his article regarding hospital arrangements, Germain Grisez does 
not even discuss the exception of duress.  His prohibition of activities begins before 
one is able to consider duress.  Russell Smith in his May 1996 article seemingly 
contradicts the language and intent of the ERDs by dismissing circumstances that 
would allow for immediate material cooperation.  He does this by quoting from the 
1975 Commentary on the Reply of the Sacred Congregation for the Doctrine of the 
Faith in Sterilization in Catholic Hospitals,  
Material cooperation will be justified only in situations where the 
hospital because of some kind of duress or pressure cannot reasonably 
exercise the autonomy it has… Direct sterilization is a grave evil.  The 
allowance of material cooperation in extraordinary cases is based on 
the danger of an even more serious evil, e.g., the closing of the hospital 
could be under certain circumstances a more serious evil…In making 
judgments about the morality of cooperation each case must be decided 
on its own merits.  Since hospital situations, and even individual cases, 
differ so much, it would not be prudent to apply automatically a 
decision made in one hospital, or in even one case, to apply to 
another.43 
 
 From this selection, Smith emphasizes the following points.  First, because 
duress appears in the presence of coercion or compulsion, the cooperating actions are 
removed from the realm of the voluntary, thus creating a situation in which the 
principles of cooperation were never intended to apply.  Secondly, Smith takes from 
the last three lines of the selection above that duress should be considered episodic 
thus not supporting a policy that could be shared among hospitals, rather than systemic 
duress that might be understood as market pressure or physician demands.  Third, he 
                                                 
43 As quoted in Smith, 93. 
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turns to the discipline of philosophy where duress has both episodic and systemic 
features.  An example that would be a clear cut example of the systemic duress is 
when the agent is compelled to perform a prohibited act that is mandated and 
sanctioned by the legal authority of the state, e.g., States requiring HMOs to provide 
contraception services by force of law. 
     G. Scandal 
The scandal which must be avoided is defined as: 
The proposal or execution of a course of action which either is or has 
the potential of being perceived as constituting a contradiction or 
compromise of the Church’s teaching with the effect that the Catholic 
partner is or appears to be doing evil, giving bad example, making evil 
appear to be good or upright, and/or suggesting that others can embark 
upon this evil with impunity.44 
 
Keenan focuses on the duty to demonstrate to the community that in cooperating we 
are not undermining the tradition but rather protecting it.  When the principle is 
applied appropriately, we enter into health care partnerships to protect Catholic values 
in health care and to contain wrong-doing. 
     H. ‘Not Doing Wrong’ Versus ‘Containing Wrongdoing’ 
Keenan is the one theologian who apparently wants to expand the application 
of the principle of cooperation.  In particular, he questions the wisdom of not 
cooperating in certain aspects of reproductive technology that could have stemmed the 
tide of ‘excess embryos’ which are now in excess of  10,000 in this country alone.  In 
1987, prior to the release of the Vatican encyclical dealing with reproductive  
                                                 
44 Smith, 92. 
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technology, Donum Vita, there were five internationally known Catholic heath care 
facilities involved in in vitro fertilization.  Donum Vita determined the moral 
unacceptability of in vitro fertilization because it separates the unitive and procreative 
dimensions of reproduction.  Some theologians believed that the moral permissibility 
should depend on the procreative partners and not the procreative act; thus, as long as 
the husband and wife became the (genetic) mother and (genetic) father, the act would 
be morally acceptable.  However, most all theologians were concerned with the 
repercussions of oocyte retrieval: that because of the pain, difficulty and cost of oocyte 
retrieval, several eggs are retrieved at once, and after fertilization, the ‘spares’ are 
frozen for later use or marked for disposal.  Of the five Catholic Universities 
participating in in vitro only one ceased its in vitro activities.  That one was in the 
U.S., whereas the others were in Europe.  Now, fourteen years later, Keenan asks what 
evil might have been prevented had the Catholic university in the U.S. had some 
influence on the status on the spare embryos whose disposition at this point is 
questionable.  
     I. Was the Principle Misapplied? 
 Should cooperation even be countenanced?  Germain Grisez’s answer to this in 
many of the cases of hospital acquisitions and mergers is a resounding ‘NO.’  Grisez 
maintains that participation in an integrated delivery system or HMO constitutes 
formal cooperation, “agreeing on this way of providing a full range of services…the 
Catholic negotiators will have intended that the excluded services be supplied by 
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others under the conditions agreed upon, and that intention will constitute formal 
cooperation.”45   
 One of the important and not fully explained problems with the prohibition of 
participation in any “prohibited service” is the range of moral seriousness of the acts.  
Russel Smith talks about the moral spectrum of seriousness that ranges from tubal 
ligation to abortion and euthanasia, none of which can be offered by a Catholic 
facility.  But Smith tells us not to ignore the vast “difference in the degrees of 
seriousness.”46  This is why compatibility studies of potential mergers focus on 
sterilizations rather than abortion.  But this does not explain the justification of the 
differences, nor why cooperation with one, albeit under duress or for serious reason, is 
permissible with one when not with the other.   
Russell Smith and James Keenan have significant differences on immediate 
material cooperation.  Smith says Keenan advocates proportionality which Smith 
states has been one of the justifications for dissent from Humanae Vitae.   Smith says 
that regardless of magisterial intervention, proportionality denies the objective moral 
order and the existence of intrinsic meaning of rational action.  Smith blames part of 
this on what he calls the “laconic explanation” of the Principle of Cooperation in the 
appendix of the 1994 ERDs.   
                                                 
45 Grisez, 67-72.   
46 Smith, 1996, 91. 
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     J. The Upshot 
 Grisez suggests that administrators of Catholic hospitals should be willing to 
give up some of their hospitals (perhaps all of them), suggesting that if the mission is 
to be taken seriously and the mission cannot proceed as the mission in the current 
health care environment, then the energy and money now expended at Catholic 
hospitals can be shifted to serve those who are least served by the present system:  
…the unborn baby whose abortion the system would provide and 
whose mother needs help to choose an alternative, the individual whose 
quality of life falls below some arbitrarily set limit, couples who need 
instruction in natural family planning, people too disorganized to make 
use of the health care system, the mentally ill who have been “freed” 
from institutions to wander in the streets, and other victims of 
ideological fashions.47 
 
                                                 
47 Grisez, 72. 
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5.  CONTRACEPTION, STERILIZATION AND ABORTION 
 
 Contraception, sterilization and abortion are three reproductive services that 
are a source of conflict both within Catholic health care as well as between Catholic 
hospitals and the communities which they serve.  Chapter Four discussed how these 
conflicts could be addressed with integrity and whether moral compromise was 
morally permissible.  Concluding that in some of these cases moral compromise could 
not be permitted, we then discussed the ways in which Catholic moral theology 
approaches these issues.  This chapter will now discuss the Catholic teaching in each 
of these areas and how these tough cases are handled at Catholic hospitals.  As 
groundwork to that discussion, let us first consider the Catholic Church’s teaching 
regarding human sexual relations. 
 
I. CHURCH TEACHING REGARDING HUMAN SEXUAL RELATIONS 
 Catholic moral theology is based on the search for truth through faith and 
reason utilizing both scripture and the moral tradition of natural law.  Natural law 
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theory was developed in its Christian formulation by St. Thomas Aquinas. As 
Thomas Aquinas developed it, God has imprinted on each person’s soul the natural 
law.  All things, including persons, have a natural end.  In terms of human sexuality, 
the natural end of sexual intercourse is the possibility of reproduction.  But it is also 
more than that.  Because God created man and woman in his likeness, the mutual love 
between a man and a woman is an image of the absolute and unfailing love of God.  
This mutual love between a man and a woman should be unbreakable.  However, the 
fall of humanity brought other characteristics, such as lust, greed and envy, into this 
relationship.  Marriage brought about an ecclesial order to the relationship which 
includes both rights and responsibilities.  The aims of the institution of marriage and 
marital love were ordered to the procreation and education of children.  But sexual 
intercourse is also a way for husband and wife to demonstrate that mutual love.  It is 
this ‘secondary’ aim that is has been underemphasized throughout the history of the 
Church, but which was always present in some form.  The church’s position on human 
sexual intercourse is that it should be found only within a sacramental marriage that is 
blessed by God and whose bonds are unbreakable and that the unitive and procreative 
aspects should not be separated nor either aspect negated.   
 In their book, Health Care Ethics: A Theological Approach,1 Benedict Ashley 
and Kevin O’Rourke discuss the two senses of sexuality.  In the first sense, every 
person is a social, sexual person.  As a social and sexual person, sexuality is one of our 
principle formative influences in our childhood and is the developmental source of our 
                                                 
1 Benedict M. Ashley, OP and Kevin D. O’Rourke, OP, Health Care Ethics: A Theological 
Analysis, Fourth Edition. Washington, D.C.: Georgetown University Press, 1997. 
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relationality.  The second sense of sexuality includes those actions which are genital 
and seek orgasmic satisfaction.  It is the second sense that is most frequently addressed 
in moral discussions and, particularly, the one which has the most implications for 
Catholic health care.  Ashley and O’Rourke describe the Christian understanding of 
sexuality as an application of the principle of stewardship and creativity,2 which serves 
as a guide to the use of modern medical technology, “Its aim is to guide sexual 
behavior in cooperation with the purposes of the Creator in designing us as sexual 
beings.”3  Interestingly, they make the case that the current Church teaching on human 
sexuality is not essentially different from early Church teachings on these matters.  St. 
Augustine taught that God intended sex for marriage and marriage remains a gift from 
God with a three-fold moral goodness: 1) procreation, 2) mutual fidelity and help of 
the spouses, and 3) sacramentality.  Where Augustine is most often seen as professing 
a negative view of sex, Ashley and O’Rourke claim that this view was prevalent in his 
early work which was influenced by early Greek spiritualism and Stoic disdain for the 
passions, and when applied to scripture, Augustine interpreted Genesis 1-3 to mean 
that if Adam and Eve had not sinned, the human race would have been multiplied by 
divine creations.  However, in later works Augustine gave up this notion and taught 
that a sinless humanity would have multiplied sexually, although Ashley and 
O’Rourke note, “Yet pessimistically he still believed that in our fallen state sexual 
                                                 
2 Principle of stewardship and creativity: The gifts of multidimensional human nature and its 
natural environment should be used with profound respect for their intrinsic teleology.  The 
gift of human creativity especially should be used to cultivate nature and environment with a 
care set by the limits of our actual knowledge and the risks of destroying these gifts.  Ashley 
and O’Rourke, 202. 
3 Ashley and O’Rourke, 207. 
  
131
intercourse is always flawed by venial sins of selfishness and excess.”4  Thomas 
Aquinas taught more positively that even if humans had not sinned they would have 
multiplied sexually but with even more pleasure, and that because humans are almost 
equally divided male and female all would have married.  After Aquinas, theologians 
taught that marital sex can promote virtuous self-giving as well as be free of sin.   
 Through the ages theologians asked of human sexuality, ‘What is God’s 
purpose in dividing the human race into male and female?’  Consulting scripture, the 
answer is found in Genesis 1:28 as God tells Adam and Eve, “Be fruitful and 
multiply.”  However, God also says in Genesis 2:18, “It is not good for man to be 
alone.  I will make a suitable helper for him.”  Unfortunately, the first command is 
given priority, resulting in the procreation and education of children being ranked as 
the primary end of marriage with loving companionship as secondary.  Along with the 
fruits of the human sexual relationship came the inextricable risks.  The risks of sexual 
intercourse, i.e. the danger of subsequent child bearing and the tasks of child rearing 
would best be moderated within a monogamous union and intact family unit.  Ashley 
and O’Rourke respond, “Therefore, the only obvious answer to the question, ‘Why did 
God make us male and female?’ is to be found in the advantages of the heterosexual 
family society for human procreation and education.  …In fact the Church never 
intended to teach that the loving companionship of married couples is simply a means 
to beget children.”5  While the loving companionship is an end in itself it is still a 
means to a higher good, that being the procreation and education of children.    
                                                 
4 Ashley and O’Rourke, 207. 
5 Ashley and O’Rourke, 208. 
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Towards the mid twentieth century, a new formulation of the purposes of 
marriage which balanced the social and personal meanings of the institution emerged 
and was given authoritative status.  Rather than the “primary end of marriage” 
described as procreation, the principle of the “inseparability of the unitive and 
procreative meanings of marriage” was substituted.  And while today it may seem that 
this teaching has changed substantially, the primary shift here is that marriage is not 
emphasized as a means to procreation, but rather as an end in itself with the unitive 
function placed on par with the procreative.  However, some individuals have 
incorrectly interpreted this to mean that procreation is an optional consequence of the 
primary end of love.6   
Now with this background of the Catholic Church’s moral teaching on the 
purposes of human sexuality and marriage, we will move forward to address some of 
the moral issues that arise from the brute reality of our existence as sexual beings.  
Specifically, in subsequent sections of this chapter we will discuss contraception, 
sterilization and abortion – the Church’s teaching on each, as well as when there might 
be ‘exceptions’ or ‘compromises’ made.   
 
II. CONTRACEPTIVES 
     A. Preventing Pregnancy, In Normal Course of Events 
 1.  History 
 By the twentieth century, with fewer marriages arranged by the couples’ 
families, there was more emphasis on the ways that individuals were fulfilled through 
                                                 
6 Ashley and O’Rourke, 209. 
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the marriage covenant – now conceived of a covenant rather than contract as it was 
heretofore known.  Theologians began to ask, ‘What do persons as individuals gain 
from sex?’  The principle of the “inseparability of the unitive and procreative 
meanings of marriage” clearly prohibits any form of contraception when contraception 
is defined as “the performance of sexual intercourse with the deliberate intention of 
rendering infertile an act which could be fertile.”7 
The Christian tradition against birth control can be traced back to the Old 
Testament story of Onan, who was punished for spilling his seed outside of his wife’s 
body.  The sinfulness of contraception was accepted by all Christian denominations 
until the twentieth century when new scientific understandings and medications 
brought about greater availability.  It was in 1930 at the Lambeth Conference that the 
Anglican Church “declared that contraception in marriage might be morally justified 
for economic or health reasons.”8  Pope Pius IX responded with the publication of 
Casti Connubi, in which he reiterated the Christian tradition.  About the time of that 
publication came the first scientific method for predicting the infertile period of the 
woman’s menstrual cycle.  With this came the understanding that conception could be 
controlled by restricting intercourse to the infertile period.  That this was morally 
acceptable was not immediately evident.  But Pope Pius XII answered this in 1951, 
saying that methods that sought to control conception by limiting intercourse to the 
infertile periods are acceptable when justified by serious medical, eugenic, economic 
or social reasons.  This system, referred to as the “rhythm method” which was merely 
                                                 
7 Ashley and O’Rourke, 272. 
8 Ashley and O’Rourke, 273. 
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a calendar method and suffered under the assumption that all women’s menstrual 
cycles were regular and of the same approximate length, was welcomed but the failure 
rate disillusioned many.  About this time came the development of the first 
progesterone pill which supplied a new wrinkle in the discussion on the permissibility 
of different methods of family planning.  Now that the Pope had spoken on the moral 
permissibility of regulating conception in limited situations by limiting intercourse to 
the infertile period of the menstrual cycle, it was posed by some that the Pill worked in 
just that way by extending the infertile period.  By that reasoning, as long as the 
couple had a significantly weighty justification for regulating children, then use of the 
Pill would be morally acceptable.  This reasoning was not accepted by all, or even 
most.  By the 1960s, it was clear that the Vatican needed to speak to the issue.   
Pope John XXIII convened a Pontifical Study Commission on Family, 
Population and Birth Problems (hereafter referred to as the Commission) to examine 
population policies of the United Nations and to advise the Church.  This Commission 
met once in 1963 and twice in 1964.  As Vatican II continued, Pope Paul VI expanded 
the Commission to 58 members, including lay individuals.  The Commission met a 
fourth time in 1965.   As the Vatican II Council closed, it released The Church in the 
Modern World (Gaudium et Spes) but reserved the issue of licit and illicit uses of birth 
control until the conclusion of the Commission.  The Commission met for the fifth and 
final time in the spring of 1966, at which time they issued a final majority report, “An 
Outline for a Document on Responsible Parenthood.”  The report primarily argued that 
the Pope might use his authority to allow contraception in some instances.  However, 
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it based its argument on the underlying reasoning that an act cannot be evil by reason 
of its moral object alone, but only when taken with its intention and circumstances.   
 Pope Paul VI took another two years of study to prepare an encyclical, 
Humanae Vitae (hereafter denoted as HV) to address all of these issues.  The 
conclusions of HV ran contrary to the results of the Commission and served to 
reaffirm the condemnation of contraception.  Ashley and O’Rourke report that some 
believed that Pope Paul VI never had any doubts about the intrinsic evil of 
contraception but only whether the use of anovulents (such as the Pill) constituted 
contraception or should be viewed as extending the infertile period of the woman’s 
cycle.  However, during the years after the release of the Commission’s majority 
report and before release of HV, many Catholics changed their practices with regard to 
contraception believing that changes were coming from the Vatican.  Many claim that 
it was during this time that the dissent of the American Catholic Church was born.  
Now those who had adopted the use of contraceptives in anticipation of the Pope’s 
encyclical were being told that they could not continue those practices and remain in 
good standing in the Church.  This resulted in many Catholics who had accepted 
Vatican II now being alienated by Humanae Vitae.  Even after the publication of HV, 
many couples began to use artificial means of birth control with the belief that this was 
an unsettled question in the Church for which they could form a proper conscience.   
 2.  Dissent 
 In the near forty years since the publication of HV, there have been numerous 
arguments against the position of HV; the two that have been most enduring and 
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divisive are the argument for proportionalism and the argument of Sensus Fidelium.  
The argument for proportionalism reignited a debate from the time of Thomas 
Aquinas that takes into account the nature of intrinsically evil acts.  In effect, the 
majority report of the commission argued from a proportionalist position: i.e., an act 
cannot be determined to be evil on the basis of its moral object but only after its 
intention and circumstances have been taken into account; whereas HV reiterated that, 
by its moral object alone, contraception is an intrinsically evil act. 
 The argument from Sensus Fidelium (literally “sense of the faith” but 
interpreted as “faith intuition”)9 says that the teaching on birth control has not been 
“received” in practice by the faithful, even by otherwise devout Catholics.  One of the 
main points of dissenters’ justification for the use of birth control is that its proper use 
will serve to strengthen the marital.  While Ashley and O’Rourke acknowledge that 
married Catholics can add a great deal to this understanding, they point out that, when 
the divorce rates of Catholics are as high as those of the general public, they question 
the conformity of the practice of contraception to the Gospel.   
 3.  Reaffirmation 
 If there was doubt post-Vatican II regarding the authentic teaching of the 
Magisterium of the Church, the encyclicals of Pope John Paul II, named Pope in 1978, 
and the numerous reiterations from the Congregation of the Doctrine of the Faithful 
have made it abundantly clear that artificial means of birth control are not acceptable 
within Church teaching.  Furthermore in the encyclical Splendor of the Truth, the 
current Pope addressed proportionalism determining that it is not a legitimate form of 
                                                 
9 Ashley and O’Rourke, 285. 
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argument in Catholic moral theology.  Likewise, he countered the arguments of 
Sensus Fidelium in that same encyclical.   
 The most recent edition of the Catechism of the Catholic Church, published in 
1994, teaches that the regulation of births is acceptable as long as the couple is not 
motivated by selfishness and is in conformity with the generosity appropriate to 
responsible parenthood.10  The only acceptable means of birth regulation is a natural 
method which has developed over the years to a scientifically sound practice with a 
high degree of success.11  The natural method of birth regulation was first known as 
“the rhythm method” and was essentially a calendar method where the couple 
abstained from intercourse on certain days of the woman’s menstrual cycle if they 
were trying to prevent pregnancy.  The old saw went, “What do you call a couple 
practicing the Rhythm Method?”  Answer: “Parents!”  The calendar method was 
improved with the Basal Body Temperature (BBT) Method whereby the time of 
ovulation could be predicted more accurately by charting the woman’s basal body 
temperature immediately upon waking.  In this method, a noted spike in temperature 
indicates that ovulation has just occurred.  After several months of charting her basal 
body temperature immediately upon waking, it was presumed she could, while 
continuing to record her temperature, accurately predict the nadir of her BBT which 
most closely correlated with the time of ovulation.  The decision could then be made 
by the couple to abstain from intercourse if trying to prevent pregnancy, or have 
intercourse if trying to conceive.   
                                                 
10 Catechism of the Catholic Church (1994), Paragraph 2368. 
11 Albeit for highly motivated and compliant couples. 
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 The BBT Method was further improved upon with the Billings Method.  The 
Billings Method utilizes a visual analysis of cervical mucus to determine peak time of 
fertility.  Women are taught to observe their cervical mucus discharge with white 
tissue at the opening of the vagina.  Dry or cloudy and sticky discharge indicates an 
infertile period; whereas clear, stretchy and lubricative indicates a fertile period.  It 
was suggested that a combination of the BBT method and the Billings method would 
yield the most effective results, but studies conducted by Thomas Hilgers and his 
associates since the late 1970s indicate that the peak mucus system method alone is 
the most accurate indicator of the estimated time of ovulation as confirmed by serum 
blood tests and that to add the BBT method does not enhance its effectiveness.12 
 Hilgers et al. have developed their methodology into a standardized medical 
model of natural procreation education (which they abbreviate to ‘NaProEducation’).  
In some places, it is referred to as the ‘Creighton Model;’ in Hilgers’ publications, it is 
referred to as the Creighton Model (CrM) NaProEducation Technology.  While it can 
boast an effectiveness of 99.5% and 96.8% in preventing pregnancy after twelve 
months and 99.5% and 96.4% at the end of the eighteen month, this method 
presupposes a couple who has agreed on their procreative goals, has expressed a 
willingness to abstain on certain days if the goal is to avoid conception and then has 
the wherewithal to follow through on this.  For this method to be truly within Church 
                                                 
12 Thomas W. Hilgers, Guy Abraham and Denis Cavanagh, “Natural Family Planning, 1. The 
Peak System and Estimated Time of Ovulation,” Obstetrics and Gynecology vol. 52, no. 5 
(Nov 1978):575-582; and Thomas W. Hilgers and Alan Bailey, “Natural Family Planning. II. 
Basal Body Temperature and Estimated Time of Ovulation,” Obstetrics and Gynecology vol. 
55, no. 3 (Mar 1980):333-339. 
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teaching, the couple must also keep their family planning goals within the teaching of
the Magisterium. 
Artificial means of preventing pregnancy are not permitted.  In doing so, the 
procreative function is severed from the unitive function of sexual intercourse, which 
is never permitted.  Some have countered the official teaching of the Church by 
discounting the moral significance of artificial means versus natural means by pointing 
to the intention of each.  Whether naturally occurring infertile periods or artificial 
means of extending the infertile period are utilized, the intention is the same: to have 
intercourse without conception occurring.  HV answers this objection stating, “…in the 
former case, the married couple use an opportunity given them by nature; but in the 
other, the couple prevent the order of generation from having its natural processes.”13  
Those couples using any of the natural family planning (NFP) methods to regulate the 
birth of children must always remain open to the possibility that they may conceive.   
 4.  Practice 
 In a survey from 1980, 76.5% of individuals who identified themselves as 
Catholic indicated that they practiced contraception and at the same time only 29% of 
American priests surveyed considered that sinful.  However, it was also commented 
that the minority who practiced NFP were very committed to their beliefs and is a 
minority that deserves to be heard.  However, in the modern practice of medicine as 
well as in a society which craves immediate solutions to their problems and a drug to 
relieve all their ills, the practice of NFP is seen as too onerous.  Many might accept in 
                                                 
13 HV, translated in Ashley & O’Rourke, 281. 
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theory the Church’s prohibition against artificial means of birth control, but when it 
comes to practice, it is a different story.   
 Now what do the Directives say?  The language in the most recent edition 
appears so vague that one may question whether this is intentional.  Directive 52 
states:  
Catholic health institutions may not promote or condone 
contraceptive practices but should provide, for married couples and 
the medical staff who counsel them, instruction both about the 
Church’s teaching on responsible parenthood and in methods of 
natural family planning.14    
 
One could ask if this is a dodge.  Perhaps not.  Oral contraceptives are used for many 
medical indications other than for contraceptive purposes.  Additionally, oral 
contraceptives, IUDs and other forms of birth control are most often prescribed in 
physicians’ offices, which keeps those practices remote from the hospital.  One might 
also speculate that the wording in Directive 52 is one example of what must have been 
many compromises within the document. 
 Additionally, there is the medical/physiological ambiguity about the 
mechanism of the drugs – does it merely work as an anovluant or can the mechanism 
act as an abortifacient?  This distinction gets at the heart of the difference in belief 
between medicine’s definition of pregnancy and the church’s belief of when new life 
begins.  Medicine does not see conception as significant in terms of a pregnancy 
achieved; it is implantation that is significant.  Because the church sees conception as 
the time of a new being coming into existence, the period between conception and 
implantation is significant.  Any action which serves to render implantation impossible 
                                                 
14 Ethical and Religious Directives for Catholic Health Care Services, Fourth Edition.  
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is proscribed.  It is just that action that is the mechanism of several methods of birth 
control: the intrauterine device and the mechanism of emergency contraception (EC) 
during some parts of the menstrual cycle.  If taken daily for the first fourteen days, the 
mechanism of the oral contraceptive pills containing both estrogen and progesterone 
cannot act as an abortifacient.  However, the progesterone only pill can act as an 
abortifacient so some physicians refuse to prescribe that pill.   
 5.  Integrity 
 How does the Church maintain integrity with stated beliefs and practices that 
are prescribed by these beliefs, but which are so widely disregarded by the ‘faithful?’  
Many Catholic physicians have dealt with the tension between their church’s teachings 
and the medical ‘standards of care’ under which they professionally practice through 
examination of conscience.  Most likely, they highlight and then honor the distinction 
between contraceptive practices and abortive practices.  They will participate in the 
former but not the latter.  And as was discussed in Chapter One, some Catholic Health 
Care provider participate in treatments proscribed by the Directives, but do so with an 
eye toward containing or preventing a greater evil.  Now the Catholic hospital which 
represents, in a formal capacity, the Catholic Church cannot reason in an analogous 
way; the hospital must practice according to the Directives.15  In this analysis, the 
distinction between pastoral and doctrinal becomes important.   
 Many Catholics understand the phrase, “shopping for a priest.”  This can be 
interpreted as a cynical way of indicating how one finds a priest who is very pastoral.  
                                                 
15 Although as stated earlier and as will be discussed later, each bishop has say over how the 
Directives will be interpreted and practiced in his diocese.   
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In this realm, the priest is responsible for guiding his flock in the path of the right.  In 
some cases this guidance is in areas of morals.  It is often in this realm that the 
individual comes to grips with how she can live the best life according to God’s plan.  
Aquinas taught that all human acts are comprised of three parts: the object, the 
intention and the circumstances.  When a priest acts pastorally, he assists the 
individual in the examination of these aspects, and this is often where latitude in 
decision making is found.  When counseled by a priest or other religious person, the 
individual is guided through the process of forming a correct conscience.  The priest or 
other, in his or her capacity, can approach the individual pastorally whereby doctrine 
is explained and understood in light of the individual’s unique circumstances.  In no 
way is pastoral counseling intended to deny or mitigate the objective teaching of the 
Church.  This pastoral role acknowledges the distinction between objective disorder 
and subjective guilt.  And while it is not the Church’s role to impose guilt, the role of 
the advisor in moral matters is to make clear the teachings of the Church which spell 
out the intrinsic evil of certain actions, while helping the individual determine her 
subjective moral culpability.  Along these lines, but specifically in response to the 
theologians criticizing Humana Vitae, the Vatican newspaper responded,  
[The] Christian moral tradition has always maintained the distinction – 
not the separation from, much less the contraposition – between 
objective disorder and subjective guilt.  For this reason when it 
becomes a matter of judging subjective moral behavior, within the 
unavoidable framework of the norm which prohibits the intrinsic 
disorder or contraception, it is perfectly legitimate to give due 
consideration to actions of individuals, not only to their intentions and 
motivations, but also to the various circumstances of their lives, and 
above all, to the causes that might impair their conscience and free will.  
This subjective situation, which can never change into “order” what is 
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intrinsically “disorder,” can have some bearing on the responsibility of the 
individual’s behavior.  As we know, this is a general principle which is 
applicable therefore to the issue of contraception.16 
 
The 1980 Synod of Bishops generated instructions and reassurances to married people 
as well as to priests.  To married people, the bishops acknowledged the frailty of the 
human condition and the difficult and trying situations that might prevent married 
couples from following Church teaching while still exhorting them to “continue along 
the difficult way toward a more complete fidelity to the commands of the Lord.”17  
Priests are advised to employ the “law of gradualness,” which recognizes, “a need 
frequently for ‘patience, sympathy, and time’ in educating couples to an understanding 
of the papal teaching, but at the same time insisting on the normative nature of this 
teaching.”18  Ashley and O’Rourke comment that health care providers should be able 
to sympathize with the pastoral dilemma which priests and spiritual directors find 
themselves in by drawing on the analogous dilemma they may find themselves in.  
After all, not all patients are compliant with the directives they prescribe; physicians 
must then decide if they will refuse to treat patients who cannot (or will not) cooperate 
in activities that are healthy or avoid activities that are unhealthy.  Most physicians 
will confront patients about unhealthy behaviors and will attempt to encourage and 
persuade patients to act in more healthy ways; all of this done in the hope that the 
patient will come around to a more healthy way of living without resorting to 
quackery.  One remedy would be to train physicians at Catholic hospitals to include 
this pastoral role in their practice; some, in fact, do practice in this manner.  However, 
                                                 
16 Ashley and O’Rourke, 309-310. 
17 Ashley and O’Rourke, 310. 
18 Ashley and O’Rourke, 310. 
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considering the vast diversity of religious beliefs among physicians at a Catholic 
hospital, not to mention the time and attention this skill requires, this option is 
virtually unfeasible.  And if this were to be a possibility, there remains the problem of 
the institution not being able to act in a pastoral role. 
 Where the priest is able to function in a pastoral role, the institution is not.  
What perhaps is needed is for some ‘body’ or entity within the hospital to be able to 
function in a pastoral capacity.  However, that role (within a Catholic hospital) is 
reserved for the bishop of that diocese.  This would present serious logistical, not to 
mention political, problems for the diocese.  As we will see in the third type of case 
arguing in favor of a tubal ligation for medical indications, this last scenario is what 
might be needed most.   
 6.  Range of Cases 
 At this point of the ethical analysis, it would normally be apropos to discuss a 
range of cases that, on the moral continuum, range from the least morally problematic 
to the most morally egregious.  However, as it is very difficult to find a Catholic 
obstetrician/gynecologist who does not prescribe the use of contraceptives to his or her 
patients, the issue is much broader than a range of cases.  This issue goes to the very 
heart of tension between the Church’s teaching and the standard of care that must be 
provided by all obstetricians and gynecologists.  Finding the compromise in their 
practices has been discussed, but finding this middle ground by the institution was 
pointed out as not so easily rendered.  One way the Catholic hospital can stay true to 
Church teaching is by distancing itself from the physicians’ practices.  If that is not 
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feasible, i.e. the medical practices are owned or managed by the hospital, then one 
might reason that the nature of the patient-physician relationship is such that the 
institution cannot insinuate itself in it.  In this way, the physician may act ‘pastorally’ 
with his or her patients.  However, this last option calls for a specific responsibility for 
physicians who are affiliated with Catholic hospitals.  They, whether Catholic or not, 
are then relied upon to give pastoral counseling to their patients.  This could prove to 
be difficult, if not impossible, in most instances.   
     B.   Emergency Contraception in Case of Sexual Assault 
 We saw in the last section that because of the principle of personalized 
sexuality, as well as the principle of inseparability of the unitive and procreative 
functions of the marital act, contraception is not permitted.  This would seemingly put 
the Church in an untenable position when addressing the needs of a woman who has 
been sexually assaulted and who may be at risk of becoming pregnant from this attack, 
an act which can be described as both a violent act as well as a non-consensual act of 
sexual intercourse.  Catholic teaching has always permitted the individual the right to 
defend oneself against unjust aggressors, and in this case it is no different.  A woman 
may defend herself against a possible conception from the unnatural act of rape.  One 
commentator says, 
It has been long recognized in the Catholic moral tradition that if it 
is morally justifiable for a woman to take measures to prevent a 
sexual attack then it is justifiable for her to prevent any 
continuation of the same attack.  Every aspect of the act (including 
the attacker’s semen and the risk of fertilization) is forced upon 
her, and is against her free choice of the will and free consent.  As 
an act of self-defense, the woman may take measures to prevent 
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fertilization.  She may stop the lingering effect of the attack by not allowing
her fertility to be integrated with that of her attacker.19 
 
This position is reflected in Directive 36 (which it should be noted is found in “Part 
Three: The Professional-Patient Relationship” rather than where one might expect to 
find it in “Part Four: Issues at the Beginning of Life,” illustrating how the bishops 
categorize the care of such individuals): 
Compassionate and understanding care should be given to a person 
who is the victim of sexual assault.  Health care providers should 
cooperate with law enforcement officials and offer the person 
psychological and spiritual support as well as accurate medical 
information.  A female who has been raped should be able to 
defend herself against a potential conception from the sexual 
assault.  If, after appropriate testing, there is no evidence that 
conception has occurred already, she may be treated with 
medications that would prevent ovulation, sperm capacitation, or 
fertilization.20 
 
An endnote to Directive 36 gives further direction,  
It is recommended that a sexually assaulted woman be advised of 
the ethical restrictions that prevent Catholic hospitals from using 
abortifacient procedures; cf. Pennsylvania Catholic Conference, 
“Guidelines for Catholic Hospitals Treating Victims of Sexual 
Assault,” Origins 22 (1993): 810.21 
 
                                                 
19 Peter Cataldo, “A Moral Analysis of Pregnancy Prevention after Sexual Assault,” in What Is 
Man, O Lord? The Human Person in a Biotech Age Eds. E.J. Furton and L.A. Mitchell 
(Boston: The National Catholic Bioethics Center, 2002):243-259. 
20 Ethical and Religious Directives (2001), #36.  Additionally, some ethicists are 
uncomfortable using the term ‘contraception,’ which is the intentional interference in the 
natural process of intercourse and conception, in discussing a woman’s response to a sexual 
assault which is an act of violence, not an act of intercourse.  See Daniel Sulmasy, “A 
Reasonable, Realistic and Ethical Proposal,” Health Progress (September-October 2002). 
21 Endnote 19 in the ERDs.  Although when considering that the Directives are themselves a 
compromise document, one can imagine the process by which it was decided to place this 
information in the endnote rather than contained in the directive.  It should be mentioned that 
the Pennsylvania Catholic Conference Guidelines incorporate the ‘ovulation method’ which 
will be discussed in this section. 
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This endnote illustrates an important feature of the Directives: each directive gives 
guidance without mandating the specific way each should be implemented.  This leads 
to variations in practice among facilities as well as widely differing practices in many 
dioceses.  Some view these variations in a positive light, allowing for varying cultural 
practices of the faith extending even to different interpretations and applications of the 
principles in different regions of the country; while others, especially those in dioceses 
in which the Directives are interpreted in their most restrictive way, see this as an 
inconsistency which undermines the principles of the Church.  Another way to phrase 
this latter concern is that it attacks the integrity of the set of beliefs propagated by the 
Church.  While there may be some ambiguity in how one carries out Directive 36, it is 
clear that one is morally directed to care for the survivor of the attack while at the 
same time protecting any life which may have already been conceived, either from a 
previous act of intercourse or from the recent attack.  So one might say that the 
Church’s willingness to move from an initial principle (which broadly and absolutely 
prohibits a practice) to employ another principle (which more accurately addresses the 
circumstances of the case) is an act of compromise.  However, even within this 
‘exception’ or ‘compromise’ there is an unsettled question that has far-reaching 
implications.   
 While there is a group who would maintain that contraception, as an intrinsic 
evil, may never be justified, that issue will not be the focus of this section.22  I mention 
this because it illustrates the broad range of thinking of Catholic moral theologians.  
                                                 
22 This first position is not explored within this work, because it is a position that is not 
embraced by the United States Conference of Catholic Bishops, nor within their document, 
Ethical and Religious Directives. 
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Some Catholics adopt an intransigent absolutist position identifying an act as an 
intrinsic evil, which cannot be directly intended or the sole act performed regardless of 
what good might come of it.  Another group takes the position that says the 
description of the act does not match that of the identified intrinsic evil.  Additionally, 
they would say that the intention is different, rendering this a different moral act.  The 
second group stops short of a third way, whereby it is allowed that an intrinsic evil 
may need to be countenanced in light of a more tragic result.  This third way 
represents a proportionalist position and is not recognized as acceptable by the 
Magisterium.  Rather, the issue of how Directive 36 is carried out in the clinical 
setting to address the moral concern that the mechanism of emergency contraception 
act as an anovulent rather than an abortifacient will be addressed.  This ‘disputed 
question’ is set within the second methodology described above.   
 Because Directive 36 is “ambiguous,”23 two primary approaches have been 
developed to implement this directive.  These can be described as the ovulation 
method and the pregnancy method.  Those who propose the ovulation method are 
primarily concerned with providing compassionate care for the survivor of a sexual 
assault while at the same time protecting nascent life resulting from either the attack or 
a preexisting pregnancy.  The medical evidence to date is inconclusive on the precise 
mechanism of emergency contraceptives (hereafter abbreviated EC).  Most agree that 
its primary action is to inhibit ovulation but disagree on its action when given during 
the preovulatory phase.  Some claim it can (or can only) act as an abortifacient by 
                                                 
23 Daniel O’Brien and John Paul Slosar, “An Issue of Moral Certitude,” Health Progress 
(September-October 2002):1. 
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making the lining of the uterus hostile to the conceptus.  If there are serious moral 
concerns that it will act as an abortifacient, then special care must be taken that it not 
be distributed during that phase of a woman’s menstrual cycle.  The ovulation method 
first tests for a preexisting pregnancy.  If the pregnancy test is positive, which could 
only indicate if a preexisting pregnancy was in place, then EC cannot be offered.  
However, if it is negative, then further tests are performed to determine the likelihood 
of a conception resulting from the sexual assault.  The woman is questioned about her 
menstrual cycle history, and then various tests are performed to see if she is in the pre-
ovulatory or ovulatory phase of her cycle.  These tests might include a urine dip-stick 
test to determine if she is in the luteinizing hormone surge, a blood test to determine 
her progesterone level or a ferning test to determine the ability for sperm to penetrate 
the cervical mucus.  A positive result on any of these would indicate that she is in the 
ovulatory phase of her cycle and emergency contraceptive cannot be administered.  
She may be given information where she can get this medication if it is refused at a 
Catholic hospital, although this practice can vary.  Some theologians argue against a 
referral, saying that to do so would violate the principle of legitimate cooperation.   
 The pregnancy method tests the woman to see if there is a preexisting 
pregnancy.  In addition, the woman is questioned about the history of her menstrual 
cycles.  If the pregnancy test is negative and the woman is not certain whether she is in 
the ovulatory phase of her cycle, then she may be offered emergency contraception.  
Clearly, the pregnancy method is more conducive to the operations of most emergency 
departments.  In fact, one of the lines of argument in favor of the ‘pregnancy method’ 
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reasons that to perform all of the required tests and to await the results may put the 
woman well past the 72-hour limit on the efficacy of the emergency contraceptive.  
This would fail the moral dictum of “ought implies can.”   
 However, one of the more recent articles in favor of the pregnancy approach 
avoids that argument, and instead, the authors, Hamel and Panicola, discuss five major 
concerns with the ovulation method.  Their first concern is that the ovulation method 
limits Directive 36 in that the directive does not say that EC cannot be administered to 
a woman in the ovulatory phase but rather discusses the condition of ascertaining that 
there is “no evidence that conception has already occurred,”24 then she can be given 
medications that would prevent “ovulation, sperm capacitation, or fertilization.”25  
Hamel and Panicola maintain that to forbid the distribution of EC during the ovulatory 
phase unnecessarily restricts the woman’s options.  However, it is difficult to deny that 
Church teaching never allows for abortion unless it is a case that fits into the principle 
of double effect, which this does not.  In this case, we are considering whether a drug 
regimen acts to suppress or delay ovulation (which is permissible) or whether it acts to 
prohibit implantation of a conceptus, thus having an abortifacient effect (which is not 
permissible); it is not the case that both effects will happen with one being intended 
and the other unintended.  If it was the case that we know that the drug will act as an 
abortifacient, we would certainly infer from Directive 36 that we were prohibited from 
using that regimen.  It appears that Hamel and Panicola misstep here.  However, they 
                                                 
24 At present there is no way to test for a conception from the recent attack.  The earliest a 
pregnancy can be detected is eleven days post-coital, by which time 72 hour post-coital 
window for the effective use of emergency contraceptive would have passed. 
25 Ethical and Religious Directives, quotes taken from Directive 36. 
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do include that when one considers fertilization as a process which unfolds over a 24-
hour period, and if the woman presents in the emergency department (ED) within that 
first 24 hours after the attack, then EC will act to prevent fertilization from ultimately 
occurring, which is permissible according to the directive.   
Their second concern is that the ovulation approach gives too much weight to 
ovulation in the moral decision-making procedure.  The indication of ovulation is only 
an indication that conception may occur, not that it has occurred.  And the degree of 
certainty to which this prediction can be made is morally significant.  Thirdly, they 
take on the argument that EC can (or can only) act as an abortifacient at ovulation by 
citing scientific studies indicating that the data are inconclusive on this point.  Daniel 
Sulmasy, in his response to their article, agrees with their overall position but 
disagrees with this line of argumentation saying, “I think they have overstated the case 
against the abortifacient effects of high-dose estrogen-progestin pills.  Unfortunately, 
there is ‘advocate science’ on both sides of this issue, and the sources they cite may 
well provide an example.”26  Their fourth concern, and perhaps the strongest argument 
against the ovulation method, is that it seeks a degree of certitude that is more in line 
with absolute certainty rather than with moral certainty (no reasonable fear of error).  
And finally, their fifth concern is that the ovulation method mischaracterizes the moral 
object of the act.  By assuming that EC can (or can only) act as an abortifacient at 
ovulation, one must reason that the object of the act is the destruction of a conceptus 
                                                 
26 Daniel Sulmasy, “A Reasonable, Realistic, and Ethical Proposal,” Health Progress  
(September-October 2002). Perhaps it is of note that Sulmasy is a member of a Catholic 
religious order, OFM, as well having the following degrees: M.D. and Ph.D. in philosophy. 
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and is therefore morally impermissible.  They do not believe the evidence supports 
this assumption. 
The degree of moral certainty to which they refer in their fourth area of 
concern is supported by what they call a “constellation of factors:” 1) the risk of 
pregnancy from sexual attack is small (less than 1 % to 5 %), 2) scientific literature 
indicates that EC most likely prevents ovulation and fertilization and has little, if any, 
post-fertilization effects, 3) the probable direct effect (moral object) is prevention of 
ovulation rather inhibiting implantation of a conceptus, 4) the intention in 
administering EC is to prevent ovulation and not inhibit implantation and 5) a 
proportionate reason exists for administering the EC, specifically, the prevention of 
pregnancy from the attack and the woman’s well-being in light of the severely 
traumatizing event she has survived.   
 The aforementioned moral discussions have taken place with the backdrop of 
very active forces in the state and federal legislative arenas (as discussed in Chapter 
Four) who have been working for laws which will mandate that EC be provided to all 
victims of sexual assault and in some cases lobbying for these medications to be 
available over-the-counter.  In an article published in 2000 in the American Journal of 
Public Health, wide variability in treatment standards for rape victims at 58 large 
urban hospitals (not all Catholic) was reported.  This, in part, prompted Catholics for a 
Free Choice (CFFC) to commission their own survey of the availability of EC at 
Catholic hospitals around the country.  They also found wide variability; not only are 
there different interpretations of the Directives throughout the country, but also 
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misunderstandings among coworkers (who are both Catholic and non-Catholic alike) 
at Catholic hospitals.  Arguably, this variability has worked against the Church’s 
mission in the poplar media.27  Shortly after their survey was completed, CFFC 
published a report, “Second Chance Denied: Emergency Contraception in Catholic 
Hospital Emergency Rooms.”  This report fueled the fires of those seeking remedy 
through legislation and, in turn, prompted the Catholic Health Association to 
commission their own survey of all Catholic hospital emergency departments.  This 
survey showed that Catholic hospitals are sensitive to the needs of women who have 
been sexually assaulted by having policies in place (similar to the ones discussed) 
whereby, even if the woman is not given EC because the provider believes to the best 
of his or her information that it will act as an abortifacient, the patient is referred to a 
facility where she can obtain EC.  Important to integrity in that instance is that the 
provider explain to the woman why EC cannot be given to her at a Catholic hospital.  
My educated guess is that this explanation in many cases is inadequate to the 
circumstances.  This leads to concerns of the integrity of the institution. 
 Clearly Catholic teaching attempts to be sensitive to the horrendous 
circumstances in which the female victim of sexual assault finds herself.  Whether the 
sexual assault policies of Catholic hospital emergency departments follow the 
ovulation method or the pregnancy method (both to be considered morally sound 
                                                 
27 Recall the citation in an earlier chapter where the debate on mergers and acquisitions and 
the resulting diminution of reproductive services found its way into the pages of Playboy 
magazine. 
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policies),28 there are other conditions that must be in place for the institution to 
operate with integrity.  For either of the methods, it must be clear to those who must 
implement the policy that the pregnancy test is to determine whether a preexisting 
pregnancy is present and is not testing for a pregnancy resulting from the recent 
sexual assault.  Secondly, it should clear to the providers the degree of certainty to 
which they are held in determining the estimated time of ovulation.  Each provider 
should understand the moral significance of this timing and have the chance to 
participate or not in the referral of the patient to another facility if necessary.  Thirdly, 
the lack of physiological certitude as to the action of EC should mitigate the 
prohibition of referral according to the principle of cooperation.  In this case, the 
provider should understand the distinction; if the individual still cannot participate in 
the referral, another coworker must be available to do such.  While these conditions 
might appear minimal in theory, in practice it is quite a different story.  In both of the 
aforementioned surveys, it was not just Catholic hospitals that had inconsistencies and 
misunderstandings among their coworkers.  The fact that Catholic moral reasoning 
must be understood and implemented by coworkers who may or may not have a 
disposition to personally accept the teaching makes this process all the more 
challenging.  This is merely a practical way that Catholic hospitals can find the moral 
middle ground in holding true to its principles and caring for women facing an 
extremely difficult situation.   
                                                 
28 Although if the demands of the policy in determining the certainty of ovulation exceed the 
capabilities of that facility to provide the services and if there is not another facility to which 
the patient can be referred, the policy is not morally sound in the it obligates the agent to do 
something that is not physically possible.   
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III. SURGICAL STERILIZATION 
 Often in the reproductive life of a woman there comes a time, when either for 
elective reasons or medical necessity, she opts for surgical sterilization.  In fact, one 
standard medical text says, “Surgical sterilization is the most popular form of 
contraception among couples of reproductive age,”29 while another says, “By 1990, 
tubal sterilization became the most common method of contraception among women 
in the U.S.”30  Despite this popular and seemingly commonplace practice, the Church 
proscribes most all surgical sterilizations.  Directive 53 of the ERDs states: 
Direct sterilization of either men or women, whether permanent or 
temporary, is not permitted in a Catholic health care institution.  
Procedures that induce sterility are permitted when their direct 
effect is the cure or alleviation of a present and serious pathology 
and a simpler treatment is not available.   
 
So what is a woman to do when her physician advises her that, should she become 
pregnant again, her life or health will be seriously jeopardized?  In the not so distant 
past, hysterectomies were more commonplace.  And while there were many medical 
indications to justify the medical necessity for a hysterectomy, there is evidence that 
hysterectomies were also performed for contraceptive purposes.  An obstetrics 
textbook published in 2002 states: 
Permanent sterilization combined with elimination of potential 
long-term risks for later uterine pathology were acceptable 
indications for cesarean hysterectomy in the 1950s and 1960s.  
Elective procedures were commonly performed for sterilization.  
                                                 
29 F. Gary Cunningham, et al., editors, “Sterilization,” Williams Obstetrics – 21st Edition, 
(New York: The McGraw-Hill Companies, Inc., 2001), Section XII – Family Planning:59.  
30 Dipika Dandade, MD, L. Russell Malinak, MD and James M. Eheeler, MD, MPH, 
“Therapeutic Gynecologic Procedures,” in Current Obstetric and Gynecologic Diagnosis & 
Treatment – 9th Edition.  Alan H. DeCherney, MD U Lauren Nathan, MD et al., editors. (New 
York: The McGraw-Hill Companies, Inc., 2003):chapter 45. 
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Justification for hysterectomy was based on an observed need for 
hysterectomy in 20 percent of patients within a mean interval of 6.3 years 
from the most recent cesarean delivery.  Several reports supported 
the safety of the planned/elective hysterectomy subset based on a 
low morbidity rate.  Despite the relative safety of this subset, the 
incidence of elective cesarean hysterectomy has fallen dramatically 
in recent years.  As other contraceptive options became available, 
authors such as Brenner et al. suggested that if hysterectomy is 
performed primarily for sterilization, the morbidity of a scheduled 
procedure will outweigh its benefits.31 
 
     A. Hysterectomies, the ‘Catholic Sterilization’ 
 
 This section will address the background of the Church’s prohibition of 
surgical sterilization for contraceptive purposes, a discussion of those cases which 
would meet the criteria of ‘indirect sterilization,’ as well as a discussion of the practice 
of performing hysterectomies on Catholic women (although they need not be Catholic) 
as a form of contraceptive sterilization and why this does not meet the demands of an 
integrity-preserving moral compromise.  
 To get an historical perspective of the Church’s position on sterilization, one 
must look to other than therapeutic sterilization.  Historically, court eunuchs were 
entrusted with protecting the king’s harem after being castrated.  In the Church, boys 
were castrated to maintain their prepubescent voices.  This was seemingly acceptable 
to the Church, even though the early Church condemned as heresy Origen’s self-
castration in order to control his desires.  St. Alphonsus Liguori, a Catholic moralist in 
the eighteenth century did not object to the mutilations of the castrati but did allow 
that the opinions of those who rejected it as morally wrong were “more probable.”  
The setting of the moral discussion of castration arose within the terms of the liceity of 
                                                 
31 Gabbe, Obstetrics – Normal and Problem Pregnancies, 4th edition, (Churchill Livingstone, 
Inc., 2002):589. 
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mutilation.  When discussing the morality of mutilation the principle of totality was 
invoked so that mutilations done for the sake of or the good of the whole were morally 
permissible.  And so it is curious that the mutilation of young men for the betterment 
of Church music was tolerated but becoming a eunuch for the Kingdom of God was 
not.  Additionally, there was never a prohibition of mutilation in the case where the 
castration (or mutilation) was punitive, i.e., a man convicted of a sexual offense.  The 
Church’s silence on the liceity of sterilization for medical indications is explained by 
the lack of scientific understanding of the human reproductive system.  It was not until 
“... 1834 that James Blundel suggested the sectioning of the fallopian tubes but it was 
only between 1880 and 1910 that successful techniques of tubal ligation were 
developed.”32  It is here that Boyle notes the shift in rationale for the proscription from 
the prohibition of mutilation to the prohibition of contraception.  But he also wants to 
give another layer to this background.  Boyle thinks it wrong to discount the historical 
context of the discussion of therapeutic sterilization. 
 At the beginning of the twentieth century when the techniques for vasectomies 
were being developed at the Indiana State Reformatory, it was clear that this location 
was not random.  The purpose behind these sterilizations was eugenic.  Shortly 
thereafter states began implementing laws that permitted the sterilization of the 
mentally retarded.  In Buck v. Bell, laws of this type were declared constitutional with 
the now infamous quote from U.S. Supreme Court Justice Holmes, “Three generations 
                                                 
32 John P. Boyle, “Church Teaching on Sterilization,” in Readings in Moral Theology No. 8 
eds. C.E. Curran and R. A. McCormick, SJ (New York: Paulist Press, 1993):177-200. 
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of imbeciles are enough.”33  One must allow that the Popes’ moral evaluations were 
taking place in a milieu that was inimical to human freedom.  At the same time, the 
population rates had declined precipitously, and so not only the Church, but many 
European nations, were prohibiting contraceptive practices (while several of these 
nations were at the same time employing eugenic practices).  Nations needed to 
repopulate, but they wanted to do so with so with ‘good stock.’ 
 In 1930, Pius XI issued Casti Conubii, which condemned strongly eugenic 
sterilization. In later years, other Popes’ encyclicals as well as Sacred Congregation 
for the Doctrine of the Faith extended this condemnation to contraceptive 
sterilizations, as well as eugenic sterilizations.  However, they continued to allow for 
punitive sterilizations. 
 Directive 53 does allow for indirect sterilizations: “Procedures that induce 
sterility are permitted when their direct effect is the cure or alleviation of a present and 
serious pathology and a simpler treatment is not available.”  This allows for a range of 
cases in which pathology is present in a reproductive organ and that organ must be 
excised.  One of the paradigmatic examples of this is the cancerous uterus; its surgical 
removal will remove the cancer as its intended effect, and its unintended result is that 
the woman will be sterile.  This use of the principle of double effect illustrates that the 
removal of the cancerous uterus is an indirect sterilization.  Other cases for which this 
would be an indirect sterilization include: cervical carcinoma, ovarian carcinoma, and 
certain fibroid tumors.  However, these lines are not always so clear cut. 
                                                 
33 Boyle, 180. 
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 Methods, medications and techniques for contraception improved greatly 
throughout the twentieth century.  To many Catholics’ chagrin this did not change the 
Church’s position on contraception; newer and more improved versions of the rhythm 
method were the only permissible methods for regulating births, or in certain dire 
cases, avoiding childbirth altogether – that is, unless your physician could justify a 
hysterectomy.  At the same time that surgical procedures to sterilize became safer, the 
morbidity and mortality associated with hysterectomies decreased.   During the 1950s, 
1960s and perhaps into the 1970s, the often referred to ‘Catholic Sterilization’ was the 
hysterectomy.  It was so-called because given the ‘right’ medical justification the 
surgery and subsequent sterility would morally be considered an indirect sterilization.   
 Most of the evidence for this is anecdotal, perhaps for the very reason that it 
was subversive of Church teaching.  The other factor that permitted this practice to 
continue reasonably unchecked was the method of reimbursement: physicians’ charges 
were not scrutinized in those decades they way they have been since the 1980s.  In an 
article on hysterectomies and autonomy published in 1988, Ellen Bernal cites evidence 
of unnecessary hysterectomies.  “Hysterectomies are sometimes performed 
unnecessarily for these reasons: small fibroids, first and second trimester abortions, 
sterilization, cervicitis, mild dysfunctional uterine bleeding, and pelvic congestion.”34  
In 1983 the Center for Disease Control was quoted as stating, “15 percent of all 
hysterectomies were questionable.”35  Another article on the variation of 
hysterectomies rates across Canada found that, in areas with higher rates of 
                                                 
34 Ellen Bernal, “Hysterectomy and Autonomy,” Theoretical Medicine 9 (1988):73-88. 
35 Bernal, 76. 
  
160
hysterectomies, there were also larger populations of French, Polish and Italian, all 
groups that are largely Catholic.   
 The following discussion from a 1970 article in The American Journal of 
Obstetrics and Gynecology is worth including despite its length: 
 During the past decade there has been a gradual increase in 
the number of sterilization procedures performed and a more 
liberal broadening for their indications.  Many factors have 
contributed to the above trend, but the increase in liberality has 
been strongly influenced by a socioeconomic awareness as well as 
by other external social and legal forces. 
This renaissance in cesarean hysterectomy as a safe and 
effective method of elective sterilization has been stimulated by the 
vast experience in the procedure by the obstetricians in New 
Orleans.  Religious restrictions on sterilization procedures from 
several groups in Louisiana may have caused a reluctance to do 
tubal ligations, and this has been a major factor in the number of 
cesarean hysterectomies performed within that locale.  Although 
analysis of Ward and Smith’s review of 254 elective 
hysterectomies at the time of cesarean section revealed a 20 
percent complication rate, it was concluded that this is the 
procedure of choice when both cesarean section and sterilization 
are required.  Their study has prompted members of their staff to 
consider the advisability of primary cesarean section with 
hysterectomy instead of vaginal delivery plus postpartum tubal 
sterilization or subsequent hysterectomy.   
 The advantages of cesarean hysterectomy include certainty of 
sterility, avoidance of future tubal pregnancies, and preclusion of 
subsequent uterine pathology.  Nevertheless it is a more difficult 
operative procedure than tubal ligation and carries with it added 
operative risks.36 
 
 There are several elements at work here that render this method of surgical 
sterilization unable to meet the demand of integrity-preserving moral compromise.  
First, one might question this on grounds of medical necessity.  In 1970, the practice 
                                                 
36 Paul Brenner, Sanford Sall and Bernard Sonnenblick, “Evaluaton of cesarean section 
hysterectomy as a sterilization procedure,” American Journal of Obstetrics and Gynecology 
vol. 108(3) (1970):338-339. 
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was being challenged on the medical appropriateness of elective hysterectomies at 
the time of cesarean delivery.  That study also hinted at the impropriety of this medical 
decision being influenced by socioeconomic factors as well as religious prohibitions of 
less invasive procedures.  However, on medical indications, it is clear that by the end 
of the twentieth century the tide had turned, with a clear medical preference for tubal 
ligations over cesarean hysterectomies as a form of surgical sterilization.   
 Secondly, from a moral perspective, it is unclear how complicit the patients 
were in this subversion of Church teaching.  Did the physicians paternalistically 
convince these patients that they medically needed the hysterectomies with the ulterior 
motive of sparing their patients any moral concern over their impending state of 
sterility?  Perhaps there were cases where the patients participated in this ‘wink, wink, 
nudge, nudge’ aspect of the consent process.   However, it deserves emphasizing that, 
although the hospital where the study from New Orleans took place was not a Catholic 
hospital, but rather Charity Hospital funded by the city, the population of New Orleans 
was predominantly Catholic, and to exacerbate the situation, the patients of Charity 
Hospital were largely poor and black, presenting the ‘trifecta’ for physicians with 
certain social leanings.  The deception of patients and the subversion of Church 
teaching preclude this practice from any degree of integrity. 
     B.   Tubal Ligations for Medical Indications 
In the previous section, we saw that surgical sterilization is the most popular 
form of contraception.  Sometimes a particular kind of surgical sterilization, a tubal 
ligation, is recommended by a physician for medical indications.  How this is handled 
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in a Catholic hospital is discussed in this section. To review, Directive 53 of the 
Ethical and Religious Directives states: 
Direct sterilization of either men or women, whether permanent or 
temporary, is not permitted in a Catholic health care institution.  
Procedures that induce sterility are permitted when their direct 
effect is the cure or alleviation of a present and serious pathology 
and a simpler treatment is not available.   
 
Footnoted at the end of directive 53 is an article from the Congregation of the Doctrine 
of the Faith (CDF), “Responses on Uterine Isolation and Related Matters,” in which 
three questions are posed on the moral liceity of surgical sterilization.  The second and 
third questions read as: 
Q.2. When the uterus (e.g. as a result of previous Caesarean 
sections) is in a state such that while not constituting in itself a 
present risk to the life or health of the woman, nevertheless is 
foreseeably incapable of carrying a future pregnancy to term 
without danger to the mother, danger which in some cases could be 
serious, is it licit to remove the uterus (hysterectomy) in order to 
prevent a possible future danger deriving from conception? 
 R. Negative. 
 Q.3. In the same situation as in No. 2, is it licit to substitute 
tubal ligation, also called uterine isolation, for the hysterectomy 
since the same end would be attained of averting the risks of a 
possible pregnancy by means of a procedure which is much 
simpler for the doctor and less serious for the woman, and since in 
addition, in some cases, the ensuing sterility might be reversible? 
 R. Negative.37 
 
While one can imagine several “present and serious pathologies” whose “cure or 
alleviation” would be addressed by a hysterectomy or oopherectomy, the same cannot 
be said of a tubal ligation.  One might imagine a case in which the fallopian tubes are 
cancerous – and to carry this out further – a case in which only the tubes and no other 
                                                 
37 Congregation for the Doctrine of the Faith, “Responses on Uterine Isolation and Related 
Matters,” Origins v. 24 (7/31/93):211-213. 
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organs are involved; however, physicians admit this would be extremely rare.38  
Taking into account both Directive 53 and the article from the CDF it is clear that 
there is very little latitude for making exceptions for tubal ligations.   
As discussed earlier in this chapter, Church teaching as regards surgical 
sterilization is based on the principle of totality, or as Ashley and O’Rourke would call 
it, the principle of totality and integrity.  Ashley and O’Rourke admit that, if this 
principle is conceived of as the principle of totality, then on proportionalist grounds 
there might be more justification for certain exceptions to the proscription of tubal 
ligations.  However, the addition of integrity to the principle brings to the whole the 
notion that one basic function cannot be sacrificed for another basic function, but 
rather to maintain integrity of the whole, a basic function may only be sacrifice to 
preserve the whole.  Accordingly, it is acceptable to remove a cancerous uterus to save 
the life of a woman; but it is not acceptable to remove a healthy uterus just because it 
would be better for her as a total person not to have anymore children.  Ashley and 
O’Rourke conclude that discussion, “It may indeed be better for her not to have 
another child, but she must solve this problem by changing her behavior, not by 
mutilating her body” (emphasis mine).39  This fails to account for the fact that it is not 
always within the woman’s control to avoid the possibility of getting pregnant.  I 
would claim that there are several ways to argue for a principled exception for 
medically necessary tubal ligations; but the purpose of this section is to discuss, in 
                                                 
38  An ectopic pregnancy that necessitates the removal of part of the fallopian tube might also 
be included in this scenario; however, usually only one tube is affected and would not 
necessarily render the woman sterile. 
39 Ashley & O’Rourke, 291. 
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light of the intransigent position of the Magisterium, an integrity-preserving moral 
compromise on these cases. 
To that end, I will suggest a range of cases and circumstances that leads to a 
woman’s decision to seek a tubal ligation, as well as what might count as mitigating 
circumstances for the Catholic health care facility to allow for exceptions.  The first 
type might be a woman who has either decided never to have a child or who is content 
with the number of children she presently has, the second type might be a woman who 
is currently pregnant without serious complications to her pregnancy but who feels 
fairly certain that she wants no more children after she is delivered of this current 
pregnancy.  We might add that other forms of contraception are contraindicated for 
her.  The third type of case is a pregnant woman, currently at high-risk for serious co-
morbidities or mortality for both herself and her fetus.  A future pregnancy will risk 
her life as well as the lives of future fetuses.   
In the first case, the woman, not being pregnant, is pursuing an interval tubal 
ligation that will most likely be done during a laparoscopy in an ambulatory surgical 
center.  This is an elective procedure, her life is not currently at risk, nor would future 
pregnancies seem to place her at any greater-than-normal risk for pregnancy.  This 
woman can easily obtain this procedure from another hospital or surgical center.  Even 
the fact that she is required to travel some distance to obtain these services does not 
place an obligation on the Catholic health care facility to provide these services 
provided that the patient has been informed of the reason why this cannot be done at 
the Catholic hospital.  This position acknowledges the claim that institutional integrity 
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can militate against an individual’s right to obtain services that run contrary to the 
values of the institution.  In this case, since the risk to the patient may be classified as 
an inconvenience the onus for finding and procuring these services may rightfully fall 
on the woman. 
In the second case, the currently pregnant woman is advised by her physician 
to have this procedure done puerperally, that is, shortly after the delivery of her baby, 
whether a vaginal or a Caesarean delivery.  Depending on the health of this woman, 
the obligations that the Catholic health care facility has to her might be measurable.   
Do the medical benefits of performing this procedure in the puerperal period outweigh 
the risks of this woman having this procedure done as an interval tubal ligation?  And 
if so, is this the only hospital within a reasonable distance at which she can deliver?  
An affirmative answer to these questions might indicate an obligation for the Catholic 
facility to assist this woman in getting services at another facility or provide them in 
their own facility.  It is exactly this type of case that led many OB/Gyn physician 
groups to threaten to pull their practices from admitting at the Catholic hospital if they 
were not permitted to perform tubal ligations, at the very least, on their patients for 
whom C-section deliveries were indicated or scheduled.  In these cases and in accord 
with the 1994 edition of the Directives, hospitals claimed duress and were permitted to 
have tubal ligations done at the time of C-section delivery at their facilities as justified 
under the principle of cooperation.  As discussed in Chapter 4, this use of duress on a 
systemic level came under severe criticism by many in the Church, so that by the 
annual meeting of the U.S. Conference of Catholic Bishops in 2001, this apparent 
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loophole was closed and the Directives reflected this change.  Now many Catholic 
facilities are finding it difficult to put the lid back on Pandora’s Box, especially as 
regards physicians’ behavior.  It should be reiterated that while it is imperative for the 
physicians to get informed consent, this is especially difficult when the physician, 
Catholic or non-Catholic alike, does not believe in nor follow this teaching of the 
Catholic Church.  The physician must often advocate for his or her patient while at the 
same time supporting the beliefs of the hospital which may run counter to the advice 
given to the patient.  In the areas where the OB/Gyns have been able to practice with 
latitude on those patients scheduled for C-section deliveries desiring a tubal ligation, it 
is not always their behavior that is required to change, but often times the hospital 
must devise a different special, financial, and legal relationship to a facility which can 
offer these services proscribed by the Directives.  One of these ‘arrangements’ is in 
Breckenridge, Colorado.  One floor of the hospital has been designated as a 
‘condominium hospital;’ it is financially and legally removed from the hospital but 
certainly not spatially removed.  The Vatican has indicated that this arrangement is 
minimally acceptable according to the Church and is in no way to be considered the 
model that other areas should emulate. 
The third type of case illustrates the most difficult position for the Catholic 
facility.  The patient’s physician has determined that her life will be at risk should she 
become pregnant in the future, notwithstanding the fact that her life is at risk with this 
current pregnancy.  Depending on the services offered by this Catholic hospital and 
the availability of the necessary services at an other-than-Catholic facility, the 
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Catholic facility’s obligations may increase.  To point, if this patient is under the care 
of a maternal-fetal medicine specialist at the Catholic facility, and that perinatologist 
group does not admit to another facility, the Catholic facility must determine the moral 
acceptability of requiring that woman to change physicians in the midst of a high-risk 
pregnancy.  Concomitant with that, if in conjunction with the maternal-fetal medicine 
services the hospital also offers a high-level neonatal intensive care unit (NICU), then 
the facility’s obligation to this patient is even higher.  How can a facility which 
knowingly provides the services which treat the most difficult of cases and 
furthermore, which actively seeks these types of cases, turn around and not provide a 
service that will prevent a future life-threatening situation?  Integrity demands that the 
facility reassess its need to offer those services or provide the medically necessary 
services that the patient requires.  Intransigent positions on the impermissibility of 
tubal ligations by the Catholic facility in this third type of case will lead to 
disintegration somewhere in the system.  This might manifest itself in several ways.  
One might be a blatant disregard of the rules by the perinatologists who might then 
rely on the ‘don’t ask, don’t tell’ approach.  But inevitably, someone finds out.  
Another disingenuous approach might be to exaggerate or manipulate the medical 
information so that the patients appear worse than they are in an attempt to game the 
system; this nurtures cynicism and deception.  Finally, it might lead to the 
perinatologists refusing to admit any patients to the Catholic hospital leaving the 
hospital without that population’s business; although I would maintain that this last 
step gets everyone closer to a position of integrity sans the moral compromise.       
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 But perhaps what is called for in this last example is that an individual or 
group within the hospital, perhaps the ethics committee, could function in a pastoral 
role.  Without denying the objective moral evil of the act; the intentions of the 
individual and the circumstances in which she finds herself can be examined.  These 
particulars would be considered in addition to the role the hospital has played in 
creating these circumstances, e.g., the hospital, in order to serve the common good, 
maintains a level III neonatal intensive care unit and has maternal fetal medicine 
specialists available to treat high risk pregnancies.  These intentions and circumstances 
could be weighed and ‘pastoral exceptions’ could be countenanced. 
 
IV. ABORTION 
     A.   Elective Abortion (Elective Termination of Pregnancy) 
 The elective termination of pregnancy of a healthy fetus borne by a healthy 
woman should not be permitted at a Catholic hospital.  This clearly violates the 
prohibition of direct killing and, as described, presents no mitigating circumstances to 
argue for any exceptions.  The purpose of this section is not to justify the Church’s 
position against abortion; rather, it is to show that when one compares the three types 
of cases we have discussed: contraception, sterilization and abortion, abortion is the 
most morally grave act along the continuum.  That being said, the following section 
will show that there are cases involving the early induced delivery of previable fetuses 
that may allow for exceptions to the prohibition against abortion.  There are two 
directives that specifically address the issue of abortion, numbers 45 and 47.   
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Directive 45.  Abortion (that is, the directly intended termination of 
pregnancy before viability or the directly intended destruction of a viable 
fetus) is never permitted.  Every procedure whose sole immediate 
effect is the termination of pregnancy before viability is an 
abortion, which, in its moral context, includes the interval between 
conception and implantation of the embryo.  Catholic health care 
institutions are not to provide abortion services, even based upon 
the principle of material cooperation.  In this context, Catholic 
health care institutions need to be concerned about the danger of 
scandal in any association with abortion providers. 
 
Possible criticisms of this approach might include the following: obligations owed to 
indigent patients who are receiving their care at a Catholic hospital, obligations to 
women who have no resources to go elsewhere, obligations to women whose life 
situations are not conducive to being parents right now, e.g., drug addicted, women 
with HIV/AIDS; and obligations to the children born to these woman.  Church 
teaching, as well as the practice at Catholic hospitals, is to minister to the women who 
find themselves in any of the aforementioned situations, as well as the children they 
bear, and they would do so without resorting to an abortion.  These same cases might 
call for an exception or compromise when discussing contraception or surgical 
sterilization, but not in the case for abortion where a life has already come into being. 
     B.   Induction of Labor on a Previable Fetus 
 In a normal, healthy pregnancy, the induction of labor of a previable fetus 
would be considered the direct killing of the innocent which would never be permitted 
according to Church teaching.  However, directive 47 allows that when a 
proportionately serious pathology exists for the mother, early induction can be 
countenanced: 
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Directive 47.  Operations, treatments, and medications that have as their 
direct purpose the cure of a proportionately serious pathological condition 
of a pregnant woman are permitted when they cannot be safely 
postponed until the unborn child is viable, even if they will result 
in the death of the unborn child. 
 
 In all of the following cases, the Principle of Double Effect can be utilized to 
determine whether the action that will bring about both a good effect and an evil effect 
is morally acceptable.  Briefly, the requirements for the moral permissibility of an act 
which allows both good and evil include: 1) the act itself must be morally good or at 
least morally neutral, 2) the good effect must be intended, the evil effect is foreseen 
but unintended, 3) the evil effect cannot be the means by which the good effect is 
achieved, and 4) the good that is achieved must be proportionate to the evil that is 
countenanced.40  In the following cases, the medical facts inform and often drive the 
moral decision to be made. 
 1.  Membrane Rupture 
 There are cases when a pregnant woman presents at the emergency department 
indicating that her ‘water has broken.’  This is a sign that her membrane has ruptured 
and the amniotic fluid has drained out.  In many cases, labor has begun, but often it is 
too early to deliver the fetus with any chance its survival.  One of the dangers here is 
that infection can ascend up the vaginal wall and in a very short period of time rage 
into a systemic infection that can kill the woman and fetus in a matter of hours.  The 
primary determination must be made as to any sign of infection.  Without any signs of 
infection, the woman can be placed on expectant management in order to give the 
                                                 
40 Some renderings of the principle of double effect, sometimes referred to as the doctrine of 
double effect, contain a fifth condition.  However, within Catholic literature it is usually stated 
with these four conditions. 
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fetus a better chance of survival outside the womb.  During this time the woman is 
given antibiotics, hospitalized or sent home on bed rest and monitored closely for 
signs of infection.   
 If upon presentation at the emergency department, the woman’s membrane has 
ruptured and there are signs of infection, then immediate action needs to be taken to 
remove the infection.  Usually signs of infection indicate chorioamniontis, an infection 
of the amniotic sac, is present.  To remove the infection, steps must be taken to 
remove the amniotic sac, unfortunately a foreseen but unintended effect is that the 
fetus will be removed along with the amniotic sac.  This case meets the criteria of the 
principle of double effect: 1) the removal of an infected amniotic sac is a morally good 
(or at least morally neutral) act, 2) saving the life of the mother is our intended effect, 
delivering a fetus which cannot survive outside the womb is a foreseen but unintended 
effect, 3) saving the life of the mother is not achieved by means of the fetus’ non-
survival – had the fetus been able to survive outside the womb, all the better, and 4) 
saving the life of the mother was proportionate to the unintended death of the fetus.  
Therefore, this instance of an early induction of labor and delivery of a previable fetus 
is not to be considered an abortion and is morally licit. 
 2.  Signs of Infection, Membrane Intact 
 In the case where the pregnant woman presents at the emergency department 
with fever and cramping with her membrane intact, steps must be taken to ascertain 
whether this is a case of chorioamnionitis.  If that is the case, then according to the 
reasoning in the case above, her physician would be justified in rupturing the 
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membrane and taking steps to remove the infection.  However, in the absence of 
chorioamnionitis or other clinical signs of infection, the physician is required to first 
consider if the infection can be treated in a less invasive way and the pregnancy 
maintained.   
 There might also be the case where a pregnant woman presents with an intact 
sac that is bulging through an incompetent cervix.  In many cases the physician is able 
to replace the sac into the uterus and perform a cerclage, which stitches together the 
incompetent cervix.  However, rupturing the amniotic sac is one of the risks of a 
cerclage, and so the risks and potential benefits of this procedure must be weighed.   
 In the case of an incompetent cervix and a patient who is not a candidate for a 
cerclage, care must be taken to assure that the decision not to perform the cerclage is 
not made on prejudicial grounds, e.g., if the woman has a history of drug abuse and 
the physician questions her fitness as a mother.  The decision not to attempt to save the 
fetus cannot be based on grounds that this fetus would be better off not being born.  
These decisions can be difficult for it may be easy for the physician to justify her 
actions by saying that labor has begun and cannot be stopped, and so in this case, she 
is merely assisting an inevitable process that has already begun.   
 3.  Preeclampsia 
Often a woman will present with preeclampsia: 
Preeclampsia is fundamentally a disease of the placenta.  Although 
the ultimate cause of preeclamsia is unknown, it is known that 
some agent produced by the placenta causes the hypertension and 
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end-organ destruction in the mother which is characteristic of this disease, 
usually of the vasculature or the kidneys.41 
 
The symptoms of preeclampsia can range from the mild (blood pressure at or above 
140/90, protein in the urine, swelling from fluid retention) to the severe (blood 
pressure at or above 160/110, protein in the urine, eye or brain disorders, bluish skin 
and fluid in the lungs).42   Symptoms of preeclampsia usually appear after the sixth 
month of pregnancy.  The most serious concern is that preeclampsia not develop into 
eclampsia, which is characterized by grand mal convulsions and coma.  This can lead 
to the deaths of the mother and the fetus.  As most cases of preeclampsia occur after 
six months, at which time the fetus is just at viability, it becomes a matter of balancing 
the risk to the mother while trying to give the fetus as much time in utero as possible 
to increase its chances of survival.  The more dire cases occur prior to viability when 
the death of the fetus outside the womb is certain.  Because preecplamsia is considered 
a disease of the placenta, in any case where the life of the mother hangs in the balance, 
the principle of double effect will apply.   
 One issue that has not been discussed thus far is the case where the mother 
freely chooses to risk her own life to save that of her fetus.  Care must be taken that 
she is making an informed decision.  If this is a last minute request made in the ‘heat 
of the moment,’ there may be concern that it is not a freely made decision which 
reflects her values and commitments to her other children and family.  However, there 
                                                 
41 T. Murphy Goodwin, M.D., “Medical and Ethical Considerations Regarding Early Induction 
of Labor,” Gospel of Life and the Vision of Health Care, ed. Russell E. Smith (Braintree, MA: 
Pope John Center, 1996):38. 
42The Mosby Medical Encyclopedia, Revised Edition (New York: Penguin Books USA Inc, 
1992). 
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may be cases where a woman feels thus and this disposition is well know to her 
family and physicians so that if the occasion arises, her wishes should be reflected.  It 
should be added, that should she change her mind in this latter case, she should be 
respected, for we can justifiably defer to the position that when life can be saved, it is 
acceptable to try.   
 4.  Anencephaly  
 The early induction of a fetus with a confirmed diagnosis of anencephaly is 
still a disputed question in Church teaching; recent discussions have moved from the 
acceptability of early induction to the advisability of waiting until full term, 
delivering, baptizing, and allowing the mother to hold her baby until he dies.  
 Anencephaly is a neural tube defect whereby the anterior end of the neural 
groove fails to close.  The neural groove would normally develop into the brain, but by 
remaining open the developing differentiating brain is exposed to amniotic fluid which 
causes it to degenerate and collapse.  The fetus is left with no cerebral hemispheres 
and it is believed that this leads to the failure of the cranial vault to form.  The fetus 
will never experience ‘upper brain’ functions (cognition, rationality, etc.), but its 
‘lower brain,’ the brain stem, that part which governs autonomic functions of the body 
such as respiration, wake/sleep cycles, assimilation and elimination of food will 
continue to function.  In most confirmed cases of anencephaly the neonate dies within 
twelve hours of birth.  It is suggested that those babies, who with intensive neonatal 
support, have lived longer than a couple of weeks are actually not anencephalic, but 
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rather suffer from microencephaly.  This points to the imperative of obtaining a 
confirmed diagnosis of anencephaly.  
 The moral question that arises in cases of confirmed anencephaly, given the 
above understanding of this condition which is incompatible with life, is what are our 
obligations to the anencephalic fetus as well as to the woman carrying this fetus?  
Perhaps the first response to this question is yet another question – why should our 
obligations be any different than those to a normal, healthy fetus?  From a medical 
perspective, there are differences: 
Labor and delivery of fetuses with anencephaly at term is 
excessively difficult because brow presentation and shoulder 
dystocia is likely to cause the baby to be stuck in the birth canal, 
and cause extreme trauma to the mother as well as a high risk of 
pre-eclampsia, hypertension, hemorrhage, and subsequent 
difficulties in pregnancy or delivery.43  
 
Because of these foreseen difficulties of labor, a cesarean section is indicated.  
However, the actual procedure of a C-section may kill the baby because of its lack of a 
cranial vault and the change in atmospheric pressure.  Psychologically, the differences 
are difficult to enumerate.  A process which, under normal circumstances with normal 
expectations, is physically and emotionally challenging to almost any woman is now 
experienced knowing that the fetus she carries has a condition which is incompatible 
with life.  One can only guess that the feelings of futility in this situation are 
overwhelming.  Armed with this information, induction prior to full term is indicated, 
but at what point?   
                                                 
43 Norman M. Ford, S.D.B., “Early Induction of Anencephalic Infant,” Ethics and Medics 
(June 2003):1. 
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 It has been suggested that this pregnancy is morally different from a normal 
pregnancy because we lack certain obligations to non-persons than we do to persons.  
An anencepahlic fetus will never be able to fulfill the purpose of a human (to know, 
love and serve God and to know and love self and others), whereas a normal fetus has 
that potential.  Because life’s purpose can never be realized in an anencephalic, why 
must its continued existence be supported, especially in light of the psychological 
distress this must place on the potential parents?  First, Church teaching would not 
permit the fetus to be designated as a non-person.  This fetus, being conceived of a 
human man and woman, is a human being worthy of the respect and dignity owed all 
human life.  As such, any induction of labor prior to viability absent a proportionately 
serious risk to the mother (which would then render it an indirect killing) would be the 
direct killing of a human, which is proscribed. 
 In the case of the anencephalic fetus, two questions arise in relation to this 
proscription.  First, we can challenge the use of the term ‘viability’ for a fetus having a 
condition that is incompatible with life.  When considering the sense of viability as 
‘ability to survive outside the womb’ then the anencephalic fetus will never be 
viable.44  That might lead one to conclude that either the fetus may then be induced at 
the moment the diagnosis of anencephaly is confirmed or that since it is never viable 
then it must be carried to term.  Secondly, direct killing of the innocent is always 
proscribed.  Under normal circumstances in a healthy pregnancy, any delivery of a 
                                                 
44 Some will maintain that any length of survival outside of the womb contradicts this 
statement; however, one must also take into account the confirmed diagnosis of anencephaly, a 
physiological state that is incompatible with continued life outside of the womb.  Surely, the 
hours or days that the parents might have with this infant can be meaningful in many ways; it 
does not negate the medical facts of the case. 
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previable fetus is considered a direct killing.  Since it cannot exist outside the healthy 
womb, then intentionally removing the fetus with no proportionate reason is a direct 
killing.  However, by the medical facts of the condition of anencephaly, any delivery 
at any time during gestation will result in the imminent death of the fetus, so we must 
question if any delivery is a direct killing.  Surely this cannot be.  So might we return 
to the options of induction that extend from the moment the diagnosis of anencephaly 
is confirmed to delivery at full term?  Neither of these extremes seems morally 
acceptable.  We have already determined that we are justified to deliver prior to full 
term because of the risks to the mother.  Because ‘viability’ and ‘direct killing’ do not 
apply with the same cogency in the case of anencephaly, we must determine what 
values or principles will guide us.  At the very least, we should treat the anencephalic 
fetus with the respect shown to any human life, which would argue against induction 
prior to the stage of viability of a healthy fetus.  Viability is generally accepted as 23 
weeks gestation.  However, a fetus delivered at 23 weeks without a lethal abnormality 
would receive intensive support in a neonatal intensive care unit (NICU), care that 
would be medically inappropriate for a neonate with anencephaly.  A fetus at 23 
weeks gestation would never be induced without a proportionately grave reason.  Here 
we must decide whether the psychological harm that will come to the mother to 
continue what she and many others will consider as a futile pregnancy outweighs any 
continued obligations to the fetus.   
 Psychological harm has never been justified as a proportionately grave reason 
to take the life of another.  But it is impossible to assess the effects of such to women 
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in this situation in a sweeping generalization. Care and compassion require that 
assistance is provided to the woman who finds herself in this situation.  Absent 
physical harm to the mother, labor should not be induced prior to 23 weeks for the 
above stated reasons.  However, after 23 weeks it should depend on the needs of the 
mother.  A sufficient interval should be required after the confirmed diagnosis of 
anencephaly so the woman may be offered counseling and assistance to come to terms 
with the diagnosis and the effects this will have on her and her family.  If the diagnosis 
is made prior to 23 weeks gestation, she would be required to wait until that time.  If 
the diagnosis is made after 23 weeks, she should be required to wait at least one week, 
during which time she should be provided with counseling and support.  Some women 
will choose to carry their baby to term, at which point her physician will then have the 
responsibility to inform her of the risks to both herself and the fetus attendant with 
each additional week that passes after 37 weeks.  Other women may not be able to 
deal with carrying the fetus much past viability, as long as adequate counseling has 
been made available and it is the case that she is making as free and as informed a 
decision as possible, she should be supported in this decision.  Likewise, the 
consciences of health care professionals involved in these cases should be respected.  
There will be those who cannot countenance the intentional delivery of a baby prior to 
term without a serious threat to the life or physical health of the mother as well as 
those who see no moral issue here past what the mother is choosing.  From Church 
teaching, it might be considered the heroic act for a mother to care for her 
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anencephalic fetus in utero until the pregnancy presents significant harm to her, but it 
should not be obligatory.  Catholic hospital policy should reflect this. 
 
V. CONCLUSION 
 Moral conflict is an unavoidable part of our lives. Many of these conflicts 
involve those areas that are integral to who we are and how we go about living a good 
life.  Some times conflicts with other parties are seemingly intractable.  Intractable 
moral conflicts often push our moral belief systems to their limit; especially if our 
moral systems apply principles or values in what might be considered an absolutist 
manner.  This dissertation has explored ways that these intractable conflicts might be 
resolved with integrity.   
 Catholic health care faces difficult challenges in today’s secular society.  
Operating according to a religious belief system places limitations on the services they 
will provide, and yet they serve communities which do not necessarily share those 
values.  There are ways that these conflicts can be handled with integrity; there are 
even circumstances that should permit compromise on the part of the Catholic facility.  
However, Catholic hospitals should be able to continue to operate according to their 
beliefs.  This work has discussed ways in which Catholic hospitals do cooperate with 
their communities and ways in which they are able to ‘compromise.’  The larger 
question which will confront us more boldly in the coming decade is how do we find 
room for religion in the public square?  Events of the first few years of the 21st century 
have aptly illustrated the dangers of religious fanaticism.  And yet, democratic ideals 
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allow for the presence of religion in the public square while at the same time 
protecting the public square from being destroyed.  I believe the issues that have been 
discussed in this work will be integral to continuing the other conversation. 
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